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Figure 1: Basal Ganglia Anatomy…………………………………………….39 
Legend: 
A: Rodent Basal Ganglia. The main input nuclei are the Striatum and the Subthalamic 
Nucleus (STN), which receive input from the thalamus, cortex, amygdala and 
hippocampus. The main output nuclei are the substrantia nigra, and the globus pallidus. 
Red arrows are excitatory connections while blue arrows denote inhibitory connections. 
(Redgrave, Scholarpedia, 2007). 
B: Original Box and Arrow diagram from Albin et al. (1989). The direct pathway 
promotes behavior through D1 containing neurons in the striatum, and the indirect 
pathway suppresses behavior through D2-containing neurons (Redgrave, Scholarpedia, 
2007). 
C: The updated, more complicated organization of the Direct and Indirect pathways 
(Redgrave, Scholarpedia, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 2: Reinforcement Learning and the Basal Ganglia…………………….40 
Legend: 
A: The topographical arrangement of cortical and thalamic inputs to the striatum show a 
distribution of dorsomedial to ventrolateral zones. Frontal cortical areas and their 
corresponding striatal projection zones are shown in the same colors. Abbreviations are 
listed in the Abbreviation section (Voorn et al., Trends in Neuroscience, 2004) 
B: The proposed dorsal/ventral divide of the actor/critic framework, with further 
subdivision based on model-free and model-based Reinforcement Learning. Model-Free 
is shown in dark grey, and Model-Based is shown in light grey (Bornstein and Daw, 
Current opinion in neurobiology, 2011). 
C: Demonstration of model-based and model-free reinforcement learning. In Model-
Based computation, a mental map is used that has been learned through prior experience. 
This forward model utilizes on online search process to predict probabilities of upcoming 
reward, based on the available action options. In contrast, Model-Free action selection is 
based on learning the long-run values of specific actions, without having to build a map 




Figure 3: Internal State Task and Behavior……………………………………52 
Legend: 
A: Behavioral task outline. Each trial begins with a tone that indicates what reward the rat 
is working for (food, water or free choice). The rat pokes his nose in the lit center nose 
poke and then moves to an adjacent (lit) nose poke before moving to the opposite wall to 
retrieve a reward. The food and water ports are physically separated so the rat has to enter 
the correct reward port prior to receiving reward on forced choice trials, but can enter 
either port to receive the reward on free choice trials.  
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B: Motivational Manipulations. An example sequence of the motivational manipulations 
used to test internal state. This pattern was randomized for each rat. 
C: Forced Choice Behavior follows internal state. On Forced Choice trials, the rats are 
instructed which reward to work for, and the rat only receives reward if he enters the 
correct goal port. Preferred and non-preferred refers to the relative value of the reward 
based on internal state (food when hungry, water when thirsty), shown as a combination 
of food and water restricted days together. Behavior is also shown broken down on Water 
Restricted and Food Restricted days. Individual rat behavior is plotted as the solid black 
lines.  
D: Free Choice Behavior follows internal state. Similar to figure (E) except that these 
show the choices the rat made when allowed to choose either food or water port on Free 
Choice Trials. A separate tone played indicating a Free Choice trial, and the rat received 
the reward from whichever goal port he entered first- there was no incorrect choice.  
E: Histology Nissl staining sample images. Example tetrode placements in the OFC (1), 
NAC (2), DMS (3) and DLS (4). Full histology figures are in figure 6. 
F: Regression Triangle, All Factors: Task-related Neural Integration. Each of the 3 main 
factors from the 3-factor regression analysis are shown with the interaction terms on the 
Regression Triangle.  
 
 
Figure 4: Behavioral Metrics  …………………………………………………….58 
Legend: 
A: Behavioral times on food restricted days for Forced Choice trials, using only correct 
trials. Initiation time is the time from when the tone plays until the rat pokes his nose in 
the first center nose poke. Movement time refers to the time it takes the rat to move from 
the center nose poke to the side nose poke. Reward retrieval time is the time it takes from 
when the rat leaves the last lit nose poke to enter the reward port. Food and water trials 
are plotted for all of the rats. Only correct trials were included in the reaction time 
analysis. Median times for food trials are listed in red, while median times for water trials 
are listed in blue. P-value for food vs. water trials are listed below the median times (t-
test). Most behavioral times follow internal state, where times are faster for the preferred 
reward. Since correct trials are shown, the Cue and Choice are the same. 
B: Behavioral times on water restricted days. Behavior and analysis is the same as in A. 
C: Behavioral times on Food Restricted days for all trials, including incorrect trials. 
Analysis is the same as figures A and B except that behavioral metrics are shown for the 
trial that was Cued, regardless of if the rat was correct or not. 
D: Behavioral times on Water Restricted days for all trials, including incorrect trials. The 
analysis is the same as in C.  
E: Free Choice on Food Restricted days. The same analysis is used as in A, except that 
only Free Choice trials were analyzed. 
F: Free Choice on Water Restricted days. The same analysis is used as in A, except that 
only Free Choice trials were analyzed. 
 
 




A: Forced choice trial behavior on sated and restricted days. Individual rats are shown in 
black lines. 
B: Free choice trial behavior on sated and restricted days. Individual rats are shown in 
black lines. 
C: All behavioral times for Forced choice trials, using only the correct trials on sated and 
restricted days. Same behavior and analysis as Figure 4. 
D: All behavioral times on Free choice trials on Sated and Restricted days. Same 
behavior and analysis as Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 6: Location of all cells………………………………….…...........................60 
Legend: 
The recording locations from each day, from each rat are plotted on the relevant brain 
atlases, listed by their AP coordinate taken from Bregma. Colored dots correspond to the 
brain region schematic used throughout the figures.  
 
 
Figure 7: Action Encoding……………………………………………….……..…65 
Legend: 
A: Action Only Cells. Universal encoding of Action in all 5 brain regions. From the 3-
factor regression (see formula, methods), the proportion of cells that reached significance 
for only the Action factor are plotted 6 seconds around each of the behavioral events, 
utilizing all trials (correct and incorrect). The filled circles represent when a region 
reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top 
indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms 
steps. 
B: Regression Triangle, Factor: Action Only.  
C: Action Firing Rate Index. From the cells that reached significance in A, the trial type 
that had the highest firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Proportions are 
subtracted from one another to create the index: Contralateral – Ipsilateral. The solid dots 
and represents when a region, as a whole, reaches significance for one index (binomial 
test, p<0.05), while the solid bars across the top indicated when 2 adjacent bins reach 
significance. This shows a contralateral bias in DMS, OFC, Core and Shell, with no 
directional bias in the DLS. 
D: Bar graph of the Action Firing Rate Index taken at 400ms from nose center out.  
 
 
Figure 8: Sated and Restricted Days Only………………………………..…….66 
Legend: 
A-F: The 3-factor regression analysis for factors Action, Goal and Cue are plotted on 
days when the rat was either sated for both rewards, or equally restricted for both 
rewards. The analysis is similar to that done in figures 7-10, with similar Identity Indexes 
also plotted for the firing rates. The filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
A: Action Only 
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B: Cue Only 
C: Action+Goal+Interaction 
D: Goal Only 
E: Current Outcome Only 
F: Goal + Cue + Current Outcome 
 
 
Figure 9: Cue Encoding………………………………………………….……..71  
Legend: 
A: Cue Only Cells. From the 3-factor regression, the proportion of cells that reached 
significance for only the Cue factor are plotted 6 seconds around each of the behavioral 
events, utilizing all trials (correct and incorrect).. The filled circles represent when a 
region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across 
the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 300ms, sliding in 
100ms steps. Cue encoding only in DLS and Shell show striatal specialization.  
B: Regression Triangle, Factor: Cue Only. 
C: Cue Identity Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the highest 
firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Proportions are subtracted from one another 
to create the index: Water – Food. The filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 300ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
Inset shows the proportion of cells 100ms after the tone for Water (top) and Food 
(bottom, no cells). Firing rate bias is for Identity in the Shell.  
D: Cue Value Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the highest 
firing rate is plotted as an index across time, but trials are identified by preference, so 
food on food restricted days and water on water restricted days. Proportions are 
subtracted from one another to create the index: Preferred – NonPreferred. The filled 
circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Inset 
shows the proportion of cells 100ms after the tone for Preferred (top) and Non-preferred 
(bottom). There is no firing rate bias for Value in any brain region.  
 
 
Figure 10: Cue Only on Previously Incorrect or Correct Trials………….……..72 
Legend: 
A: Cue for Previously Incorrect Trials: The 3-factor regression for Action, Goal and Cue 
is shown for the Cue only factor, using trials that had previously been incorrect. In this 
behavioral task, when a trial is incorrect, it is repeated on the next trial. The filled circles 
represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin 
width of 300ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
B: Cue for Previously Correct Trials. The cells that reached significance for Cue Only in 
the 3-factor regression for Action, Goal and Cue is shown using trials that had previously 
been correct. Since in this behavioral task, an incorrect trial is repeated, this means that 
previously correct trials are unique, and have a new tone presented. Response to the Cue 
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happens on ‘unique’ trials, when there is no information known to the rat, prior to the 
tone playing. 
 
Figure 11: Action Goal Cells in the Dorsal Medial Striatum………………………..76 
Legend: 
A: Action + Goal + Interaction cells. From the 3-factor regression, the proportion of cells 
that reached significance for the main effect of Action, Goal and the interaction term 
between the two are plotted 6 seconds around each of the behavioral events, utilizing all 
trials (correct and incorrect). The filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
Striatal specialization is seen in the DMS for Action + Goal encoding. 
B: An example cell from figure A is shown. This cell fires most for the food-contralateral 
trials on a water-restricted day (non-preferred). The top is the raster plot, and the bottom 
panel is the peri-event time histogram. The black bar represents when the cell reached 
significance for Action + Goal + Interaction. 
C: The mean z-score firing rate from cells that reached significance at 700ms after Nose 
Side In from A, only in the DMS, are plotted based on the goal choice as preferred vs. 
non-preferred, on ipsilateral vs. contralateral actions. This shows that the firing rate in 
these cells was highest on contralateral movements to the non-preferred goal port.  
D: The cells that were plotted in B are broken down by trial type, as correct vs. incorrect 
for the preferred vs. non-preferred reward. A majority of cells had the highest firing rate 
for the non-preferred correct goal port. 
E: Action + Cue + Interaction (action-cue). From the 3-factor regression, this 
demonstrates that no brain regions reached significance for the main effect of Action, 
Cue and the interaction term between the two. 
F: Action + Current Outcome (goal-cue). From the 3-factor regression, this demonstrates 
that no brain regions reached significance for the main effect of Action, while 




Figure 12: Goal Only Cells…………………………………………………………..81 
Legend: 
A: Goal Only Cells. From the 3-factor regression, the proportion of cells that reached 
significance for only the Goal factor are plotted across behavioral events. The filled 
circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin 
width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. The inset triangle shows the Goal factor on the 
Regression Triangle. Universal encoding for the port the rat enters is seen prior to entry 
in all 5 brain regions. 
B: Value Firing Rate Index. From the cells in 9A, the trial type that had the highest firing 
rate is plotted as an index across time, but trials are identified by preference, so food on 
food restricted days and water on water restricted days (Preferred – NonPreferred). The 
filled circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while 
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the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. 
Inset shows the area under the curve of the line plotted in B, from -1 to 1s after reward 
port in. There is no firing rate bias in any brain region for the Value of the port that is 
entered. 
C: Identity Firing Rate Index. Same as B except that each cells is plotted for Identity, so 
the index is Water – Food. The inset shows the area under the curve from -1 to 1s after 
reward port in. There is a bias in all 5 brain regions for the port the rat enters, based on 
goal identity. 
D: Example cells from each of the 5 brain regions on a Food Restricted day. Black bar 
indicates when the cell reached significance for encoding the Goal factor. The top plots 
are the raster plots while the bottom plots are the peri-event time histograms 
E: Example cells from each of the 5 brain regions on a Water Restricted day. Black bar 
indicates when the cell reached significance for encoding the Goal factor. 
 
 
Figure 13: Reward Integration Cells After Reward Port In…………………...…… 85 
A: Current Outcome Only cells. From the 3-factor regression, these are cells that reached 
significance for the interaction between Goal and Cue only, plotted 6 seconds 
surrounding reward port in. The filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
Universal coding of the Outcome is seen in all 5 brain regions, with the Core reaching the 
highest proportion of cells.  
B: Outcome Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the highest 
firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Trials are identified by Outcome, (Correct - 
Incorrect). The solid dots and corresponding bar represents when a region, as a whole, 
reaches significance for one index (binomial test, p<0.05). Inset shows the area under the 
curve of the line plotted in B, from 0 to 1s after reward port in. The DLS is the only 
region to show a bias for the correct outcome- all other brain regions are biased for the 
incorrect outcome. 
C: Reward Integration Cells. From the 3-factor regression, these are cells that reached 
significance for the main effect of Goal, the main effect of Cue and the interaction 
between Goal and Cue, plotted 6 seconds surrounding reward port in. The filled circles 
represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin 
width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
D: Outcome and Value Firing Rate Index. From the cells in C, the trial type that had the 
highest firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Trials are identified by Outcome for 
the dashed lines, (Correct - Incorrect), and Value for the solid lines, represented as 
Preferred – Non-preferred. The solid dots represents when a region, as a whole, reaches 
significance for one index (binomial test, p<0.05). The solid bars on the top half of the 
plot correspond to significance on the Outcome Index, with a corresponding inset 
showing the area under the curve for this index from 0-1s after reward port in. The solid 
bars on the bottom half of the graph show significance for the Value index, with the inset 





Figure 14: Reward History …………………………………….………..….…89 
Legend: 
A: Previous Outcome Only cells. From a new 3-factor regression examining Previous 
Outcome, Goal and Cue, these are cells that reached significance for the factor Previous 
Outcome Only, plotted 6 seconds around each of the behavioral events. The filled circles 
represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin 
width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. All 5 brain regions significantly encode whether 
or not the previous trial was rewarded, prior to the tone playing in the current trial. 
B: Previous Outcome Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the 
highest firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Trials are identified by whether or 
not the previous outcome was correct (Previous Correct - Previous Incorrect). The filled 
circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Inset 
shows the area under the curve of the line plotted in B, from -3 to 1s before Tone. 
C: Previous Outcome Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the 
highest firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Trials are identified by whether or 
not the previous outcome was correct (Previous Correct - Previous Incorrect). The filled 
circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Inset 
shows the area under the curve of the line plotted in B, from -3 to 1s before reward port 
in. 




Figure 15: Dorsal Lateral Striatum…………………………………………….94 
Legend: 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the DLS, in 6 second time windows surrounding the 
relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are 
shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, 
p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach 
significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the DLS is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during 
the events Nose Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 
seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
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D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 
3 different time points around Reward Port In (Goal: -0.5 to 0.5 seconds; Outcome: 0.5 to 
1.5 seconds; Integration: 1.5 to 2.5 seconds). 
 
 
Figure 16: Dorsal Medial Striatum……………………………………………..95 
Legend: 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the DMS, in 6 second time windows surrounding the 
relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are 
shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, 
p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach 
significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the DMS is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during 
the events Nose Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 
seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 
3 different time points around Reward Port In (Goal: -0.5 to 0.5 seconds; Outcome: 0.5 to 
1.5 seconds; Integration: 1.5 to 2.5 seconds). 
 
 
Figure 17: Nucleus Accumbens Core…………………………………………...96 
Legend: 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the Core, in 6 second time windows surrounding the 
relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are 
shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, 
p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach 
significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the Core is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during 
the events Nose Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 
seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
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D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 
3 different time points around Reward Port In (Goal: -0.5 to 0.5 seconds; Outcome: 0.5 to 
1.5 seconds; Integration: 1.5 to 2.5 seconds). 
 
 
Figure 18: Nucleus Accumbens Shell……………………………………………97 
Legend: 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the Shell, in 6 second time windows surrounding the 
relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are 
shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, 
p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach 
significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the Shell is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during 
the events Nose Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 
seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 
3 different time points around Reward Port In (Goal: -0.5 to 0.5 seconds; Outcome: 0.5 to 
1.5 seconds; Integration: 1.5 to 2.5 seconds). 
 
 
Figure 19: Orbitofrontal Cortex………………………………………………..98 
Legend: 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the OFC, in 6 second time windows surrounding the 
relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are 
shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, 
p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach 
significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the OFC is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during 
the events Nose Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 
seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
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D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 
3 different time points around Reward Port In (Goal: -0.5 to 0.5 seconds; Outcome: 0.5 to 
1.5 seconds; Integration: 1.5 to 2.5 seconds). 
 
 
Figure 20: Dorsal Lateral Striatum……………………………………………..99 
Legend: 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted 
for all of the relevant factors for the cells in just the DLS, in 6 second time windows 
surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach 
significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the DLS is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent 
across all behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome 
encoding during the events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port 
In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
 
 
Figure 21: Dorsal Medial Striatum……………………………………………..100 
Legend: 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted 
for all of the relevant factors for the cells in just the DMS, in 6 second time windows 
surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach 
significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the DMS is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent 
across all behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome 
encoding during the events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port 
In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
 
 




A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted 
for all of the relevant factors for the cells in just the Core, in 6 second time windows 
surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach 
significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the Core is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent 
across all behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome 
encoding during the events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port 
In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
 
 
Figure 23: Nucleus Accumbens Shell…………………………………………..102 
Legend: 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted 
for all of the relevant factors for the cells in just the Shell, in 6 second time windows 
surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach 
significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the Shell is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent 
across all behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome 
encoding during the events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port 
In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
 
 
Figure 24: Orbitofrontal Cortex………………………………………………..103 
Legend: 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted 
for all of the relevant factors for the cells in just the OFC, in 6 second time windows 
surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach 
significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region reached 
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significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the OFC is plotted 
individually. When a cell reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression 
factors, a colored line is used to indicate the time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of 
significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different regression factors are 
visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the amount 
of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent 
across all behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome 
encoding during the events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port 
In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds for Outcome).  
 
Figure 25: Overall Encoding…………………………………………………183 
Each region of the Basal Ganglia and OFC has a specialized contribution to translating 










ac, anterior commissure;  
ACd, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex;  
AId, dorsal agranular insular cortex;  
AIv, ventral agranular insular cortex;  
CeM, central medial thalamic nucleus;  
CL, central lateral thalamic nucleus;  
DA, dopamine; 
D1, dopamine D1 containing receptor; 
D2, dopamine D2 containing receptor; 
DS dorsal striatum;  
DLS, Dorsal Lateral Striatum; 
DMS, Dorsal Medial Striatum; 
FSI, fast spiking interneuron; 
GPe, external globus pallidus; 
GPi, internal globus pallidus; 
IL, infralimbic cortex;  
IMD, intermediodorsal thalamic nucleus;  
MD, mediodorsal thalamic nucleus;  
MSN, medium spiny neuron; 
NAc, Nucleus Accumbens; 
OFC, Orbitofrontal Cortex; 
PC, paracentral thalamic nucleus;  
PFC, prefrontal cortex;  
PLd, dorsal prelimbic cortex;  
PLv, ventral prelimbic cortex;  




RPE, reward-prediction error; 
SMC, sensorimotor cortex. 
SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta;  
SNr, substantia nigra pars reticulata;  
STN, subthalamic nucleus; 






Parallel cortical-striatal loop circuits participate in distinct forms of decision-
making that make use of different representations. To investigate how these circuits 
process information that translates internal state into action selection, we designed a 
behavioral task that uses hunger and thirst to manipulate motivational states. Rats had to 
follow an instructed cue guiding them to either food or water reward on a majority of 
trials, and were only rewarded if they chose correctly. On 25% of trials the rats were 
allowed to freely choose the reward in order to test how internal state affects choice 
behavior. Behavioral performance on the task demonstrates that internal state accurately 
guides decisions on both free choice and instructed choice trials.  
To investigate how the cortical-striatal loop circuits process information in this 
unique behavioral task, we compared single-neuron activity across multiple striatal 
subregions, together with orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), to tease apart coding of overt 
movements, expected goals, and internal motivational states. Recordings were made from 
7 rats, in 2,345 cells. Overall, neural activity evolved in a remarkably similar way across 
all recorded areas, with each region showing significant encoding of movement direction, 
expected goal, reward outcome and reward history.  
Within each striatal subregion we also found neurons encoding a unique 
combination of task elements. Neurons responsive to the combination of movement 
direction and current goal were found selectively in dorsomedial striatum (DMS), thought 
to be important for action-outcome associations. Tone response was found exclusively in 
the dorsolateral striatum (DLS) and nucleus accumbens shell. All recorded areas 
responded in anticipation of the upcoming goal choice, while no regions directly 
represented the correct cue, prior to receiving reward. Only the dorsomedial striatum 
showed changes in firing rate due to internal motivational state, while all other brain 
regions specialized in reward-identity coding. Additionally, although each region 
significantly encoded Action, Goal, Outcome and Reward History, the relative 
contribution made by each region varied, demonstrating each regions unique 
specialization.  
These results indicate that parallel cortical-striatal circuits share a common 







Chapter 1: Internal State and the Cortico-Basal Ganglia Circuitry 
 
When hungry, how does the brain know to go to the cupboard and get a bag of 
Oreos, rather than head to the fridge and pour a glass of milk? Internal motivational states 
dictate what appropriate actions to take when standing in the kitchen, deciding between 
the fridge and the cupboard. How the neural correlates of translating hunger and thirst 
into action-selection are still unclear. 
Flexible decision-making uses both external sensory information and internal 
motivational drives (or states) to influence the choices that an animal makes. External 
cues may guide reward selection, but internal properties, such as hunger and thirst, are 
salient motivational factors in a natural environment. How does the brain encode these 
internal states that then drive motivated actions? Neuroscientists have been studying 
rewarded behavior for decades, but most studies rely on externally driven motivational 
manipulations, such as reward probability or reward magnitude. The cortico-basal ganglia 
circuitry plays a crucial role in integrating information about reward predictions with 
planning external movements used to obtain rewards. This study uses behavior and 
electrophysiology to examine and compare the neural encoding of internal states in this 
circuitry, specifically, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the dorsal striatum (DS) and the 
ventral striatum (VS).  
Dissociating the role of external vs. internal information lends insight into various 
diseases, such as eating disorders, depression, OCD and obesity. The same circuit 
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implicated in reward and actions are implicated in these disorders. A common feature in 
all is that some feature of internal state is misrepresented, causing actions that are 
inflexible and harmful. The underlying brain structures involved show that irregular brain 
activity may underlie these disorders. OCD patients show abnormal metabolic activity in 
the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate/caudal medial prefrontal cortex, and the 
caudate nucleus (Graybiel, 2000). Studies done examining anorexia nervosa have found 
abnormalities in distinct behavioral tasks and neural circuitry involved in motivation 
(Zastrow et al., 2009). Human literature also suggests that the underlying 
pathophysiology of both Depression and OCD center on the prefrontal-basal ganglia 
system, including the orbitofrontal cortex and both dorsal and ventral striatum (Haber and 
Brucker, 2009; Drevets, 2000).  
Studies examining obesity in humans found that the consumption of palatable 
foods involves an increase in activation in the right lateral OFC, frontal operculum and 
insula, indicating that in humans, the OFC is responsible for encoding subjective reward 
value related to food consumption (O'Doherty et al., 2002). Studies that took into account 
intrinsic physiological states found that, in contrast to controls, obese women had 
selective activation in the dorsal striatum, lateral orbitofrontal cortex as well as other 
frontal cortical regions (Rothemund et al., 2007). It is clear that the basal ganglia and 
orbitofrontal cortex are involved in internal motivation, decision-making, actions, 
predicting reward value, and are sensitive to food-related cues. Patients that show a 
deficit in monitoring and controlling their internal state show a concurrent change in 
activation in the cortico-basal ganglia circuitry.  
  The field of decision-making is a wide field of research, and theories explaining 
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animal behavior come from areas such as behavioral economics, machine learning and 
classical psychology. Although the behavioral task used in this study does not fall neatly 
into any one specific category, it is important to discuss the relevant research related to 
instrumental learning such as goal-directed behavior and stimulus-response behavior, as 
well as the role of classical conditioning through Pavlovian association, since all of these 
aspects of behavior are crucial to any decision-making discussion.  
 
Pavlovian Conditioning  
  One form of learning and decision-making is Classical Conditioning. In this form 
of learning, an animal learns the relationship between a stimulus and the outcome, so that 
the paired stimuli can then come to release an action (Niv et al., 2006). Unconditioned 
responses (UR) are evolutionary responses such as salivating, freezing, approach or 
fleeing. An animal can learn to associate previously neutral stimuli (such as a tone or a 
light) with a rewarding event (such as food). The neutral stimulus is initially not capable 
of eliciting a UR- there is no natural response for a rat when it hears a non-threatening 
tone, or sees a flashing light. Through repeated pairings of the neutral stimulus with a 
reward, the previously neutral stimulus then becomes a conditioned stimulus (CS). It does 
so by evoking the conditioned response (CR) that was appropriate to the reward. The 
important aspect of Pavlovian conditioning is that the animal can learn this association 
without his behavior actually being the cause of receiving the reward. The conditioned 
response develops because of an association that forms between a representation of the 
CS and the US. The connections between the ventral striatum and amygdala are critical 
for Pavlovian Behavior (Cardinal et al., 2002a).  
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  In rodents, one way to measure Pavlovian associations is through Pavlovian 
conditioned approach, which is measured by approach to a light or lever that predicts a 
reward (sign tracking), or approach to a goal port where food is delivered (goal tracking) 
(Flagel et al., 2011). Another way Pavlovian associations can be indirectly measured is 
by their effect on instrumental behavior. In this procedure, a rodent learns the Pavlovian 
association between a light and the delivery of a sucrose pellet. It is then presented with a 
lever that, after pressing it, delivers a sucrose reward (an instrumental response). When 
presented with the light at the same time as the lever, the rat will enhance responding on 
that lever, due to the motivating effect of Pavlovian instrumental transfer (Lovibond, 
1983; Estes, 1948; Cardinal et al., 2002a). The stimulus learned through Pavlovian 
associations adds to the instrumental effect of lever responding. 
 
Instrumental Learning 
  Instrumental learning involves forming a relationship between an animal’s action 
and the reinforcing outcome.  Repeated delivery of a reward serves to strengthen the 
association between an environmental stimuli and a particular response. The key 
difference between the Pavlovian system and instrumental system is that in instrumental 
conditioning, the agent learns to select specific actions that will increase the probability 
of reward (Skinner 1938; Thorndike 1911), while Pavlovian conditioning does not 
require a direct action to receive reward. An instrumental response can be any type of 
movement or action, and is not necessarily an evolutionarily specific behavior related to 
the reward association. On the other hand, Pavlovian associations evoke reward-specific 
responses that are evolutionarily specific.  
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  A series of studies utilizing instrumental learning procedures with various tests on 
the nature of goal representation have determined that instrumental decision-making is 
driven by either a goal-directed or a stimulus-response mechanisms (Balleine and 
Dickinson, 1998; Balleine et al., 2009). The main procedure used to test how a behavior 
is being represented is called ‘Outcome Devaluation’. In the first phase of training, an 
animal learns that a certain action leads to a reward. The value of the reward is then 
reduced, either by pairing the reward with feeling sick, or feeding the reward to satiety. 
The animal is then tested in the previous behavioral paradigm without giving any reward. 
If the animal reduces responding to the previously rewarded action, then the behavior is 
thought of as goal directed. If the animal continues to respond in the same manner before 
devaluing the reward, then the behavior is thought to be habitual, because then his actions 
are not being driven by the specific goal, since that goal is no longer desired or 
consumed.  
  In order to understand how these different aspects of behavior and decision-
making are represented in the brain, and translated into action selection, it is important to 
understand the neurophysiology of one circuit involved in reward and action selection: 
the Basal Ganglia.   
 
 
Basal Ganglia Circuitry 
The basal ganglia work together with the cortex to orchestrate and execute 
planned movements by integrating aspects of goal-directed behavior that include 
elements of motivation, emotion and cognition (Mink, 1996; Balleine et al., 2007). The 
	  
6	  
general term ‘basal ganglia’ (BG) includes the striatum, the globus pallidus (external- 
GPe and internal -GPi) the ventral pallidum (VP) the substantia nigra (pars compacta, 
SNc and pars reticulata, SNr) the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the subthalmic 
nucleus (STN). The striatum is the largest part of the basal ganglia, and is the primary 
input nucleus, receiving excitatory inputs from the thalamus and cortex (Figure 1A). The 
STN is the other major input structure, and receives connections from the cortex and 
thalamus.  The major output nuclei are the SNr and GPi, which receive input from the 
striatum, STN and GP, and project to the thalamus and back to the cortex as well as other 
brainstem nuclei (Figure 1A) (Mink, 1996; Haber, 2003; Grillner et al., 2005).  
The striatum can be broadly divided into 3 main components: the dorsolateral 
(DLS), dorsomedial (DMS) and ventral striatum (VS) (Figure 2B) (Joel and Weiner, 
2000; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). Divisions in the dorsal striatum are delineated mainly by 
the extent of cortical inputs, with the DLS receiving primary motor and somatosensory 
cortical inputs, and the DMS receiving inputs from the association cortices (Stanton et al., 
1988).  
The ventral striatum includes the nucleus accumbens (NAc), and generally 
constitutes the remaining area of the striatum. The two subregions of the NAc are the 
Core and Shell (Zaborszky et al., 1985; Heimer et al., 1991; Groenewegen et al., 1999). 
The Core is a dense region of cells surrounding the anterior commissure. Staining for 
acetylcholinesterase (AChE) and calbindin show clear delineation between the core and 
shell, with light staining in the core for AChE and dark staining in the shell, while the 
opposite pattern is true for calbindin staining (Zaborszky et al., 1985; Zahm and Brog, 
1992; Jongen-Relo et al., 1994; Groenewegen et al., 1999).  
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 The majority of the striatum is comprised of medium spiny neurons (MSNs) and 
are the projections neurons of the striatum (Tepper and Bolam, 2004; Matamales et al., 
2009). These are GABA-containing neurons that are often quiet, due to their intrinsic 
membrane properties (Wilson and Bowman, 2004). Activation often requires strong input 
from the cortex and/or thalamus. When activated, their activity acts to reduce the 
tonically active downstream targets, and through specific activation of different 
pathways, the striatum allows action selection through disinhibition (Deniau and 
Chevalier, 1985; Mink, 1996).  
 Other striatal neurons include GABAergic interneurons that co-express 
parvalbumin and are called ‘fast-spiking interneurons’ (FSIs) (Kawaguchi, 1993), 
(Kawaguchi, 1995). These fast spiking interneurons act to inhibit local microcircuits and 
provide more precise control over action selection, by suppressing unwanted actions 
(Kita et al., 1990), (Parthasarathy and Graybiel, 1997), (Gage et al., 2010). Interneurons 
compromise around 5% of the striatal neurons, but have broad reaching effects.  FSIs 
form an inhibitory microcircuit in the striatum (Parthasarathy and Graybiel, 1997), 
(Mallet et al., 2005). FSIs receive glutamatergic input from cortical pyramidal neurons, 
and in some estimations, it is thought that a single FSI inhibits between 135-541 MSNs 
(Koós and Tepper, 1999), in both direct and indirect pathways (Kita, 1993; Bennett and 
Bolam, 1994; ;Gittis et al., 2010; Gittis et al., 2011; Planert et al., 2010). Additional local 
inhibitory circuits arise from lateral projections of MSNs onto other MSNs, and although 
this connectivity may be weak and sparse (Kawaguchi et al., 1989; Koos et al., 2004; 
Jaeger et al., 1994; Taverna et al., 2008) the sum total inhibitory network could form 




Direct vs. Indirect Pathways: 
 There are two main pathways, through which information flows through the basal 
ganglia, which have opposite effects on their target neurons (Figure 1B) (Albin et al., 
1989; DeLong, 1990). The ‘direct’ pathway has a disinhibitory effect on targets, acting to 
promote motor output, while the ‘indirect’ pathway increases inhibition on target 
neurons, suppressing action (Chevalier and Deniau, 1990; Mink, 1996). The direct 
pathway is thought to contain mostly D1 type receptor neurons that co-localize with the 
neuropeptides substance P and dynorphin. These receptors subtypes are preferentially 
located on MSNs that project to the SNr and GPi through monosynaptic connections (the 
so called striatonigral pathway). The indirect pathway is thought to contain mostly D2 
receptor neurons and contain enkephalin as well as adenosine A2A receptors.  The 
indirect pathway has a multisynaptic route that synapses on the GPe and STN before 
reaching the SNr and GPi (the so called striatopallidal pathway) (Figure 1C) (Surmeier et 
al., 1996).  
Using EGFP to tag either D1-like or D2-like receptor promoters on transgenic 
mice, Bertran-Gonzalez (Bertran-Gonzalez et al., 2008) was able to show that only 5% of 
the MSNs in the dorsal striatum express both dopamine receptor subtypes, demonstrating 
a distinct segregation of these two pathways.  Additionally, new techniques in tract 
tracing show conclusively that sensory cortical and limbic structures preferentially 
innervate the direct pathway, while motor cortex preferentially target the indirect 
pathway (Wall et al., 2013). The thalamostriatal input, dopamine input and other specific 
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cortical layer input targets both pathways, while the amygdala shows stronger innervation 
onto the direct pathway. 
The classic model of basal ganglia function proposed that the direct and indirect 
pathways opposed each other, but more recent studies demonstrate activation of both 
pathways during a contraversive movement (Cui et al., 2013). Additional proof of 
principle between activation of the direct and indirect pathways in initiating and 
inhibiting movement was most recently shown using optogenetics to evoke or inhibit a 
locomotor response in mice (Kravitz et al., 2010; Kravitz et al., 2012; Tai et al., 2012). 
Other theories for the direct and indirect pathway propose separate roles in reward related 
action selection. The direct pathway may facilitate previously rewarded actions, while the 
indirect pathway may act to suppress previously unrewarded actions (Bromberg-Martin et 
al., 2010; Frank et al., 2004; Kravitz et al., 2012).  
Additional distinctions between the direct and indirect pathway can be seen in 
their differential response to dopamine, due to differences in dopamine receptor affinities. 
Different levels of dopamine affect the relative excitability of the two different pathways. 
The D1-direct pathway is more excitable with a high dopamine level concentration, 
leading to increased D1-excitation. The D2-indirect pathway is more excitable during low 
levels of dopamine concentration, due to the fact that the normal suppression of neuronal 
excitability is now reduced (Albin et al., 1989; Surmeier et al., 2010).  
 
Dorsal Striatum 
The Striatum, in general, is the largest component of the basal ganglia circuitry, 
and in addition to the STN, is the only input nuclei in the basal ganglia. The Dorsal 
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Striatum receives excitatory glutamatergic inputs from almost the entire cerebral cortex, 
including motor, sensory, association and limbic areas. Additional inputs come from the 
limbic system and thalamus, as well as dopaminergic inputs from the midbrain (Sesack et 
al., 2003). The thalamic inputs come from the midline and intralaminar nuclei. The main 
outputs of the basal ganglia are the substantia nigra and the globus pallidus, which then 
project to the thalamus (and then on to the cortex) and to pre-motor areas of the brain 
stem (Groenewegen, 2003; Redgrave et al., 1999).  The predominant class of neuron is 
the medium spiny neuron (MSN), which receives and integrates most of the inputs from 
the cerebral cortex and thalamus. These MSNs contain the inhibitory neurotransmitter 
GABA and project to the pallidum and substantia nigra (Gerfen and Wilson, 1996). 
The dorsal striatum can be divided into two subregions based on functional 
connectivity and behavioral studies (Figure 2A). The dorsal medial striatum (DMS) 
receives input from the associative areas of the prefrontal cortex while the dorsal lateral 
striatum (DLS) receives inputs from the sensorimotor cortex (Alexander et al., 1986), 
(Groenewegen et al., 1990). Balleine and colleagues have demonstrated from a series of 
studies that the dorsal medial striatum (DMS) is involved in  goal-directed behavior, 
while the dorsal lateral striatum (DLS) is important for habitual behavior (Yin et al., 
2008a; Balleine et al., 2009). The specific behavioral roles of DMS and DLS will be 
discussed in upcoming sections. 
Differences between the DMS and DLS can also be seen through their differential 
expression of specific types of learning. Within the striatum, D1 and D2 pathways differ 
in their expression of synaptic plasticity through long term depression (LTD) or long 
term potentiation (LTP). LTP can be induced by the activation of D1-like dopamine 
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receptors and NMDA glutamate receptors (Partridge et al., 2000; Kerr and Wickens, 
2001). Blockade of NMDA receptors in the DMS prevents learning action-outcome 
contingencies (Yin et al., 2005b). LTP is usually found in the DMS. In contrast, the DLS 
usually displays LTD, which requires the activation of D2-like dopamine receptors, 
group I metabotropic glutamate receptors and L-type calcium channels (Gerderman 
2002). The separation of D1 and D2 containing neurons, paired with their differential 




Inputs: The dorsal striatum and both regions of the ventral striatum share common 
inputs from the neocortex, thalamus and dopaminergic cells in the brainstem. The nucleus 
accumbens receives inputs from the hippocampus and amygdala (Kelley and Domesick, 
1982; Groenewegen et al., 1987). The entorhinal cortex, both medial and lateral, send 
projections to the medial and lateral divisions of both core and shell (Totterdell and 
Meredith, 1997). Within the prefrontal cortex, the strongest inputs to core and shell (as 
well as to the dorsal striatum) are from the medial prefrontal cortex, which include the 
prelimbic area, medial orbital area and infralimbic area (Ding et al., 2001). The 
infralimbic area only projects to the medial shell. Projections from the dorsal and ventral 
agranular insula project to the caudo-lateral and rostro-lateral core and shell (Hoover and 





 The connectivity and morphology of the Core is very similar to the dorsomedial 
striatum (Humphries and Prescott, 2010). The Core contains two populations of MSNs 
that express D1 or D2 receptors (Lu et al., 1998), whose main targets are restricted to 
nuclei within the basal ganglia. The overlap between D1 and D2 containing MSNs within 
the same neuron remains low, like the dorsal striatum, at 6% (Bertran-Gonzalez et al., 
2008). Projections from the core target subdivisions of the SNr (Deniau et al., 1996; 
Deniau et al., 1994), and are primarily formed by D1-dominant MSNs (Zhou et al., 2003; 
Lu et al., 1998). Additionally, the core projects to the dorsolateral ventral pallidum 
(Heimer et al., 1991; Maurice et al., 1997), which then projects to the medial STN then 
on to the dorsomedial SNr, which is the target of the direct projections from the core. The 
projections from core to the VP consist of all the MSNs with D2 receptors (Lu et al., 
1998; Zhou et al., 2003), however there is also a sub-population of D1 MSNs that also 
project to the VP. This dorsolateral VP projects back to the core (Hakan et al., 1992; 
Groenewegen et al., 1993). 
 
Shell Connectivity 
 The shell distinguishes itself by having projections to structures outside of the 
basal ganglia. Within the shell, the dorsomedial area projects directly to regions of the 
lateral hypothalamus (LH) and lateral pre-optic area. The ventromedial shell projects to 
the adjacent areas of those same structures, as well as to the parabrachial nucleus, the 
periacqueductal grey and adjacent areas (Mogenson et al., 1983; Zahm and Brog, 1992), 
(Usuda et al., 1998). The lateral shell projections stay within the basal ganglia (Usuda et 
al., 1998). Additionally, the Shell has a higher proportion of MSNs that express both D1-
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like and D2-like receptors (17%), compared to Core (6%) (Bertran-Gonzalez et al., 
2008). 
Like the core, the D1 and D2 containing MSNs have distinct projections. The D1 
MSNs send a dense projection to the VTA (Lu et al., 1998; Zhou et al., 2003), while the 
lateral shell has reciprocal connections with the lateral VTA, and projects to the SNc (like 
the core). The medial shell has reciprocal connections with the medial VTA and projects 
to lateral VTA as well (Zhou et al., 2003; Ikemoto, 2007). The shell also projects to the 
ventral pallidum, maintaining a medial-lateral divide within shell to similar divisions in 
VP (Ikemoto, 2007).  
  
Connectivity through the basal ganglia 
Studies tracing the afferents from cortex to striatum suggest there may be five 
corticostriatal loops (Alexander et al., 1986).  The main function of each of these loops is 
determined by the specific cortical input it receives. Each loop acts on a focused part of 
striatum, and causes inhibition to the corresponding output nuclei of the basal ganglia, in 
either the GPi or the SNr. This causes disinhibition of the thalamus and its corresponding 
projection back to the cortex (Chevalier and Deniau, 1990). A ‘spiral’ of successive 
projections from striatal regions to dopamine cells that then project to adjacent striatal 
regions is proposed to follow a shell-core-DMS-DLS sequence (Maurin et al., 1999; 
Haber et al., 2000). 
Importantly, Joel and Weiner proposed a modification to the idea of parallel 
loops. Rather than strictly closed loops, they argued that there is interaction among 
different loops due to interconnections within channels (Joel and Weiner, 1997, 2000b) 
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(Joel and Weiner, 1994; Haber et al., 2000). Due to the interaction between the loops, it 
has been suggested that there is a functional hierarchy of striatal and cortical circuits 
(Redgrave et al., 1999). In addition, Haber proposed that connections between cortical 
areas that project to the striatal regions parallel the spiral, so that the shell projections to 
the cortex provide more feedforward inputs than the feedback inputs from the core 
projecting cortical region. These cortical projections also tend to innervate more than just 
their specific section of striatum, and instead extend to part of the adjacent striatal region, 
giving rise to the more integrative loop structure (Haber, 2003).  
Connectivity throughout the cortex and basal ganglia determines the type of 
information that is transmitted. The sensorimotor loop refers to the connections between 
the DLS, the premotor cortex and the primary motor cortex. The main role of this loop is 
the selection of actions based on sensory and motor information, and is also implicated in 
the acquisition and expression of habitual behavior (Alexander et al., 1986; Yin and 
Knowlton, 2006; Packard and Knowlton, 2002; Featherstone and McDonald, 2004b). The 
associative loop refers to the connections between the DMS and the parietal cortex, the 
PFC and the frontal eye field (Cheatwood et al., 2003; Alexander et al., 1986). The main 
role of the associative loop is for orientation, attention and working memory, and has 
been implicated in learning and storing information relating actions to outcomes (Yin et 
al., 2005a; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). 
 
Role of the basal ganglia circuit in behavior: 
Nucleus Accumbens:  
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 In general, manipulations to the NAc cause a change in spontaneous locomotion 
(Pennartz et al., 1994). In the core, blocking NMDA receptors leads to spatial deficits, 
such as not learning a path to rewards (Kelley, 1999), learning spatial sequences (Bauter 
et al., 2003) or finding platforms in a Morris water maze (Sargolini et al., 2003). Lesions 
between hippocampus and NAC lead to deficits in constructing paths, or forming new 
paths (Whishaw et al., 1995; Gorny et al., 2002).  
Lesions of the shell do not produce spatial task deficits (Kelley et al., 2005; 
Kelley, 1999). Instead, Kelley and colleagues implicate the shell in free-feeding behavior, 
as well as approach behavior (Kelley et al., 2005), most likely through connections with 
the lateral hypothalamus (Kelley, 1999). Infusion of an AMPA receptor antagonist, or a 
GABA receptor agonist into the Shell stimulates feeding behavior (Kelley and Swanson, 
1997; Basso and Kelley, 1999; Stratford and Kelley, 1997). Kelley also demonstrated that 
blockade of the Core impairs acquisition of a lever response task for food, but not on 
performance (Kelley and Swanson, 1997). This may have been due to a motivational 
deficit, which is supported by studies from Salamone, who show that dopamine depletion 
of the NAC causes rats to stop performing when more effort is required (Aberman and 
Salamone, 1999).  
An alternative theory to the ventral striatum’s role in goal-directed instrumental 
behavior is that it is only necessary for tasks that have long intervals between stimuli. 
Studies seeking to parse this out have shown that when animals are given the choice 
between a smaller reward given now, versus a larger reward after a delay, rats with 
lesions to the accumbens core make impulsive choices, and do not choose the larger, 
delayed reward (Cardinal et al., 2001). It has also been shown that in primates, the neural 
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activity in the VS across a delay does represent the expectation of reward (Schultz et al., 
2000). Additionally, single unit studies in rats have shown that firing rates in the current 
trial are greatly affected by reward history (Kim et al., 2007), (Goldstein et al., 2012). 
Recording studies in the NAc Core have found firing in anticipation of a variety 
of task related events, including cues that predict reward as well as reward receipt 
(Carelli and Deadwyler, 1994; Nicola et al., 2004a; Taha et al., 2007; Ito and Doya, 2009; 
Kim et al., 2009; Kimchi and Laubach, 2009b; van der Meer and Redish, 2009b; 
Goldstein et al., 2012). Since some of these studies have also shown neural firing patterns 
that anticipate the value of an outcome by firing more for the preferred reward, it is 
thought that the ventral striatum may help aid animals in making a decision by computing 
the relative value of a potential action. This role is further supported by the fact that few 
studies find neural firing in the NAC related to an upcoming choice prior to action 
selection, indicating that its role is in either computing value, or updating value after a 
choice is made and the outcome is revealed (Ito and Doya, 2009; Kim et al., 2009; 
Kimchi and Laubach, 2009b).  
Evidence from Balleine and Killcross demonstrate that the accumbens is not 
required for goal directed behavior. Findings from lesion studies show that damage to the 
NAC does not affect sensitivity to reinforcer values (Balleine and Killcross, 1994). When 
they lesioned the NAC, they found that rats were still sensitive to changes in contingency, 
and that rats were still sensitive to the value of the outcome (Balleine and Killcross, 1994; 
Corbit et al., 2001).  
The NAC has a role in motivational behavior. Cues that are associated with 
reward elicit attention and approach behavior from the rat, and are crucial to appetitive 
	  
17	  
and consummatory behavior. Damage to the NAC core during the acquisition or 
performance of Pavlovian tasks demonstrates its role for the ongoing maintenance of this 
behavior (Parkinson et al., 2000; Cardinal et al., 2002a). Another aspect of motivation 
can be measured as vigor, and studies that lesion the NAC core show a reduced rate of 
responding and abolishes the effect of Pavlovian instrumental transfer (Balleine and 
Killcross, 1994; Corbit and Balleine, 2011). 
Another hypothesis for the role of the ventral striatum in task responding is the 
flexible approach hypothesis (Nicola, 2010). In this series of experiments, dopamine was 
depleted in the NAC core. The rat’s main deficit was a reduction in operant responding, 
but this was due to the fact that animals had a harder time generating an approach 
behavior. Once the animals engaged in the start of the task, their performance was 
normal. The deficit was in beginning the task, especially if it required a flexible (ie, not 
stereotyped) behavior (Nicola, 2010). Single unit studies have found evidence that 
neurons encode information about this flexible approach behavior (McGinty et al., 2013).  
The role of the Nucleus Accumbens Shell in decision-making is less known, 
although in some studies it appears to have overlap with the Core. Lesions to the Shell 
impairs specific responses in PIT (Corbit et al., 2001; Corbit and Balleine, 2011), while 
injection of amphetamine leads to an increase in response to levers associated with food 
(Parkinson et al., 1999). Somewhat confusingly, lesions of the Shell do not disrupt 
Pavlovian conditioning to aversive cues, and do not impair appetitive Pavlovian approach 
behavior (Parkinson et al., 2000; Parkinson et al., 1999). Dopamine release has been 
show in the Shell when exposed to unconditioned stimuli (or primary reinforcers) that are 
unexpected (Ito et al., 2000; Bassareo and Di Chiara, 1999). However, conditioned 
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stimuli do not elevate dopamine levels in the Shell, but do instead elevate these levels in 
the Core (Ito et al., 2000; Bassareo and Di Chiara, 1999; Wilkinson et al., 1998;  Roitman 
et al., 2004; Day et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2010; Cacciapaglia et al., 2012; Cacciapaglia et 
al., 2011).  
 
Dorsal Striatum: 
Rats with lesions to the Dorsal Lateral Striatum (DLS) are impaired in simple 
discrimination tasks using different cues and responses (Packard et al., 1989; Reading et 
al., 1991; McDonald and White, 1993; McDonald and Hong, 2004). Tasks that require 
the acquisition of a stimulus-response association, such as pressing a lever or pulling a 
chain when a specific cue (such as a light) comes on in order to receive a reward are 
disrupted by lesions of the DLS- both in the acquisition and performance of the task 
(Featherstone and McDonald, 2004b).  
Additionally, it is thought that stimulus-response representations are both encoded 
and potentially stored in the DLS. When rats were taught to lever press for a food reward 
(sucrose), and then tested in a devaluation procedure, where the sucrose was paired with 
feeling sick, normal rats and rats with DLS lesions both showed a reduced response to 
sucrose. However, when rats with DLS lesions were then tested in an instrumental task, 
where lever press used to be paired with reward (but this is done in extinction, so no 
reward is present), they reduce responding to the lever when normal rats continue to press 
the lever. In this scenario, it is proposed that the normal rats are responding to the lever in 
a habitual manner, and are using the DLS, while the DLS-lesioned rats have not acquired 
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a the stimulus-response (SR) association, and are instead using the DMS, which retains 
sensitivity to reinforcer devaluation (Yin et al., 2006; Yin et al., 2004). 
Reports from the primate literature have found single unit examples of cue-
responsive neurons in the DLS (Apicella et al., 1992; Vicente et al., 2012; Yamada et al., 
2004; Hori et al., 2009).  From the hypothesis that the DLS encodes information related 
to stimulus-response, it would make sense to find single-unit firing of the cue, or 
stimulus, in the DLS. This prediction has not held up in many rodent single unit studies, 
showing very little, if any, cue-specific firing in the rodent DLS (Gage et al., 2010; Berke 
et al., 2009; Thorn et al., 2010).  
 The Dorsal Medial Striatum (DMS) has a broad role in a range of behaviors. 
There have been neural correlates of direction, location and movement selectivity in the 
DMS (Wiener, 1993; Kim et al., 2009; Mizumori et al., 2009). However, the role of the 
DMS goes beyond just spatial navigation, and includes a role in behavioral flexibility 
(Ragozzino et al., 2002), and includes encoding stimuli and actions in tasks that go 
beyond allocentric encoding (Ito and Doya, 2009; Kimchi and Laubach, 2009b).  
 In instrumental learning tasks, the DMS is thought to play a role in response-
outcome learning. When testing rats on a lever press task for food reward, increased 
training renders the behavior more habitual, and less susceptible to reinforcer devaluation 
procedures. If the DMS is lesioned, the rat no longer forms response-outcome 
associations, which is the hallmark of flexible, goal-directed behavior (Yin and 
Knowlton, 2004; Yin et al., 2005a; Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Daw et al., 2005).  
 
Reinforcement Learning and the Basal Ganglia 
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Reinforcement Learning is a computational approach to understand how learning 
different types of action associations maximizes the overall accumulation of rewards (or 
appetitive outcomes) (Sutton and Barto 1998). Using terms from reinforcement learning 
theory, an individual (‘agent’) can represent the world as a set of states, of which the 
agent can take one of a set of potential actions. A state (or state space) is something like a 
location in a maze, or the presence or absence of a stimulus in an operant box (Dayan and 
Niv, 2008). An action in a specific state leads to the next state, as well as a possible 
reward (Sutton ad Barto 1998).   
 
Actor-Critic learning 
  One approach to understanding the break down of striatal components of action 
selection that comes from Reinforcement Learning theory is called ‘Actor-Critic’ 
learning. In seeking to maximize rewards and minimize punishment, the agent has to 
learn from experience. To do so, the agent relies on a reward prediction error (RPE) that 
comes from the difference of the expected outcome of a choice vs. the actual outcome. In 
the actor-critic view of decision-making, there is a component that learns the stimulus-
action policies (actor), while another area learns to predict rewards (critic) (Barto, 1995). 
Evidence from rodent lesion studies demonstrates a role for the dorsal striatum as actor 
and ventral striatum as the critic (Packard and Knowlton, 2002; Cardinal et al., 2002a). 
Corresponding human imaging studies add to these results (O'Doherty et al., 2004; 
Tricomi et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2009). Signals from the dopaminergic neurons in the 
SNC to the dorsal striatum are thought to influence synaptic plasticity, which in turn, 
guides learning of the action-selection policy, as the actor (Joel et al., 2002).  
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  Modeling decision-making through the actor-critic framework has the added 
bonus of fitting in nicely with other classical psychological distinctions: the Pavlovian 
system and the Instrumental system. With Pavlovian learning, the agent learns the 
stimulus-outcome relationship (critic), while in instrumental learning the agent learns 
which actions are advantageous (actor). Within instrumental learning, a further 
breakdown can be seen in how the animal is actually responding- if it is habitual or goal-
directed. When behavior is very well learned, and is no longer sensitive to changes in the 
value of the outcome, it is considered habitual, whereas behavior that is still sensitive to 
contingency degradation is considered goal-directed.  
  Due to anatomical connections between the motor and limbic system (Mogenson 
et al., 1980), as well as connections to the dopamine neurons in the VTA (Haber and 
Brucker, 2009), the nucleus accumbens has been thought of as the ‘critic’ in this 
framework (Joel et al., 2002). Studies using fast scan cyclic voltammetry (FSCV) have 
found value-predicting error signals in dopamine levels in the NAc (Cheer et al., 2007; 
Day et al., 2007). Studies examining the role of the NAc in response to receiving a 
reward has found reward-related firing that occurs shortly after an animal is rewarded 
(Lavoie and Mizumori, 1994; Taha and Fields, 2005), as well as a ramp-like increase in 
firing as an animal approaches reward (Lavoie and Mizumori, 1994; van der Meer and 
Redish, 2011). However, single unit studies in the rodent have looked for, but not found, 
encoding of an RPE signal in NAc spiking activity (Roesch et al., 2009; Ito and Doya, 
2009).  
  The actor-critic framework relies on stimulus-response learning only, and cannot 
explain aspects of goal-directed behavior like devaluation sensitivity. The most important 
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distinction is that in the actor-critic form of learning and decision-making, the agent must 
experience a particular reward in a certain state to understand that it is no longer valued. 
Contrary to this, tests using satiety or devaluation have found that even on the first trial, 
before experiencing the reward, a rat can already have a representation of that goal in 
mind, and act accordingly. This means that he is not using newly learned action-value 
representations to modify the reward value in a new sated or devalued state. A new 
explanation of behavior using reinforcement learning was needed.  
 
Model-free vs. Model-based encoding 
Due to the difficulty in explaining how an animal could change his response to a 
devalued outcome, without having experienced that ‘state’, theorists have more recently 
begun using another set of ideas from machine learning to understand how each region is 
representing information. An important component for decision-making in the RL 
framework is the use of ‘action-values’. An action-value is an estimate on how much 
future reward is expected by taking a particular action in a given state. 
There are two main differences in how an action is selected, based on how the 
agent represents information. In a model-free representation of these states, each potential 
action has a cached ‘action-value’, where the action itself is given a reward prediction 
error (i.e., the likelihood of reward), and an action is chosen based on that representation- 
not of the goal itself. Using a model-free representation, action selection is due to two 
interacting components. One part learns to predict a reward value while another part 
forms the rule about what action to select when in a particular state (Daw et al., 2005; 
Rangel et al., 2008; Redish et al., 2008). This form of action-selection is faster and less 
	  
23	  
computationally intense, since the animal uses a cached value to determine the potential 
value of an action, without representing the actual outcome itself.  
Using a model-based representation, the agent learns the value of different actions 
through experience and constructs a model of his environment. When making a decision, 
the agent utilizes information about the current state, and chooses an action based on an 
estimation of the goal, by searching through what the consequences of each action lead 
to. The agent forms a model of the world in the current state, and uses an on-line search 
process to determine the potential rewards available depending on the state. The agent 
then thinks through the consequences of potential actions in order to determine which 
action to take (Daw et al., 2005; Rangel et al., 2008; Redish et al., 2008). A 
representation of real-world model-free and model-based encoding is shown in Figure 
2C. 
An important prediction from the model-based and model-free decision-making 
framework is that some areas of the brain should represent action-values. In primates, this 
encoding has been found in the dorsal striatum, as well as the GPi and the supplemental 
motor area (Samejima et al., 2005; Pasquereau et al., 2007; Wunderlich et al., 2009; Hori 
et al., 2009; Lau and Glimcher, 2008). In rodents, this signal is not as robust, but 
significant proportions have been found in the dorsal and ventral striatum (Ito and Doya, 
2009; Kim et al., 2009; Roesch et al., 2009). However other studies examining single 
units in the ventral striatum of rodents has not found any integration of action and value 
(Kimchi and Laubach, 2009b). 
Just as action-outcome has been mapped onto the DMS, it is also proposed as the 
site responsible for model-based encoding. The DLS has been proposed to carry model-
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free information, similar to its role in processing habits and stimulus-response 
associations (Daw et al., 2005). Model-based, or goal directed behavior is flexible, and 
can quickly adapt to changes in reward contingency, but is computationally expensive. 
Model-free, or stimulus-response/habitual behavior is more efficient, and typically 
involves less processing time, but is inflexible.   
  When making a decision, information about the value or consequence of potential 
actions must be transmitted to a place where action-selection occurs. Previous work 
trying to determine the exact locus of action-selection may depend on the nature of the 
behavioral task, and action-selection regions have been discovered in a variety of regions. 
Behaviors that involve fixed stimulus-action associations, or highly learned motor 
sequences appear to rely on the dorsolateral striatum (Knowlton et al., 1996; Hikosaka et 
al., 1999; Yin et al., 2006). However in studies that involve more flexible decision-
making, such as a dynamic foraging task, the signal related to an animal’s upcoming 
choice has appeared earliest in the medial motor cortex (Sul et al., 2011). The 
representation of the upcoming action has been found in the dorsal striatum in both 
primates and rodents (Samejima et al., 2005; Pasquereau et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009; 
Pasupathy and Miller, 2005). Representation of the upcoming action in the NAc has also 
been found (Roesch et al., 2009), as well as not found (Ito and Doya, 2009; Kim et al., 
2009; Kim et al., 2007), leading to open questions about where the actual action-selection 
decision occurs.  
  Another important aspect to the decision-making process is the ability of the agent 
to understand the relationship between an action that was just performed, and its 
consequences, as well as the influence of that action on future behavior. For example, in a 
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game of chess, it is important to be able to understand that the move just made was either 
good or bad. This is often referred to as the temporal credit assignment problem (Sutton 
and Barto 1998). Brain regions that are important in an animals’ ability to correctly alter 
decisions based on an outcome include the OFC (Schoenbaum et al., 2002), the prefrontal 
and posterior parietal cortex of primates (Barraclough et al., 2004; Seo and Lee, 2009), 
and the frontal cortex and striatum of rodents and primates (Kim et al., 2007; Kim et al., 
2009; Sul et al., 2010; Sul et al., 2011; Nakamura et al., 2012).  
  In order to update value functions in a model of reinforcement learning, a reward 
prediction error is used. This is defined as the difference between the actual reward and 
the reward expected by the current value function (Sutton and Barto 1998). These signals 
were first isolated in putative midbrain dopamine neurons (Schultz, 2006), but have also 
been found in other regions including the globus pallidus (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008), 
orbitofrontal cortex (Sul et al., 2010) and striatum (Kim et al., 2009; Oyama et al., 2010; 
Stalnaker et al., 2012).  
  Early studies of reward originally thought of dopamine as the reward signal in the 
brain (Wise, 1978). Studies in primates done in the ‘90s found that the role of the 
dopaminergic neurons was more complex than simply a reward signal. In experiments 
done in the Schultz lab, monkeys were given rewarding stimuli, such as food and water, 
and recordings were done during these instrumental or Pavlovian conditioning tasks. 
During learning, the recorded cells did show phasic bursts of firing when given a reward, 
but if the reward was consistently preceded by a cue, such as a tone, the dopaminergic 
response to the reward gradually decreased. This contradicts the theory that dopamine 
always equals reward. Upon further examination of the monkey’s behavior and the 
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subsequent neural firing rates, they observed that the subjects were exhibiting 
anticipatory behavior to the cues that predicted reward, and the neural firing rates 
followed (Ljungberg et al., 1992; Romo and Schultz, 1990; Schultz et al., 1993).  
  When computational theorists began applying reinforcement learning algorithms 
to neuroscience, this dopaminergic signal was obvious- it was a reward prediction error; 
(Montague, 1993, 1995; Montague and Sejnowski, 1994). The key was that the RPE 
signaled an unexpected reward. In initial learning, the primates did not expect reward 
delivery, so the dopaminergic neurons fired when reward appeared. With learning, they 
began to expect the reward, so the neurons gradually stopped firing. However, the cue 
that predicted the reward became the unexpected event, and had reward predictive power, 
hence eliciting firing from the dopaminergic neurons (Takikawa et al., 2004; Hollerman 
et al., 1998).  
  Verification of this theory has been demonstrated in a variety of tasks (Bayer and 
Glimcher, 2005; Hollerman et al., 1998). In fact, when using probabilistic rewarding 
tasks, or tasks where different reward magnitudes are predicted, and the relationship 
between cue and reward delivery depends on a reward probability or magnitude, rather 
than a simple 1:1 reward ratio, the conditioned stimuli that predicts the reward elicits a 
phasic dopaminergic response that is proportional to the probability/magnitude of 
expected reward (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). In rodents, the relationship 
between the conditioned stimulus and reward has been shown with phasic levels of 
dopamine (Day et al., 2007; Walton et al., 2006). 
  While in the decision-making process, the value of the action that was actually 
chosen must also be stored in order to assess the outcome of choosing that action, and is 
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often referred to as the chosen value. Various brain regions carrying this signal include 
the medial frontal cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum (Padoa-Schioppa and 
Assad, 2006; Lau and Glimcher, 2008; Kim et al., 2009; Sul et al., 2010; Cai et al., 2011). 
This signal, paired with the RPE, in some RL theories, can then inform the rat about the 
next state, and the updated action-value associations.  
Contrary to the idea that the phasic burst of dopamine acts as an RPE in 
reinforcement learning theory, Berridge (Berridge, 2007) argues that phasic dopamine is 
not crucial to learning, but is instead a signal of incentive salience, which acts to maintain 
or repeat whatever current action is currently rewarding. The dopamine signal is therefore 
a signal of ‘wanting’.  
 
 
Mapping onto strict subregions- with difficulty: 
  A series of lesion studies came up with a potential explanation for how there 
could be both stimulus-response and goal directed behavior simultaneously.  In these 
studies, it is proposed that different subregions of the striatum represent separate aspects 
of instrumental decision-making. Pharmacological blocking of the DMS causes goal-
directed actions to become habitual, while on the other hand, blocking activity in the DLS 
causes previously habitual actions to become goal-directed (Yin et al., 2006; Yin et al., 
2005a; Yin and Knowlton, 2004; Balleine et al., 2009). This anatomical separation keeps 
the actor-critic RL theory, as the model-free representation in the DLS and Core, while a 




  These theoretical frameworks have held up under some lesion and imaging 
studies, but there are other aspects that question the overall architecture. The first issue is 
that the ventral striatum, which is supposed to function as a critic in the typical RL 
theory, shows model-based tendencies, such as sensitivity to devaluation (Van Der Meer 
and Redish, 2009b; van der Meer et al., 2010). Nicola (2010) has found that the NAC is 
involved when a rat can flexibly approach an aspect of reward, but if the task involves 
stereotyped, or habitual actions, the ventral striatum is less involved, again going against 
a role in habits or model-free learning (Nicola, 2010). Studies seeking to find precise 
firing rate changes in aspects of the dorsal striatum that track onto the model-free vs. 
model-based framework are often conflicting, showing similar patterns of activity related 
to stimulus-response and response-outcome encoding in both DMS and DLS (Stalnaker 
et al., 2010; Thorn et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2013). A possible explanation suggests that 
these hypothetical systems are more interactive, which is consistent with an overlapping 
and interconnected loop representation of information in the basal ganglia, and tracks 
onto anatomical studies of interconnection between regions (Alexander et al., 1986; Joel 
and Weiner, 2000).   
  Single unit studies examining the role of the dorsal striatum in habitual actions 
have found a distinction between DMS and DLS at the beginning and end of action 
sequences (Barnes et al., 2005; Thorn et al., 2010), as well as task-related firing changes 
that develop with experience (Barnes et al., 2005; van der Meer et al., 2010; Thorn et al., 
2010). However, distinct separations based on anatomical location into stimulus-response 
vs. action-outcome representation leads to mixed results (Kimchi and Laubach, 2009b; 
Stalnaker et al., 2010; (Thorn et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2013). Kim (2013) found overlap 
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between the DMS and DLS in the animal’s goal choice, the outcome, as well as an action 
value signal before the choice was revealed (Kim 2013). Stalnaker 2010 (Stalnaker et al., 
2010) found significant overlap between stimulus-response encoding and response-
outcome encoding in both the DMS and DLS, with no modification in firing rate due to 
value. There is clearly a gap in the understanding of the role of the striatum as it relates to 
these elegant models of behavior when examining studies done using lesions vs. 
recording single units.  
  The biggest difficulty in finding the neural correlates of model-free vs. model-
based behavior appear mostly in finding a specific underpinning for the model-free neural 
firing rates. In most studies that seek to compare contrasting strategies, areas that had 
previously been thought to only be involved in model-free behavior show model-based 
differentiation. In the human fMRI literature, there are two main types of tasks that can 
be broadly broken down: sequential decision-making and tasks involving the inference or 
observation in a change in reward value. In all of these studies, all areas of the brain are 
activated anywhere reward information is processed, even if these tasks are not explicitly 
using model-free information (Glascher et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011; van der Meer et 
al., 2010; van der Meer and Redish, 2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012; Abe and Lee, 2011). 
Most importantly, an area of the brain thought to be used only in the model-free system, 
the human ventral striatum, has shown RPE correlates in a model-based task (Daw et al., 





 A final brain region that is relevant to a study on decision-making and reward is 
the orbitofrontal cortex. Besides the striatum, reward prediction and movement-related 
neurons have been isolated in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Convergent evidence from 
humans, non-human primates and rats implicates the OFC in a variety of behaviors 
relating to decision-making, flexible actions and reward (Rolls, 2000). Disorders 
involving the OFC include depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Understanding 
how the OFC acts in concert with the striatum, in regards to updating information on 
internal states is a crucial piece of information missing in the literature.   
Anatomy: The orbitofrontal cortex in rodents receives inputs from other areas of 
the cortex, including areas that receive sensory information  (Price 1985, Price 2007, 
Dalley et al., 2004; Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005; Schoenbaum and Esber, 2010), as 
well as spatiomotor information, including the posterior parietal cortex and medial 
agranular cortex (Reep 1996). The more medial areas of the rat cortex receive stronger 
afferents from the limbic system, including the amygdala and hippocampus (Ongur and 
Price, 2000; Price, 2007).  
The ventro-lateral area of the rodent orbital cortex projects more to sensorimotor 
structures (Coffield et al., 1992, Reep et al., 1994, 1996). Additionally, the distribution of 
projections to the dorsal striatum shows that more medial orbital regions target the medial 
striatum, while the VLO innervates the central regions and the more lateral orbital cortex 
projects to the more lateral areas of the striatum. The connections of the OFC also make 
it a unique target to determine if sensory properties are more explicitly encoded in the 




Orbitofrontal Cortex and Behavior: 
A prominent area of study demonstrating a role for the rodent OFC in outcome-
guided behavior comes from reversal studies. In reversal studies, a rodent first learns to 
discriminate between two cues, one that predicts a reward, and another that predicts 
either an aversive event, or no outcome. Once this is learned, the contingencies are 
changed, so that the previously rewarded cue now predicts the opposite outcome (either 
the aversive event or nothing), while the other cue now leads to reward. Learning is 
achieved when the animal demonstrates that he has learned the new cue-outcome pairing. 
Studies using lesions in the OFC have shown that it is necessary in order for rapid 
reversal learning to occur (Schoenbaum et al., 2002; Izquierdo et al., 2004). One specific 
aspect of these results that is crucial to impart is that the OFC is not necessary for the 
initial discrimination learning- it is only when the contingencies are changed that the 
OFC becomes necessary.  
A variety of theories try to explain what, specifically, the OFC is doing in these 
reversal studies. Some think that the role of the OFC is to inhibit a previously learned 
response (Eagle et al., 2008; Izquierdo and Jentsch, 2012). Other theories state that the 
OFC is using and/or assigning value to the cue, in a common currency (Levy and 
Glimcher, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa and Cai, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). 
Additionally, other theories think that the OFC is necessary for predicting and integrating 
specific features of an upcoming event, possibly without actually signaling value (Clark 
et al., 2012; Delamater, 2007; McDannald et al., 2012; Schoenbaum et al., 2009).  
Another area of study demonstrating a clear role of the OFC in behavior is by 
utilizing similar procedures discussed above- outcome devaluation. In these studies, an 
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animal learns that a cue predicts a specific outcome. After some amount of learning, the 
outcome is devalued, either through pairing it with feeling sick, or feeding an animal to 
satiety. Lesions of the OFC in rodents show a deficit in performance when testing an 
animal with outcome devaluation (Gallagher et al., 1999; Pickens et al., 2005; Pickens et 
al., 2003). These deficits are not due to learning- the animals still acquire the Pavlovian 
or instrumental response. The OFC is also not necessary when choosing between rewards 
when they are actually present (Gallagher et al., 1999; Pickens et al., 2005; Pickens et al., 
2003). The specific deficit is seen when the animal needs to integrate information about 
the reward, and pair that with a predictive cue to update the new value of the reward. 
Additional tests used to probe the specific aspect of outcome encoding seen in the 
OFC have utilized two more behavioral tasks. In one procedure, called ‘unblocking’, a rat 
learns the relationship between a cue and an outcome. An additional cue is then added to 
the first cue, while also increasing the size of the reward. The new cue has new 
information, because it is adding information about the increased value of the reward- not 
the specific identity of the outcome. The response to the new cue is similar to the second 
behavioral task used to probe OFC function, called Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer 
(PIT). In these studies, rodents learn that two separate responses lead to two separate, but 
valued rewards. Animals also learn that two different cues lead to these different rewards. 
Once the animal learns both the Pavlovian and instrumental response, a test occurs where 
the cue is given in the presence of the instrumental response, with no reward. During the 
presentation of the specific Pavlovian learned cue, instrumental actions related to the 
prediction of that cue are typically enhanced.  
The contribution of the OFC to both of these behavioral tasks appears to support a 
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role in specific outcome identity. When lesions are made prior to training, an unblocking 
procedure based on value remains intact, while another based on reward features is 
impaired (McDannald et al., 2011; Burke et al., 2008). Studies utilizing PIT and OFC 
lesions show that there is no deficit in the acquisition of the Pavlovian association or the 
instrumental learning, but OFC lesions do impair the performance of specific transfer 
(Ostlund and Balleine, 2007; Scarlet et al., 2012).  
Single unit studies paint a more complicated picture. One difficulty in 
understanding the function of the OFC is the species differences between primate and 
rodent studies. In both species, the OFC appears to learn the value of the stimulus (Burke 
et al., 2008), and is used to make adaptive decisions (Rudebeck et al., 2006). 
Additionally, both species encode decision related information (Schoenbaum et al., 1998; 
(Roesch et al., 2006; Kepecs et al., 2008; van Duuren et al., 2007; van Duuren et al., 
2009). One striking difference is that rodent studies have found response (or action) 
specific encoding in the OFC (Furuyashiki et al., 2008; Feierstein et al., 2006), while 
primate studies do not (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Wallis and Miller, 2003; Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad, 2006).  
Besides response differences, another species difference seen in recording studies 
is the integration of value signals. As discussed before, rodent lesion and some recording 
studies have found that the OFC encodes specific information about the outcome, but is 
not necessarily doing so by integrating an abstract value signal (Roesch et al., 2006; 
Burke et al., 2008). In contrast, most primate research finds a signal related to abstract 
value (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Morrison and Salzman, 2009; Kennerley and 
Wallis, 2009b).   
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Because of the findings that movement is not encoded in primate OFC, and that 
there is an integration of multiple signals for value, primate researchers have proposed an 
alternate theory than that discussed above by Balleine and Schoenbaum. Specifically, 
studies comparing neural firing rates in primates have demonstrated that the OFC 
contributes to encoding value in a common currency (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; 
(Padoa-Schioppa and Cai, 2011). In this way, different goods can be compared using a 
common neural substrate- there is a way to compare apples to oranges (Padoa-Schioppa 
and Cai, 2011). Additionally, single unit studies have found neural correlates in the OFC 
for reward probability (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009b), response requirement and reward 
identity (Rolls and Baylis, 1994). 
There have not been as many single unit studies in the OFC of rodents studying 
different reward types, so most single unit studies find neural firing rates that may encode 
an aspect of value in upcoming reward (van Duuren et al., 2007; van Duuren et al., 2009; 
Feierstein et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2006). However, there does appear to be some 
identity encoding, regardless of preference, in the rodent OFC as well as specific action-
related activity (Furuyashiki et al., 2008; Feierstein et al., 2006; Young and Shapiro, 
2011; Roesch et al., 2006) that is not seen in primate OFC (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; 
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Abe and Lee, 2011), and leads to confusion about the 
role of the rodent OFC in encoding a ‘common currency’. Compounding that difficulty is 
that more recent primate work has found evidence of specific direction-related coding in 
the OFC, when a task requiring more movement was used (Luk and Wallis, 2013; 






There are few studies that directly manipulate internal motivational states, while 
directly testing decision-making processes. From these studies, evidence exists that 
internal state is encoded in the basal ganglia, and may be a crucial component of reward-
based neuronal firing rates. The Berridge lab demonstrated how shifts in internal 
representation of rewards influence neurons in the ventral pallidum. These studies 
utilized a taste reactivity paradigm, along with Pavlovian conditioning, to pair a stimulus 
with a tastant, delivered directly into the oral cavity (Tindell et al., 2004; Tindell et al., 
2006). In these studies, they manipulated the rat’s internal salt content to change a 
previously aversive salt taste into a rewarding stimulus under salt deprivation. This 
distinct change in behavioral outcome was mirrored by a change in firing rate in the 
ventral pallidum. Not only did the firing rates change when the salt tastant was orally 
infused, but the firing patterns also changed significantly to the cue predicting the 
infusion, indicating that the rat knew the salt would be rewarding in his salt-depleted 
state. These studies demonstrate a specific subset of neurons responsible for tracking the 
internal state of an animal in the basal ganglia (Smith et al., 2009). 
This evidence indicates that specific cells can modulate their firing rates for 
changing reward values, as well as modifying firing rates to the cues that predict the 
rewards. The Carelli lab compared natural rewards to drug reinforcers and found that 
cocaine self-administration elicits responding in specific neurons that are in a separate 
population compared to neurons that track food and water reward (Carelli, 2004; Carelli 
and Deadwyler, 1994; Carelli et al., 2000). They reported on a portion of the neurons that 
overlapped, and coded both food and water reward (68%) in the ventral striatum. The 
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remaining neurons were either selective for one reward or the other, or indistinguishable, 
but since the original hypothesis was testing natural vs. drug reward, food and water 
specific neurons were not included. Between the Berridge and Carelli studies, there is 
ample evidence to suggest that internal states are ‘online’ while a rat is performing a task. 
Manipulations of internal states can be done in animals, by regulating access to food and 
water, or by salt depletion, which consequently leads to different firing patterns (Rolls, 
1989). 
 Additional evidence for internally motivated neural firing comes from a study 
done by the Shapiro lab while recording from the hippocampus. Rats were either food or 
water deprived, and had to make decisions based on their internal state in a contextual-
based memory task, which the researchers then compared to the rat’s behavior in a 
random foraging task (Kennedy and Shapiro, 2009). Importantly, they found that 
motivational state influenced hippocampal encoding during the contextual memory task, 
when the motivational cues were crucial to selecting a remembered, goal-based action. 
During the foraging task, when memory based cues were not involved, these same 
neurons did not determine behavior (i.e., they did not fire more for food or water). 
Kennedy and Shapiro demonstrated that internal motivation not only guides memory-
based tasks, but these cues also reflect concurrent changes in firing rates. Their study did 
not compare food and water within the same trial, however. 
OFC and internal state: Evidence also exists that the OFC encodes signals 
relating to hunger, and may in fact encode motivation. De Araujo et al. studied ensembles 
in the OFC, among other places while rats were fed to satiety. They found that OFC 
neurons encode a signal that reflected the animal’s motivational state across the entire 
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feeding cycle, with higher activity levels during the hunger phases (de Araujo et al., 
2006). This is similar to early electrophysiology studies by Rolls et al that found a 
decrease in response to cues predicting food when the animal was sated (Rolls, 1989). 
There is evidence that neuronal populations in the OFC respond to separate food/water 
stimuli, but whether this is simply encoding a sensory property or it’s motivational 
salience is unknown (Rolls, 2004).  
The behavioral task used in this project presents a unique opportunity to test the 
relevant theories related to OFC function. This task disentangles reward from movement, 
so a definitive role for the OFC in encoding movement, absent reward can be tested. 
Additionally, the anatomical connections with sensory areas between OFC and other 
cortical regions, as well as downstream targets put it in a unique location to integrate 
sensory information with internal information in order to calculate value. On the other 
hand, the OFC may just encode the sensory properties of the reward identity itself, absent 
value, allowing us to answer the question: does the OFC encode specific reward identity, 
or is it encoding value? And how is action represented in the OFC, independent of 
reward? 
 The Carelli et al studies demonstrate that internal motivation may be encoded in 
the ventral striatum, while the Berridge et al and Shapiro et al studies show that these 
firing rate changes influence behavior and neuronal firing in other brain areas, indicating 
that the entire cortical-basal ganglia circuit may be involved in updating online 
information about internal motivation.  The advantage of the behavioral task used in this 
study is the ability to distinctly dissociate internal motivation from specific movements, 
all while recording from multiple brain areas to solidify theories of how motivation, 
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action and value are updated in the basal ganglia. Manipulation of internal state, 
combined with trials of flexible choice, allows us to determine how the neural firing rates 





Figure 1: Basal Ganglia Anatomy 
 
A: Rodent Basal Ganglia. The main input nuclei are the Striatum and the Subthalamic Nucleus (STN), 
which receive input from the thalamus, cortex, amygdala and hippocampus. The main output nuclei are the 
substrantia nigra, and the globus pallidus. Red arrows are excitatory connections while blue arrows denote 
inhibitory connections. (Redgrave, Scholarpedia, 2007). 
B: Original Box and Arrow diagram from Albin et al. (1989). The direct pathway promotes behavior 
through D1 containing neurons in the striatum, and the indirect pathway suppresses behavior through D2-
containing neurons (Redgrave, Scholarpedia, 2007). 








Figure 2: Reinforcement Learning and the Basal Ganglia 
 
A: The topographical arrangement of cortical and thalamic inputs to the striatum show a distribution of 
dorsomedial to ventrolateral zones. Frontal cortical areas and their corresponding striatal projection zones 
are shown in the same colors. Abbreviations are listed in the Abbreviation section (Voorn et al., Trends in 
Neuroscience, 2004) 
B: The proposed dorsal/ventral divide of the actor/critic framework, with further subdivision based on 
model-free and model-based Reinforcement Learning. Model-Free is shown in dark grey, and Model-Based 
is shown in light grey (Bornstein and Daw, Current opinion in neurobiology, 2011). 
C: Demonstration of model-based and model-free reinforcement learning. In Model-Based computation, a 
mental map is used that has been learned through prior experience. This forward model utilizes on online 
search process to predict probabilities of upcoming reward, based on the available action options. In 
contrast, Model-Free action selection is based on learning the long-run values of specific actions, without 






Chapter 2: Materials and Methods 
 
 
Behavioral Task  
All animal procedures were approved by the University of Michigan Committee 
on Animal Use and Care. Animals were housed on a 12:12 reversed light/dark cycle, with 
experiments performed during the dark phase. Long Evans rats (350-550g) were trained 
and tested using a modified reaction time task in a five nose-port operant chamber  (Med 
Associates Inc, St Albans, VT). The operant box consisted of stainless steel grid floors 
with five nosepokes, a speaker, a video camera and a reward dispenser that physically 
separated the food and water ports. Infrared photobeam detectors recorded entry into 
every nosepoke and food or water receptacle entry.  
 
Task Description: A trial began with a 500ms tone (1kHz = water, 4kHz = food), 
informing the rat which reward would be available following a correct performance. 
Immediately following the tone offset, one of the three central nosepokes was 
illuminated. The rat had to poke the lit port, prompting the illumination of an adjacent 
nosepoke (to his left or right, pseudorandomly). After correctly poking this second port, a 
white noise burst signaled to the rat that he was correct, and he could retrieve a reward. 
Food and water ports were physically separated, and each had a photo-beam sensor to 
monitor entry and exit, therefore reward was not actually delivered until the rat entered 
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the correct receptacle. Precise measurements of all actions were recorded using Labview 
Software and photobeam detectors on each nosepoke and food/water receptacles. Upon 
completion of a correctly rewarded trial, the rat had an 8-10 second inter-trial interval 
before a tone played to begin the next trial. The sequence of task events is illustrated in 
Figure 3A.  
 
Behavioral Events: The task included 6 main behavioral events. The first event is ‘Tone’, 
which is centered on when the food/water tone began playing. The next event is ‘Nose 
Center In’, aligned to the time when the rat poked his nose into the first lit nose port. The 
task was self-paced, so there was no time limit between ‘Tone’ and ‘Nose Center In’.  
The time window between these two events is considered the Initiation Time.  The next 
event is ‘Nose Center Out’, which is aligned to the time the rat removed his nose from the 
first lit nose port. ‘Nose Side In’ was the next event, triggered by the rat entering the 
adjacent lit nosepoke. The time between ‘Nose Center In’ and ‘Nose Side In’ is 
considered the Movement Time. ‘Nose Side Out’ is aligned to when the rat exited the 
second nosepoke. ‘Reward Port In’ is aligned to the time when the rat entered the reward 
receptacle (before receiving the reward). The time from ‘Nose Side Out’ to ‘Reward Port 
In’ is considered the Reward Retrieval Time. Behavioral events are outlined in Figure 
3A.  
 
Task Training: Rats were initially trained to associate the 500ms tone (1kHz = water, 
4kHz = food) with the appropriate reward, which was delivered in the separated food or 
water receptacle. After rats reliably learned the tone-reward pairings (correct reward 
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entry >80% of trials), they were then trained to poke a lit nosepoke before being 
presented with the food or water tone. The next level of training presented the rats with 
the tone first, then one lit nosepoke, which required the rats to remember the correct tone 
and enter the appropriate reward receptacle after poking 1 lit nosepoke. Once the rats 
achieved 80% reliability on the 1-poke version of the task, an additional nosepoke was 
introduced after the first correct poke, forcing the rats to move to the adjacent left or right 
nosepoke before entering the appropriate reward receptacle. All rats were trained using 
the same paradigm of increasing difficulty, culminating in the final behavioral task 
(outlined above). Training typically lasted 2-3 months. Once a rat achieved 80% accuracy 
while both food and water restricted on 3 consecutive days, he underwent drive 
implantation surgery.  
 
Errors: Inappropriate actions during trial performance resulted in a 15 second trial 
timeout, signaled by illumination of the houselight. Procedural errors include instances 
when the rat poked an inappropriate nosepoke (one that is not lit) at any point after the 
start of a trial. Reward port errors were when the rat went to the inappropriate reward 
receptacle (ex. going to the food port on a water cued trial). Procedural errors are not 
included in the behavioral analysis. If the rat performed either a procedural or reward 
error, after the trial time out, the rat had to repeat the same trial type until correct. This 
ensured that the rat completed both left and right movements, and prevented the rat from 




Free choice: On select trials (20-30% of total trials), the rat heard a 12 kHz tone lasting 
50ms. On these trials, once the rat correctly poked the 2 nosepokes, he was allowed to 
choose either reward by poking his nose in the desired reward receptacle. Whichever port 
he entered first triggered reward delivery. These trials allowed us to probe which of the 2 
rewards were considered more desirable to the rat (see below). 
 
Internal Motivation Manipulation: Before each testing session rats were either food-
restricted, water-restricted, or both. Since rats can only eat when water is available, there 
was a one-hour period immediately following testing during which the rat had full access 
to both food and water. The timeline of day to day testing is outlined in Figure 3B. When 
Sated, rats were allowed full access to both food and water for the full 24 hour period 
prior to testing. When Restricted of both food and water, the rat had access to both food 
and water for 1 hour after testing. On Food Restricted days, the rat had free access to both 
food and water for 1 hour, and then the food was removed, leaving only water for the 24-
hour time period prior to testing. When the rat was Water Restricted, the rat had free 
access to food and water for one hour, and then the water was removed, leaving only food 
in the 24 hour period prior to testing. 
 
Electrophysiology  
Tetrode Implantation: To investigate neural firing patterns in multiple brain 
structures simultaneously, we used an electrode assembly consisting of 21 independently 
driveable “tetrodes.” Each tetrode was made up of four 12.5μm Ni-Cr wires twisted 
together, which helps discriminate between individual neurons and gives a greater 
	  
45	  
capability for recording (Gage et al., 2010). Tetrode tips were gold-plated to lower 
impedances to 200-250 MΩ. Prior to implantation surgery, rats were taken off of food 
and water restriction for at least 24 hours. For drive implantation surgery, rats were 
anesthetized using isoflurane and a craniotomy was performed on the right hemisphere. 
Measurements were taken relative to bregma, so that individual tetrodes would reach the 
OFC, DMS, DLS and Nucleus Accumbens (both Core and Shell). Care was taken when 
removing the duramater to reduce brain swelling and bleeding. Skull screws were used to 
record electrocorticograms (ECoG) and served as a recording reference site, targeted on 
midline, approximately 1 mm posterior to lambda, and another ground, placed at the 
posterior lateral skull ridge. Additional skull screws were used to provide stability. After 
successful placement of the drive onto the brain surface, dental cement was used to fix 
the drive to the skull screws. As has been previously demonstrated (Berke et al., 2009; 
Berke et al., 2004), this drive set up allows us to record from a variety of brain structures 
simultaneously, and still allows the animal a free range of movement during recordings. 
In addition, each individual tetrode assembly was moveable, allowing for small 
adjustments within targeted structures to maximize neural recordings. Drive implantation 
surgery was performed on a total of 7 rats. Each 21-tetrode drive targeted the OFC, 
Insula, DMS, DLS, NAc Shell and NAc Core.  
 
Recording Apparatus: The Berke lab utilizes custom-designed 96-channel systems, and 
records from all tetrodes simultaneously and continuously with minimal filtering. The 
drives weighed less than 15g, and did not impede behavior or movement during task 
performance. The cables that connected the drive to the computer were counterbalanced 
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and moveable, so the rat was free to move in any direction without restriction. During 
task performance, neural signals from each tetrode wire were recorded continuously at 
high-speed (31250 samples/s/channel), with minimal filtering ("wide-band", 1-9000Hz). 
The status of cue lights and photobeams was monitored at the same high speed (i.e. 32µs 
precision), and synchronized to the neural recordings. 
 Following a one-week recovery period from surgery, rats were tested daily 
(typically performing 150-400 trials in each ~2-hour session). Once recording began, a 4 
day sequence of recordings was obtained before each tetrode was moved ~100µm to 
sample a new set of neurons for the next recording sequence, with at least 24 hours 
between tetrode moving and new recording to allow the brain tissue to settle. 
 
Histology: At the end of the experiment, each tetrode site was marked with a small 
electrolytic lesion by passing a 25uA of current for 10 seconds, while under anesthesia. 
The rat was then perfused and the brain was Nissl stained so that the final tetrode 
locations could be mapped onto coordinates in a reference brain atlas (Paxinos and 
Watson, 2005), using Sqirlz Morph software (Xiberpix, Inc) and Matlab. From these atlas 
locations, prior recording day locations could be estimated by the number of screw turns. 





Spike sorting: The continuously digitized signal was first wavelet-filtered 
(Wiltschko et al., 2008) and then spike sorting was performed manually using Offline 
Sorter (Plexon INC, Dallas, TX). To differentiate unique cells, the difference in 
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waveform size and shape across all four tetrode wires was compared. Cells could be 
further classified as putative medium spiny neurons (MSN) or fast-spiking interneurons 
(FSI) based on clusters found in the scatter plot of two measurements of the wide-band 
spike waveform: the peak width at one-half maximum (FSI: 50-200ms; MSN 150-
450ms) and the time from peak to valley (FSI: 100-455ms; MSN: 560-1500ms).  
 
Behavioral Analysis: Behavior analysis examined free choice and forced choice trials 
separately. Procedural errors were excluded, and a two-tailed t-test was performed to test 
if choices on both free and forced choice trials were significantly different on Food and 
Water trials (p< 0.05). Additionally, trials were collapsed across days to examine the 
Preferred and Non-preferred behavior, so that Food trials on Food restricted days were 
Preferred, and Water trials on Water restricted days were Preferred. A similar behavioral 
analysis was then performed.  
The median Initiation Times, Movement Times and Reward Retrieval Times were 
taken for each rat, and averaged across each trial type where the rat made it to the correct 
reward port (procedural errors and reward port errors were excluded). Analyses were 
performed separately on Food restricted and Water restricted days, as well as Sated and 
Restricted days. A two-tailed t-test was performed to test for significantly different 
reaction times between food and water trials (p<0.05). 
 
Identification of trial related activity: After spike sorting and clustering, the population of 
cells was tested for trial-related activity. To reach criterion, a cell had to reach a 
minimum firing rate of 2 Hz on at least 2 trials of the same type (food-contra/food-ipsi, 
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etc.), within the same 30ms time window. An entire session was only included if the rat 
performed at least 80 trials, and was successful at >70% of the reward port entries. 
Analyses are limited to the days in which the rat was either food restricted or water 
restricted (unless otherwise noted).  
 
Statistical Analysis: All analyses were performed using MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc, 
Natick, MA). To examine the population response, we performed a multiple regression 
analysis on each individual cell using the regstats function and the following formula: 
 
S(t)= β0 + β1A(t) + β2C(t) + β3T(t) + β4AX(t) + β5CX(t) + β6TX(t) + ε(t) 
 
where spike discharge rate S(t) for each trial (t) was analyzed using three task-related 
factors- Action (A(t)) (contralateral vs. ipsilateral), Goal port Chosen (C(t)) (food port vs. 
water port entered) and Cued Tone (T(t)) (food tone played vs. water tone played).  ε(t) 
indicates the error terms and β0 β6 are the regression coefficients. An additional 
regression analysis was run using the same formula, but instead had the factors Previous 
Outcome, Goal Chosen and Cued Tone 
Each of the 6 behavioral events was analyzed separately, by centering a 6 second 
time window at the zero point of each event. A sliding window average of 500ms was 
used, moved in step sizes of 100ms for most analysis (unless otherwise stated). To better 
understand the specificity of encoding using the 3-factor regression, all combinations of 
main effects and interactions were examined from the 3-factor regression. From a first 
pass analysis, the combinations of main effects and interaction terms that best captured 
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encoding at reward port in were ‘Goal Only, ‘Current Outcome Only’, and 
‘Goal+Cue+Current Outcome’. This last factor includes all cells that showed a main 
effect for Goal as well as a main effect for Cue, and had a significant interaction effect 
between those two terms. For action related firing, the ‘Action Only’ term captured most 
directional cells, while cells that encoded a main effect of ‘Action’, ‘Goal’ and the 
Interaction effect between the two also showed significant encoding. A diagram of the 
analysis used can be found in the Regression Triangle in Figure 3F. 
To plot the proportion of cells from each brain region that reached significance in 
the 3-factor regression, an individual cell had to have a p-value < 0.05 for the main 
effect(s) and/or interaction effect(s) of the specific regression coefficient in a given 
500ms window. The proportion of cells that reached significance was plotted across time 
for each separate combination of regression factors, centered on each of the 6 behavioral 
events. Finally, a binomial test was done with p<0.05 to test if the population encoding 
reached significance. A solid dot indicates the beginning of the 500ms time window that 
reached significance. The solid bars plotted across the top of the graphs indicate the start 
of a 500ms time window where at least 2 adjacent time-windows for a given region reach 
significance in the binomial test.  
To further analyze what individual cells were firing for, we created a trial-type 
firing rate index. For a given regression factor, there were a set number of trial types that 
could potentially have the highest firing rate. For example, if a cell reached significance 
for ‘Goal Only’, it did so by differentiating between choosing the preferred vs. the non-
preferred reward ports. If the average z-score firing rate was highest for a cell during a 
preferred-port chosen trial, then that cell was included in a total proportion of cells with 
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preferred-port chosen as the highest firing rate. The number of cells that had a higher 
firing rate for the non-preferred port was then subtracted from the number of preferred 
port cells to create the Value index. This same analysis was also done for Identity, and 
used water – food, rather than preferred vs. non-preferred, creating the Identity Index. A 
similar index was calculated for Action (contralateral – ipsilateral) and Outcome (correct 
– incorrect). Additionally, for cells that had 2 main effects, two indices are used- one for 
Value and another for Outcome. A positive number on the Value index means that there 
were more significant cells that had a higher firing rate for the preferred reward than the 
non-preferred reward. A negative number on the Outcome index means that there were 
more significant cells that had a higher firing rate for incorrect trials than correct trials 
(regardless of preference). To further demonstrate this Firing Rate Index, specific time 
points or an area under the curve was plotted as a bar graph, using specific time points 
related to the analysis. 
To compare how each individual cell was encoding each of the different factors 
across time and across events, each cell from each region was individually plotted for all 
of the relevant regression factors. A 6 second time window was used around each event, 
with non-overlapping 200ms time bins. Each time a cell reached significance for a 
specific regression factor, that time bin was plotted in the color corresponding to the 
relevant factor. The Action/Goal/Cue plots have the cells sorted by the factor Goal, at the 
time of reward port in, and maintain that sorting across all of the behavioral events. The 
cell on line 1 stays the same for all behavioral events. The PreviousOutcome/Goal/Cue 
plot is sorted by the factor Previous Outcome at the time of the tone, and maintains that 
sorting across all behavioral events. To show the relationship between factors for the 
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entire region, the 3-factor regression analysis with the relevant factors is plotted across all 
behavioral events, in a similar manner described for Figures 7-14, but instead, each 
region is plotted separately (Figures 15-24). This was done for both 3-factor regressions. 
Finally, individual cell overlap between events was examined. If a cell reached 
significance for 1 non-overlapping 200ms time bin used in the previous analysis, it was 
included. The specific factors examined were Action at 1 second surrounding nose side 
in, Goal at 1 second surrounding reward port in, Outcome at 0.5-1.5 seconds after reward 
port in, Integration of Cue+Goal from 1.5-2.5 seconds after reward port in, and Previous 
Outcome, -2 to -1 seconds before the tone. Cells that reached significance for the 
subsequent events and factors, as well as their overlaps are plotted using a Venn diagram. 
The outside circles represent cells that only reach significance in the corresponding 






Figure 3: Internal State Task and Behavior 
 
A: Behavioral task outline. Each trial begins with a tone that indicates what reward the rat 
is working for (food, water or free choice). The rat pokes his nose in the lit center nose 
poke and then moves to an adjacent (lit) nose poke before moving to the opposite wall to 
retrieve a reward. The food and water ports are physically separated so the rat has to enter 
the correct reward port prior to receiving reward on forced choice trials, but can enter 
either port to receive the reward on free choice trials.  
B: Motivational Manipulations. An example sequence of the motivational manipulations 
used to test internal state. This pattern was randomized for each rat. 
C: Forced Choice Behavior follows internal state. On Forced Choice trials, the rats are 
instructed which reward to work for, and the rat only receives reward if he enters the 
correct goal port. Preferred and non-preferred refers to the relative value of the reward 
based on internal state (food when hungry, water when thirsty), shown as a combination 




Center Cue On Nose Center In Nose Side In Reward Port In
Nose Center Out
Nose Side OutTone
1 2 3 4
Off
1 6 7 8










Prefer Non-prefer Food Water Food Water
































































Water Restricted Food RestrictedFood or Water Restricted
Water Restricted Food RestrictedFood or Water Restricted
	  
53	  
Restricted and Food Restricted days. Individual rat behavior is plotted as the solid black 
lines.  
D: Free Choice Behavior follows internal state. Similar to figure (E) except that these 
show the choices the rat made when allowed to choose either food or water port on Free 
Choice Trials. A separate tone played indicating a Free Choice trial, and the rat received 
the reward from whichever goal port he entered first- there was no incorrect choice.  
E: Histology Nissl staining sample images. Example tetrode placements in the OFC (1), 
NAC (2), DMS (3) and DLS (4). Full histology figures are in figure 6. 
F: Regression Triangle, All Factors: Task-related Neural Integration. Each of the 3 main 
factors from the 3-factor regression analysis are shown with the interaction terms on the 










Chapter 3: Results 
 
 
Section 1: Behavior Results: Internal motivation drives behavior 
 
Seven rats performed an average of 304 trials per day on food-restricted and 
water-restricted days, with a range of 140-488 trials per session. All seven rats used their 
internal state to guide decision-making on both free choice and forced choice trials, on 
food and water restricted days. When hungry (food restricted day), the preferred reward 
was food, and when thirsty (water restricted day), the preferred reward was water. On 
instructed, forced choice trials (75% of total trials), the rats correctly chose the preferred 
reward 86% of the time, while only correctly choosing the non-preferred reward 54% of 
the time, reflecting the fact that even when cued to go to the non-preferred port, the rats 
instead (incorrectly) chose the preferred port (Figure 3C, p < 0.05). On free choice trials 
(25% of total trials), when the rats could choose either reward port, the animals chose the 
preferred reward on 81.6% of trials and the non-preferred reward 18.3% of the time 
Figure 3D, p <0.05).  
The rats were allowed unlimited time to complete the nose pokes and get the 
reward, making it a self-paced task. Several time points in the task are behaviorally
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relevant. These include the time from reward onset to first nosepoke, (trial initiation 
time), the time from first nosepoke to second nosepoke (movement time), and timefinal 
nosepoke exit to reward port entry (reward retrieval time) (Figure 3A, behavioral 
diagram).  
 
Behavioral Metrics:  Correct trials on either food restricted or water restricted 
days were used to examine how the rat moved through the task. The first relevant event 
was the trial initiation time- the time it took from when the rat heard the tone, to then 
poke his nose in the lit center port. In general, the rats were faster at this on Water 
Restricted days compared to Food Restricted days (Figure 4A and 4B). Examining just 
the Food Restricted days, it was surprising to find that the rats were actually significantly 
faster on Water trials, the non-preferred trial type, at initiation time (Figure 4B 3.9s vs. 
3.7s). During the Movement Time and Reward Retrieval Time the rat moved faster on the 
food reward (the preferred reward). The reason that the Initiation Time for Water on 
Food Restricted days was faster than that for Food is because this analysis looked at only 
the correct trials. Examining all trials for reaction times shows that on all Water Cued 
trials, the rat initiates trials much more slowly, if incorrect trials are included (Figure 4C 
and 4D). 
On Water Restricted days, the Initiation Times and Movement Times were both 
slightly, but not significantly faster on the Water Trials (preferred reward). The rats did 
move significantly faster during the Reward Retrieval Time on water trials, even though 
the difference in timing was very small (Figure 4B). Free Choice reaction times show a 
similar pattern to the Forced Choice reaction times (Figure 4C and 4D). In general, the 
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animals moved faster on Water Restricted days, for both reward types. Within Food or 
Water restricted days, the rats usually moved faster for the more preferred reward. 
However, this difference was not always significant, because the rat often moved just as 
quickly for a food reward on water restricted days (Figure 4D), which demonstrates that 
the rat may have been in a more highly motivated state when Water Restricted.  
Examining Sated and Restricted for overall behavior shows that the rats 
performed slightly better on Restricted days for water trials, and slightly better on Sated 
days on Food trials (Figure 5A, n.s.). Free Choice behavior shows that on both Restricted 
and Sated days, Food was the more preferred reward (Figure 5B, p<0.05 for Sated days 
only). Individual rat preferences varied more on Free Choice trials on Restricted days, 
with some rats choosing Food more, and some rats choosing Water more (black bars on 
Figure 5B).  
Reaction times on Sated and Restricted days for Forced Choice, correct trials 
shows the animals moved faster for food trials during the initiation and initial movement, 
but then faster on correct water trials when retrieving the reward, although these 
differences did not reach significance (Figure 5C). On Free Choice trials, the rats chose 
food or water with the same speed on each trial type, and moved at a similar speed as the 
Force choice trials (Figure 5D).   
The behavioral choices and reaction times of the rat demonstrate that internal state 
influences how the rats perform. The biggest differences in the reaction time data are 
when the rat moves to receive the reward, with faster movements for the more preferred 





Single unit activity was recorded from a total of 2,345 cells over 141 days, which 
included of 605 cells from the DMS, 460 from the DLS, 335 from the OFC, 275 from the 
NAc Core, 572 from the NAc Shell and 98 from the Insula. In order to examine task-
responsive neurons, we applied a firing rate criterion to each cell (see methods), and 
ended up with 1,103 neurons across 134 days of recording, with 127 cells from the DMS, 
137 from the DLS, 115 from the OFC, 77 from the Core, and 101 from the Shell (Table 
1). Insula recordings were not used for the remainder of the results. Histological 
verification of all of the recording locations for all of the cells used in the subsequent 




Figure 4: Behavioral Metrics  
 
A: Behavioral times on food restricted days for Forced Choice trials, using only correct trials. 
Initiation time is the time from when the tone plays until the rat pokes his nose in the first 
center nose poke. Movement time refers to the time it takes the rat to move from the center 
nose poke to the side nose poke. Reward retrieval time is the time it takes from when the rat 
leaves the last lit nose poke to enter the reward port. Food and water trials are plotted for all 
of the rats. Only correct trials were included in the reaction time analysis. Median times for 
food trials are listed in red, while median times for water trials are listed in blue. P-value for 
food vs. water trials are listed below the median times (t-test). Most behavioral times follow 
internal state, where times are faster for the preferred reward. Since correct trials are shown, 
the Cue and Choice are the same. 
B: Behavioral times on water restricted days. Behavior and analysis is the same as in A. 
C: Behavioral times on Food Restricted days for all trials, including incorrect trials. Analysis 
is the same as figures A and B except that behavioral metrics are shown for the trial that was 
Cued, regardless of if the rat was correct or not. 
D: Behavioral times on Water Restricted days for all trials, including incorrect trials. The 
analysis is the same as in C.  
E: Free Choice on Food Restricted days. The same analysis is used as in A, except that only 
Free Choice trials were analyzed. 
F: Free Choice on Water Restricted days. The same analysis is used as in A, except that only 
Free Choice trials were analyzed. 
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Figure 5: Behavioral Metrics for Sated and Restricted days  
A: Forced choice trial behavior on sated and restricted days. Individual rats are shown in 
black lines. 
B: Free choice trial behavior on sated and restricted days. Individual rats are shown in black 
lines. 
C: All behavioral times for Forced choice trials, using only the correct trials on sated and 
restricted days. Same behavior and analysis as Figure 4. 
D: All behavioral times on Free choice trials on Sated and Restricted days. Same behavior and 
analysis as Figure 4. 
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The recording locations from each day, from each rat are plotted on the relevant brain 
atlases, listed by their AP coordinate taken from Bregma. Colored dots correspond to the 
brain region schematic used throughout the figures.  
 
  
Bregma -0.48Bregma +0.24Bregma +0.72Bregma +1.44 








Table 1: Number of cells recorded from each rat, in each brain region 
  
DMS$ DLS$ OFC$ NAC$Core$ NAC$Shell$ Totals$
IM167& 9& 6& 2& 6& 2& 0& 6& 14& 0& 1& 46$
IM224&
&
2& 5& 1& 5& 0& 4& 3& 3& 6& 8& 37$
IM228& 15& 15& 0& 0& 9& 7& 12& 10& 11& 14& 93$
IM252& 5& 2& 9& 5& 16& 4& 1& 2& 10& 2& 56$
IM253& 8& 6& 9& 4& 22& 18& 7& 4& 4& 6& 88$
IM261& 21& 22& 26& 25& 9& 10& 3& 4& 14& 8& 142$
IM264& 7& 4& 21& 24& 8& 6& 4& 4& 9& 8& 95$
Totals$ 67$ 60$ 68$ 69$ 66$ 49$ 36$ 41$ 54$ 47$ 557$





Section 2: Action Encoding: Neural signal for action is distributed throughout the 
cortico-basal ganglia network 
 
This task was designed to disentangle specific aspects of reward-related behavior- 
the Cue indicating what reward is available, the movements taken to get to the reward, 
the reward port the rat chose, and the actual outcome of the trial. The main event 
corresponding to direction is ‘nose center out’, when the rat removes his nose from the 
center port, sees the lit adjacent port, and begins moving towards that port. In order to test 
our hypothesis that the dorsal striatum would have the highest proportion of cells 
encoding the direction of movement, we used a 3-factor multiple regression analysis with 
the three most relevant factors in the task: the cue-tone that played (‘Cue’), the direction 
the rat moved (‘Action’) and the reward port the rat chose (‘Goal’) (See Regression 
Triangle, Figure 3F). For the Action factor, we were comparing movements made to the 
adjacent contralateral or ipsilateral nose poke port, and examined cells that only showed a 
significant main effect for Action.  
The original hypothesis was that only specific regions of the dorsal striatum- 
mainly the DLS- would encode a general motor response, due to the anatomical 
connections between the motor cortex and DLS (Alexander et al., 1986; Alexander et al., 
1990; Voorn et al., 2004), and our single unit studies finding contralateral and ipsilateral
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specific movements in the DLS (Gage et al., 2010; Schmidt et al., 2013). Previous rodent 
literature has found spatial encoding in the OFC, which may have been related to action 
(Feierstein et al., 2006; Furuyashiki et al., 2008), but no action-specific encoding has 
been found in the primate OFC (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Wallis and Miller, 
2003), and no task has been utilized to specifically test action-related encoding in the 
OFC. Because of these findings, we expected to find very little encoding of Action in the 
OFC. In the Nucleus accumbens, previous literature has always focused on the 
integration of specific movements with a reward (Ito and Doya, 2009; Nicola et al., 
2004a; Taha and Fields, 2006; Day et al., 2011). The few studies that have disentangled 
action from value (Goldstein et al., 2012) have focused on how value was encoded in the 
NAC, not movement. Due to these previous findings, we expected to find the greatest 
difference in contra/ipsi firing to be in the DLS, with very little encoding of movement in 
the other subregions. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, all 5 brain regions had a significant proportion of cells 
that differentiated between contralateral and ipsilateral movements (binomial test, 
p<0.05), demonstrating that Action encoding was universal across the cortico-basal 
ganglia circuit (Figure 7A). Even more surprising was the fact that the brain region with 
the most Action-only encoding was the OFC, which reached a maximum proportion of 
34%, at 500ms after nose center out. The DMS had 21% of cells at 500ms after nose 
center out, the DLS had 27% at 600ms, the Core reached a maximum of 25% at 900ms, 
while the Shell reached 18% at 600ms (Figure 7A). All 5 brain regions showed a similar 
timecourse of Action encoding, with the DMS and OFC reaching their maximum 
encoding earliest, while the Core reached its peak last.  
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To test whether or not each region showed a bias in a specific movement direction 
(contra or ipsi), we examined the maximum firing rates in the two different trial types for 
each cell that reached significance in Figure 7A. Beginning as soon as the rat started 
moving, the OFC and DMS show significantly more cells with a higher firing rate for the 
contralateral movement (Figure 7C). The DMS had 20 cells (16%) firing more for the 
contralateral reward and 5 cells (4%) firing more for the ipsilateral reward (binomial test, 
p<0.05), and the OFC had 24 cells (21%) firing for contra vs. 8 cells (7%) firing for the 
ipsilateral side (p<0.05 binomial test). The Shell and Core also reach significance for a 
contralateral bias, but at a later time point (maximum bias in the Core at 900ms, and Shell 
at 600ms after nose center out). Surprisingly, the DLS does not show a significant 
directional bias, indicating that equal numbers of cells are firing more for both 
contralateral and ipsilateral movements. At 2.2 seconds after the rat begins moving, the 
OFC significantly changes its directional bias to the ipsilateral trials. Figure 7D shows the 
results from 400ms after nose center out from Figure 7C. 
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Figure 7: Action Encoding 
 
A: Action Only Cells. Universal encoding of Action in all 5 brain regions. From the 3-
factor regression (see formula, methods), the proportion of cells that reached significance 
for only the Action factor are plotted 6 seconds around each of the behavioral events, 
utilizing all trials (correct and incorrect). The filled circles represent when a region 
reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top 
indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms 
steps. 
B: Regression Triangle, Factor: Action Only.  
C: Action Firing Rate Index. From the cells that reached significance in A, the trial type 
that had the highest firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Proportions are 
subtracted from one another to create the index: Contralateral – Ipsilateral. The solid dots 
and represents when a region, as a whole, reaches significance for one index (binomial 
test, p<0.05), while the solid bars across the top indicated when 2 adjacent bins reach 
significance. This shows a contralateral bias in DMS, OFC, Core and Shell, with no 
directional bias in the DLS. 
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A-F: The 3-factor regression analysis for factors Action, Goal and Cue are plotted on 
days when the rat was either sated for both rewards, or equally restricted for both 
rewards. The analysis is similar to that done in figures 7-10, with similar Identity Indexes 
also plotted for the firing rates. The filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
A: Action Only 
B: Cue Only 
C: Action+Goal+Interaction 
D: Goal Only 
E: Current Outcome Only 
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Section 3: Cue Encoding: Neural signals for cue in the DLS and Nucleus Accumbens 
Shell 
Previous results have shown abundant cue-related activity in the NAc (Stalnaker 
et al., 2010; Roesch et al., 2009; Nicola et al., 2004b; Setlow et al., 2003; Taha et al., 
2007; Ito and Doya, 2009). Therefore, the hypothesis was that there would be distinct 
groups of cells in the Nucleus accumbens Core, as well as the Shell, that would encode 
information related to the tone that played.  
Lesion work in the Dorsal Striatum in rodents has led to the hypothesis that the 
lateral division of the dorsal striatum may be separately involved in stimulus-response 
behavior (Yin et al., 2004; Yin et al., 2006; Balleine et al., 2009). However, previous 
single unit studies from our lab and others have not consistently found a distinct stimulus-
response, or ‘Cue’ encoding only in the DLS (Gage et al., 2010; Berke et al., 2009; Thorn 
et al., 2010; Stalnaker et al., 2010). Because of these conflicting results, we did not 
expect to find much cue specific encoding in the DLS, and none in the DMS. This study 
sought to examine how specific cue related information was encoded, though, 
differentiating this task from others that only examined general cue related activity. This 
task used 2 distinct tones that signaled different outcomes, allowing an analysis for the 
food vs. water tone.  
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On instructed trials, the tone (‘Cue’) signals which reward is potentially available 
upon correct completion of the current trial. The Cue indicates the same reward 
throughout both training and testing, and Tone presentation is independent of the rat’s 
actions, or where the rat is in the recording chamber. The relative value of the Cue 
changes each day, depending on the rat’s internal state. To test how the Cue is 
represented in the brain, the same 3-factor multiple regression described previously was 
used, but this time examined only cells that significantly differentiated between the two 
tones presented, on only the forced choice trials, regardless of the outcome of the trial. 
This ‘Cue Only’ factor reveals that both the DLS and Shell have a significant proportion 
of cells that encode information about the Cue, at the time of the tone (Figure 9A). At the 
time point of peak encoding for the factor ‘Cue Only’ (100ms), the DLS had 10% of cells 
encoding Cue, and the Shell had 11% cells encoding Cue. The OFC and DMS did not 
show a significant proportion of cells encoding a difference between the food tone and 
water tone, while the Core briefly reached an encoding of 12%, but only for one 500ms 
time window.  
According to stimulus-response ideas of encoding, specifically in the DLS, it is 
theorized that the DLS is encoding this information without a representation of the goal 
in mind. This could also be viewed in a model-free framework, where the DLS is simply 
responding to a stimulus as it relates to the response, rather than a value/goal. If this were 
the case, we would expect to find equal proportions of cells firing for both food and water 
rewards, regardless of the current motivational state of the animal, meaning some cells 
would fire more for the water reward on BOTH food restricted and water restricted days. 
Previous findings in the NAC have typically found more firing for the more preferred 
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reward, so we hypothesized that any bias seen in the NAC subregions would be for water 
cue on thirsty days and food cue on hungry days. 
 The cells that reached significance for the factor Cue could be responding to the 
value of the potential reward, or they could be firing more for the reward it represents 
(food vs. water). To better understand how each region encoded Cue, a firing rate scale 
was used for Preferred vs. Non-preferred Tone (Value Scale) while a separate scale 
compared the tones in the context of Food vs. Water (Identity Scale). The difference in 
the two indices is that for the Value scale, the tones switch meanings based on whether 
the rat is hungry or thirsty, while the Identity scale remains the same regardless of 
internal state. Interestingly, the Shell tracked much better with the Identity scale, with all 
11 cells (11%) firing more for the water tone than the food tone, (p<0.05, Figure 9C). By 
contrast, the DLS cells encoding Cue showed a trend towards the Value scale, with 10 
cells (7%) firing more on preferred trials and 4 cells (3%) firing more for non-preferred 
trials 200ms after the tone (Figure 9D, p=0.09). The Core only showed a very brief bias 
for the Non-Preferred Cue, but this bias was not at the same time point when the region, 
as a whole, reached significance.  
The results of finding no specific bias in the DLS confirmed the hypothesis that 
the DLS is most likely encoding the Cue in a model-free, stimulus-response based way. 
There was no specific increase in encoding for either a specific food/water tone, or a 
specific preferred/non-preferred tone- the DLS was simply encoding the stimulus. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, the Shell on the other hand, was only firing for the tone that 




Figure 9: Cue Encoding 
 A: Cue Only Cells. From the 3-factor regression, the proportion of cells that reached 
significance for only the Cue factor are plotted 6 seconds around each of the behavioral 
events, utilizing all trials (correct and incorrect).. The filled circles represent when a 
region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across 
the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 300ms, sliding in 
100ms steps. Cue encoding only in DLS and Shell show striatal specialization.  
B: Regression Triangle, Factor: Cue Only. 
C: Cue Identity Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the highest 
firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Proportions are subtracted from one another 
to create the index: Water – Food. The filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 300ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
Inset shows the proportion of cells 100ms after the tone for Water (top) and Food 
(bottom, no cells). Firing rate bias is for Identity in the Shell.  
D: Cue Value Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the highest 
firing rate is plotted as an index across time, but trials are identified by preference, so 
food on food restricted days and water on water restricted days. Proportions are 
subtracted from one another to create the index: Preferred – NonPreferred. The filled 
circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Inset 
shows the proportion of cells 100ms after the tone for Preferred (top) and Non-preferred 
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A: Cue for Previously Incorrect Trials: The 3-factor regression for Action, Goal and Cue 
is shown for the Cue only factor, using trials that had previously been incorrect. In this 
behavioral task, when a trial is incorrect, it is repeated on the next trial. The filled circles 
represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin 
width of 300ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
B: Cue for Previously Correct Trials. The cells that reached significance for Cue Only in 
the 3-factor regression for Action, Goal and Cue is shown using trials that had previously 
been correct. Since in this behavioral task, an incorrect trial is repeated, this means that 
previously correct trials are unique, and have a new tone presented. Response to the Cue 
















































Section 4: Action-Goal Encoding: Dorsal medial striatum drives action-goal encoding 
 
Since this task specifically disentangles action from the goal port, it can help 
answer the question- which brain region encodes both action and goal? The reward tone 
signals which reward port the rat must enter, but the directional cue is only signaled via 
lit nose ports as the rat is moving- meaning directional and reward cues are separate and 
unrelated. In addition, the goal port the rat actually chooses does not always correspond 
to the port that was signaled, leading to the more precise measurement of Goal. That is, 
the Goal the rat chose does not guarantee reward, so any signal related to the upcoming 
Goal is not simply an anticipation of reward delivery. To examine the interaction of 
Action and Goal, the same 3-factor regression was used with variables direction 
(contralateral vs. ipsilateral), Goal (food vs. water CHOSEN) and Cue (food vs. water 
TONE). All trials on food and water restricted days were used, regardless of if the rat 
chose the correct reward. From the 3-factor regression, only cells that showed a main 
effect for ‘Action’, a main effect for ‘Goal’, and an interaction between the two terms 
were analyzed (Figure 11A inset).  Cells that only had an interaction effect, or just one 
main effect and the interaction effect were not included in this analysis, and no brain 
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region reached significance for any combination of factors other than those in Figure 
11A.  
Previous work has found Action-Value like encoding in the striatum of primates 
and rodent (Kim et al., 2009; Kimchi and Laubach, 2009b; Samejima et al., 2005; Seo et 
al., 2012; Pasquereau et al., 2007; Lau and Glimcher, 2008), as well as some encoding in 
the NAC in rodents (Roesch et al., 2009). However, previous research has specifically 
focused on how the brain integrates action with value. The current task was designed to 
separate those two variables. If the brain still integrates action with a goal, or value, then 
it would be in cells that actually participate in both of those aspects of responding, 
separately, as well as becoming engaged in the task when those aspects are integrated. 
Rather than examining how the individual regions were working to bias a response for 
the more preferred reward, this analysis is more similar to an action-selection task, since 
there were no action + value integrations, and the reward likelihood was a known value to 
the rat. 
As hypothesized, the strongest encoding of action-goal occurs in the DMS, where 
a maximum of 10% of cells reached significance for Action, Goal and the interaction 
term (Figure 11A), at 700ms after nose side in. An example cell from the DMS is shown 
in Figure 11B. To understand how the DMS was encoding Action-Goal, the average z-
score firing rates of the significant cells in Figure 11A were plotted at the time window of 
maximum encoding (700ms after nose side in) in Figure 11C. This plot uses the firing 
rates from each of the 4 different trial types- contralateral-preferred, contralateral-non-
preferred, ipsilateral-preferred, ipsilateral-non-preferred. Using this analysis, it is clear 
that the DMS is firing the most for contralateral + non-preferred goal.  
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The average firing rates from the DMS cells demonstrate that as a region, firing is 
enhanced on trials when the rat chooses the non-preferred reward and moves in the 
contralateral direction. An example DMS cell that is firing for the non-preferred reward 
(food) and the contralateral direction (left) is shown in Figure 11B. The DMS is the only 
region that reaches significance with this combination of factors. Taking the cells that 
were plotted in Figure 11B, we also examined if the firing rate was highest on correct or 
incorrect trials, and plotted those proportions in Figure 11D. 
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A: Action + Goal + Interaction cells. From the 3-factor regression, the proportion of cells 
that reached significance for the main effect of Action, Goal and the interaction term 
between the two are plotted 6 seconds around each of the behavioral events, utilizing all 
trials (correct and incorrect). The filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
Striatal specialization is seen in the DMS for Action + Goal encoding. 
B: An example cell from figure A is shown. This cell fires most for the food-contralateral 
trials on a water-restricted day (non-preferred). The top is the raster plot, and the bottom 
panel is the peri-event time histogram. The black bar represents when the cell reached 
significance for Action + Goal + Interaction. 
C: The mean z-score firing rate from cells that reached significance at 700ms after Nose 
Side In from A, only in the DMS, are plotted based on the goal choice as preferred vs. 
non-preferred, on ipsilateral vs. contralateral actions. This shows that the firing rate in 
these cells was highest on contralateral movements to the non-preferred goal port.  
D: The cells that were plotted in B are broken down by trial type, as correct vs. incorrect 
for the preferred vs. non-preferred reward. A majority of cells had the highest firing rate 
for the non-preferred correct goal port. 
E: Action + Cue + Interaction (action-cue). From the 3-factor regression, this 
demonstrates that no brain regions reached significance for the main effect of Action, 
Cue and the interaction term between the two. 
F: Action + Current Outcome (goal-cue). From the 3-factor regression, this demonstrates 
that no brain regions reached significance for the main effect of Action, while 





Section 5: Reward Port Encoding: Universal goal encoding, with subregional 
specializations 
 
The final stage of the task occurs when the rat leaves the last nose poke port and 
enters the reward port: the ‘Goal’. At this point the rat can still get the trial correct or 
incorrect because he still has to enter the correctly cued port first, before he receives the 
reward. Previous research has found upcoming goal choice in the OFC (van Duuren et 
al., 2007; Sul et al., 2010; McDannald et al., 2012), and the dorsal striatum (van der Meer 
et al., 2010).  It is unclear whether or not impending goal choice is always encoded in the 
ventral striatum (van der Meer and Redish, 2010; Kim et al., 2007). We used the 3-factor 
regression and examined cells that were significant for Cue-only, Goal-only, and Cue-
Goal Interaction. Surprisingly, we found that all 5 brain regions had a significant 
proportion of cells encoding Goal-only, beginning almost 2 seconds before entering the 
final port (Figure 12A), while no brain regions reached significance for the Cued Reward 
at the time of reward port in (Figure 9A), indicating that the cells were differentiating 
where the rat actually went versus where the rat was instructed to go. 
 Goal encoding was universal across regions, but the relative proportions and 
timing of maximum encoding differed between areas. Prior to entering the reward port, 
the highest proportion of coding cells was found in the OFC (18%) and Shell (17%), 
followed by DLS (15%), DMS (14%), and Core (12%). In contrast, after reward port in, 
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the Goal port was encoded in 27% of Core units, followed by OFC (18%), DLS (12%), 
DMS (11%), and Shell (11%).  Peak encoding also demonstrates the different profiles 
between the 5 regions: the Shell and DLS peak before reward port in (26% at -300ms and 
20% at -100ms), while the DMS and Core peak 100ms after reward port in (23% and 32 
% respectively), and the OFC peaking latest, 300ms after reward port in (34%). 
The cells encoding the factor Goal-Only show differentiation between which 
reward port the rat enters. It was our hypothesis that certain brain regions would show a 
bias for the higher value port (e.g. the food port when hungry), by having a higher firing 
rate before and after entering that port. To test this hypothesis, we used the Value Index 
for preferred vs. non-preferred trial type firing rates (see methods). Contrary to our 
hypothesis, there was no single brain region with a bias for the higher value port (Figure 
12B). Next we used the Identity Index to test for encoding of the food port vs. the water 
port, regardless of internal state. Unexpectedly, we found regional biases for the identity 
of the port (Food vs. Water port, Figure 12C). The Core reaches significance before 
reward port entry for the Water port, while the DMS reaches significance before Food 
port entry. The OFC reaches significance for the food port after reward entry, and the 
Shell reaches significance for the water port long after reward entry. The bar graph insets 
in Figures 12B and 12C demonstrate the total encoding of the respective firing rate 
indices from 0 to 1 second after reward port entry, which again shows that there was no 
regional bias for value, but there were strong regional biases for the identity of the reward 
port. Despite previous research showing higher firing rates and regional biases for higher 
valued or more preferred goals, our results indicate that the identity of the reward port 
	  
80	  
was the only factor to show a bias in some brain regions, and only after reward port entry, 
despite the fact that all 5 brain regions had strong encoding of the upcoming goal. 
 Individual cell examples are shown in Figures 12D and 12E on either food or 
water restricted days. The DMS, DLS and OFC have 2 different cells that fire most when 
the rat enters the food port on either day. The Core and Shell show higher firing rates 
when entering the water port, regardless of internal state.  
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Figure 12: Goal Only Cells 
 
A: Goal Only Cells. From the 3-factor regression, the proportion of cells that reached 
significance for only the Goal factor are plotted across behavioral events. The filled 
circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin 
width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. The inset triangle shows the Goal factor on the 
Regression Triangle. Universal encoding for the port the rat enters is seen prior to entry 
in all 5 brain regions. 
B: Value Firing Rate Index. From the cells in 9A, the trial type that had the highest firing 
rate is plotted as an index across time, but trials are identified by preference, so food on 
food restricted days and water on water restricted days (Preferred – NonPreferred). The 
filled circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while 
the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. 
Inset shows the area under the curve of the line plotted in B, from -1 to 1s after reward 
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C: Identity Firing Rate Index. Same as B except that each cells is plotted for Identity, so 
the index is Water – Food. The inset shows the area under the curve from -1 to 1s after 
reward port in. There is a bias in all 5 brain regions for the port the rat enters, based on 
goal identity. 
D: Example cells from each of the 5 brain regions on a Food Restricted day. Black bar 
indicates when the cell reached significance for encoding the Goal factor. The top plots 
are the raster plots while the bottom plots are the peri-event time histograms 
E: Example cells from each of the 5 brain regions on a Water Restricted day. Black bar 
indicates when the cell reached significance for encoding the Goal factor. 
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Section 6: Outcome Encoding After Reward Port In 
 
The interaction term between Goal and Cue represents the 'Outcome' variable, and 
indicates whether or not the rat was correct or incorrect. Each of the 5 brain regions had 
cells that showed significance for the interaction term only, without any of the 2 main 
effects, indicating that a signal about whether or not a trial was correct was universal. 
However, no region began significantly encoding the Outcome until after the rat entered 
the reward port (Figure 13A). Despite a widespread signal for Outcome, this signal was 
strongest in the Core, although it began at a later time point than most of the other regions 
(Figure 13A). The maximum proportion of cells encoding Outcome reached 26% in the 
Core, at 2.7 seconds after reward port in. The DMS reached 17% (+1.7 seconds), the 
DLS reached 16% (+1.9seconds), the OFC reached 16% (+2.2seconds) and the Shell 
reached 18% (+2.9seconds).  
Outcome encoding showed the strongest regional bias on the firing rate index 
among all 5 brain regions, compared to all of the other factors examined. To quantify this 
bias, we looked at the firing rates on correct vs. incorrect trials and created the Outcome 
Firing Rate Index (Figure 13B). All 5 brain regions reached significance 700ms after 
entering the reward port. The DLS, as a region, had a significant bias to fire more on 
correct trials, just after reward port in (9 cells firing more for the correct reward and 2 
cells firing more for the incorrect reward, Figure 13B p<0.05 binomial test). All of the 
other brain regions had a significant bias for the incorrect outcome- the DMS, OFC, Core 
and Shell each only had 1 cell fire more on correct trials (Figure 13B, p<0.05), with 
significantly more cells firing at a higher rate for the incorrect outcome. The DLS pattern 
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changed 2.2 seconds after reward, when the DLS then had 5 cells firing for the correct 
outcome, and 10 cells firing for the incorrect outcome (Figure 13B).  
The findings for Outcome were nearly the same on sated/restricted days as they 
were on food or water restricted days, with the Core showing the highest proportion of 
cells encoding Outcome (Figure 8E). The DMS, OFC, Core and Shell all had 
significantly more bias for the incorrect reward, while the DLS had a trend towards the 
correct reward (Figure 8E inset).  
The final combination of factors that showed significance at the time of the 
reward were cells that had a main effect of Cue, a main effect of Goal, and a significant 
interaction term between Cue and Goal. The DLS showed the greatest proportion of cells 
for this term, as well as encoding these variables earlier than all other brain regions. At 1 
second after reward port in, the DLS reached a proportion of 18%, the DMS at 15%, the 
OFC at 10%, the Shell at 9% and the Core at 7% (Figure 13C).  
 The firing rate scale for this combination of terms again shows that the DLS is 
biased to fire for the correct reward, up until 1.5 seconds after reward port in, while the 
other 5 brain regions show a bias for the incorrect reward, though this only reached 
significance in the OFC and Core (Figure 13D, solid lines). Interestingly, the DMS again 
had a higher firing rate for the non-preferred goal (Figure 13D, dashed line) and was the 
only region to reach significance for the Value firing rate scale, demonstrating that the 
DMS was the only region with a bias for value, and did so by firing more for the non-
preferred reward. This same analysis for Stimulus (food vs. water) did not yield a 
significant bias in any brain region.  
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Figure 13: Reward Integration Cells After Reward Port In 
 
A: Current Outcome Only cells. From the 3-factor regression, these are cells that reached 
significance for the interaction between Goal and Cue only, plotted 6 seconds 
surrounding reward port in. The filled circles represent when a region reached 
significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
Universal coding of the Outcome is seen in all 5 brain regions, with the Core reaching the 
highest proportion of cells.  
B: Outcome Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the highest 
firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Trials are identified by Outcome, (Correct - 
Incorrect). The solid dots and corresponding bar represents when a region, as a whole, 
reaches significance for one index (binomial test, p<0.05). Inset shows the area under the 
curve of the line plotted in B, from 0 to 1s after reward port in. The DLS is the only 
region to show a bias for the correct outcome- all other brain regions are biased for the 
incorrect outcome. 
C: Reward Integration Cells. From the 3-factor regression, these are cells that reached 
significance for the main effect of Goal, the main effect of Cue and the interaction 
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represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin 
width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. 
D: Outcome and Value Firing Rate Index. From the cells in C, the trial type that had the 
highest firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Trials are identified by Outcome for 
the dashed lines, (Correct - Incorrect), and Value for the solid lines, represented as 
Preferred – Non-preferred. The solid dots represents when a region, as a whole, reaches 
significance for one index (binomial test, p<0.05). The solid bars on the top half of the 
plot correspond to significance on the Outcome Index, with a corresponding inset 
showing the area under the curve for this index from 0-1s after reward port in. The solid 
bars on the bottom half of the graph show significance for the Value index, with the inset 
showing the area under the curve of the line plotted from 0 to 1s after reward port in.	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Section 7: Reward History  
The rat’s performance on the previous trial determined if the current trial was a 
repeat of the previous trial, or if the current trial presented a unique tone to the animal. 
Since trial history affected the presentation of each trial, we analyzed how this encoding 
was represented in the brain, as Reward History. This analysis followed the encoding of 
the current outcome factor into the inter-trial interval and into the next trial. This separate 
regression analysis examined the effect of the previous outcome on firing rates seen in 
the current trial. This is especially interesting because the task was designed so that after 
an incorrect trial, the rat had to repeat that trial. Therefore on some trials, the rat already 
knew what the trial would be before the cue even came on. To analyze how reward 
history was encoded in the brain, a 3-factor multiple regression analysis was performed 
using the factors ‘Previous Outcome’, ‘Cue’, and ‘Goal’. The proportion of cells from 
each brain region that encoded only Previous Outcome are shown in Figure 14A across 
all behavioral events.  
In order to determine how the individual cells were encoding the previous 
outcome, a firing rate index was plotted for Previous Outcome, and correct vs. incorrect 
trials were examined at two relevant time points, the Tone and at Reward Port In. In this 
analysis, the Core fires significantly more for the previously incorrect trials in the 3 
seconds prior to the tone (Figure 14B). No other region has a significant bias prior to the 
tone coming on. As the rat approaches the reward port no regions show a significant bias 
for either previously correct or incorrect trials (Figure 14C). 
To test if there were other aspects of the previous trial that influenced firing rate, 
other multiple regression analysis were run for Previous Outcome + Previous Goal, 
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Previous Goal + Current Outcome, and Previous Outcome + Current Outcome. None of 
these interactions reached significance for any of the brain regions. 
The final analysis was examining Previous Outcome on sated and restricted days, 
when the value of the two rewards was similar. When we ran the 3-factor regression 
using Previous Outcome, the same pattern of response was seen in all 5 brain regions as 
on the food and water restricted days, with the Core showing the strongest effect of 
Previous Outcome. The Core also fired more for the previously incorrect reward prior to 




Figure 14: Reward History 
 
A: Previous Outcome Only cells. From a new 3-factor regression examining Previous 
Outcome, Goal and Cue, these are cells that reached significance for the factor Previous 
Outcome Only, plotted 6 seconds around each of the behavioral events. The filled circles 
represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin 
width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps. All 5 brain regions significantly encode whether 
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B: Previous Outcome Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the 
highest firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Trials are identified by whether or 
not the previous outcome was correct (Previous Correct - Previous Incorrect). The filled 
circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Inset 
shows the area under the curve of the line plotted in B, from -3 to 1s before Tone. 
C: Previous Outcome Firing Rate Index. From the cells in A, the trial type that had the 
highest firing rate is plotted as an index across time. Trials are identified by whether or 
not the previous outcome was correct (Previous Correct - Previous Incorrect). The filled 
circles represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the 
corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Inset 
shows the area under the curve of the line plotted in B, from -3 to 1s before reward port 
in. 





Section 8: Cell and Event Overlap 
 
 To get a better understanding of how individual cells contribute to the entirety of 
the behavioral task, each cell was plotted across time for all of the relevant behavioral 
factors. Any time a cell reached significance for any of the relevant regression factors 
within a 200ms time window, a different color was plotted based on the factor of 
significance. This way, each cell could be followed throughout the task, and the length of 
encoding as well as the actual factor that was encoded could be seen. Finally, a direct 
comparison of cells in different behavioral events, reaching significance for different 
regression factors was compared using a Venn diagram, to better understand how 
individual cells overlapped in time and encoding. The first Venn Diagram represents 
Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during the events Nose Side In (action) and Reward Port 
In (Goal and Outcome). The second Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration 
encoding at 3 different time points around Reward Port In (see methods). Each region is 
plotted separately, with the 3-factor regression shown for that region alone. A separate 
analysis was done for Action-Goal-Cue (Figures 15-19), and Previous Outcome-Goal-
Cue (Figures 20-24). 
 Difference in encoding schemes across events and between cells demonstrates 
other regional differences. When comparing Action cells to cells that encode Goal or 
Outcome, both the DMS and Shell show the greatest separation of cells, having very few 
cells overlap their encoding during different behavioral events (Figure 16C and Figure 
18C). On the other hand, the DLS and Core show more overlap within the same cell 
across behavioral events and different encoding factors (Figure 15C and Figure 17C). In 
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fact, only 6 of the 32 cells in the Core only encode the factor Action, while 14 cells 
overlap between Action and Goal, and 5 overlap with Action, Goal and Outcome (Figure 
17C and 17D). The OFC has the highest amount of integration of all 5 brain regions, 
showing that the OFC encodes a little bit of everything across all behavioral events, 
without having one distinct role (Figure 19C and 19D).   
When comparing how cells encode information at the reward port, the DLS again 
stands out as the region that has the highest number of cells that only integrate 
information about the Cue, the Goal and the Outcome (Figure 15D), while still a large 
proportion of cells that contribute to this integration also showed significance for the 
Goal. The DMS has the fewest number of cells that overlap between factors. The OFC 
and Shell show almost no overlap between cells that encode ‘Outcome’ and those that are 
significant for Cue, Goal and Outcome (Figure 16D). This could mean that the cells that 
integrate all 3 signals are doing so for the motor movement, while a separate signal 
encodes whether or not a reward was received.  
 The DMS shows relatively even encoding across all factors and all events. The 
DLS shows a brief increase in firing for the Cue, for the Action, and then has a much 
longer responses to the reward related factors, with a nearly even distribution between the 
Goal, the outcome, and their integration. The Core shows very brief responses for the 
Action, very brief responses for the Goal, and longer responses in cells that fire for 
Outcome. The Shell has cells that fire for a longer period of time for the Cue, with short 
periods of encoding for the Action. At Reward port in, responses to the outcome are the 
longest. The general firing rate patterns of the DMS and Shell are similar, while the firing 
rate patterns of the DLS and Core are similar. Although it is not clear from this study how 
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these regions are acting differently for model-free vs. model-based encoding, it does 
appear that a the schematic in Figure 2B, at least as far as encoding patterns go, gives 







Figure 15: Dorsal Lateral Striatum 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the relevant factors 
for the cells in just the DLS, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The 
total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region 
reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 
adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the DLS is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during the events Nose 
Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds 
for Outcome).  
D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 3 different time 
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Figure 16: Dorsal Medial Striatum 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the relevant factors 
for the cells in just the DMS, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The 
total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region 
reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 
adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the DMS is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during the events Nose 
Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds 
for Outcome).  
D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 3 different time 
points around Reward Port In (Goal: -0.5 to 0.5 seconds; Outcome: 0.5 to 1.5 seconds; Integration: 1.5 to 
2.5 seconds). 
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Figure 17: Nucleus Accumbens Core 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the relevant factors 
for the cells in just the Core, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The 
total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region 
reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 
adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the Core is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during the events Nose 
Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds 
for Outcome).  
D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 3 different time 































































Figure 18: Nucleus Accumbens Shell 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the relevant factors 
for the cells in just the Shell, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The 
total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region 
reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 
adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the Shell is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during the events Nose 
Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds 
for Outcome).  
D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 3 different time 
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Figure 19: Orbitofrontal Cortex 
 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Action-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the relevant factors 
for the cells in just the OFC, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant behavioral events. The 
total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when a region 
reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates when 2 
adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the OFC is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Goal’ encoding at reward port in, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Action-Goal-Outcome encoding during the events Nose 
Side In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for action), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 to 1.5 seconds 
for Outcome).  
D: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Goal-Outcome-Integration encoding at 3 different time 
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Figure 20: Dorsal Lateral Striatum 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the DLS, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant behavioral 
events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when 
a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the DLS is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome encoding during the 
events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 
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Figure 21: Dorsal Medial Striatum 
 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the DMS, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant 
behavioral events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles 
represent when a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across 
the top indicates when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the DMS is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome encoding during the 
events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 


















































Figure 22: Nucleus Accumbens Core  
 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the Core, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant behavioral 
events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when 
a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the Core is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome encoding during the 
events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 













































Figure 23: Nucleus Accumbens Shell 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the Shell, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant behavioral 
events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when 
a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the Shell is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome encoding during the 
events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 


















































Figure 24: Orbitofrontal Cortex 
 
A: Encoding by Region. The 3-Factor regression Previous Outcome-Goal-Cue is plotted for all of the 
relevant factors for the cells in just the OFC, in 6 second time windows surrounding the relevant behavioral 
events. The total proportion of cells that reach significance are shown, and the filled circles represent when 
a region reached significance (binomial test, p< 0.05), while the corresponding bar across the top indicates 
when 2 adjacent bins reach significance. Bin width of 500ms, sliding in 100ms steps.  
B: Individual Cell Plots. Each cell that was recorded from in the OFC is plotted individually. When a cell 
reached significance for any of the relevant multiple regression factors, a colored line is used to indicate the 
time window (200ms, non-overlapping) of significance for that factor. In this way, all of the different 
regression factors are visualized for each cell, across all events. The individual cells were sorted for the 
amount of ‘Previous Outcome’ encoding at the Tone, and this sorting order remained consistent across all 
behavioral events.  
C: Event Overlap. The Venn Diagram represents Previous Outcome-Goal-Outcome encoding during the 
events Tone (-2 to -1 seconds for Previous Outcome), Reward Port In (-0.5 to 0.5 seconds for Goal and 0.5 


















































Chapter 4: Final Conclusions  
 
 
In task after task, manipulation after manipulation, specific regions are thought to 
behave in a specialized manner, which is clearly delineated along anatomical borders. 
With that in mind, the expectations going into this experiment were to find very clear 
patterns of activity that would strictly segregate according to region. The fact that this 
behavioral task so strongly separated all aspects of a reward based decision-making task 
contributed to this hypothesis. If Cue can be so distinctly separated from Action- in both 
time and meaning- which is also separated from the Goal, then these aspects of decision-
making that are so clearly seen in other lesion and electrophysiology studies should be 
even more obvious in the current study. 
 
Universal Action Encoding 
The strongest and most overwhelming result of this study is that the individual 
brain regions are highly redundant. Surprisingly, the most universal and consistent coding 
seen in all 5 brain regions was for ‘Action’- a differentiation between contralateral and 
ipsilateral movements. Importantly, this study specifically disentangled actions from the 
upcoming reward, by having the cue that signaled direction separate and unattached to 
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the cue that signaled the reward. The rat used a visually guided cue to determine 
movement direction, and then proceeded to the reward port after successfully completing 
the nose poke action.  Contrary to the hypothesis, all 5 brain regions encoded action, 
independently of reward in a large fraction of cells (ranging from 17-33% of task-related 
cells). Even more surprisingly, the OFC had the highest proportion of cells encoding the 
action variable, at 34%. The Shell had the lowest proportion of cells encoding action, and 
also did so for the shortest amount of time. 
Importantly, this behavioral task as well as the analysis, was very restrictive of 
how to encode the action variable. The Cue that began each trial (a tone) only signaled 
the upcoming reward (food vs. water). There was no pre-motor signal that gave the rat 
any information about what movement he would make. Therefore, as expected, there was 
no pre-motor movement related activity. This is different than many other tasks that often 
impose a delay between a reward/movement instructive cue, and a trigger stimulus that 
then tells the animal to go (Gage et al., 2010; Apicella et al., 1992; Hollerman et al., 
1998; Pasupathy and Miller, 2005; Samejima et al., 2005; Hikosaka and Watanabe, 
2000).  
Additionally, when examining specific motor activity, the analysis was restricted 
to cells that only showed specific directional selectivity- so more firing on a contralateral 
trial vs. an ipsilateral trial. This analysis excluded cells that had a change in firing rate 
over baseline, but did not encode a specific direction. To further fine-tune the analysis, 
the multiple regression was restricted to cells that showed ONLY a main effect of 
‘Action’. If a cell encoded another aspect of the task at the same time as it became 
significant for Action, it was not included in these Action-Only results. This is unlike 
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many other studies that compare activity within a specific time window to baseline, 
without necessarily differentiating different movements. It also excludes cells from this 
particular analysis that encode something other than a purely movement related response.  
Because of this highly restrictive analysis, it was even more surprising to find 
such abundant encoding of contralateral vs. ipsilateral movements, with nearly the same 
temporal profile, in all 5 brain regions. Studies that have examined strict motor firing in 
the basal ganglia have often found it to be very context dependent (Hikosaka et al., 
1989b; Rolls et al., 1983; Tremblay et al., 1998), so the fact that we still found such 
abundant motor movement, with differential starting points and distinctly separate 
reward-value predictions, is a significant contribution to understanding the basal ganglia 
literature. Many decision-making tasks overlay the combination of action + value to 
differentiate neural firing rate patterns, and cannot speak to the separate contributions 
within each subregion. This task can. 
 
Dorsal Striatum:  Directional coding in both the medial and lateral dorsal striatum has 
been seen in a variety of tasks, throughout the reward and learning literature (Wiener, 
1993); (Yeshenko et al., 2004; Stalnaker et al., 2010; Van Der Meer et al., 2010; Thorn et 
al., 2010; Barnes et al., 2011; Schmitzer-Torbert and Redish, 2008; Schmitzer-Torbert 
and Redish, 2004; Tang et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2002; Gage et al., 2010; Bryden et al., 
2012). The basal ganglia has long been thought to be an area important to the selection of 
actions (Mink, 1996; Redgrave et al., 1999; Samejima and Doya, 2007). Lesion studies 
have also demonstrated the role of the dorsal striatum in executing specific directional 
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responses (Brasted et al., 1997; Carli et al., 1989; Cook and Kesner, 1988; Brown and 
Robbins, 1989; Döbrössy and Dunnett, 1997).  
 Based on recent lesion literature, there is a strong consensus on the medial-lateral 
divide in the dorsal striatum, and the subsequent role each has in reward related behavior 
and learning (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine et al., 2007; Balleine and O'Doherty, 
2010; Yin et al., 2008, White, 2009; Redgrave et al., 2010; Devan et al., 2011). It is 
therefore somewhat surprising to find a roughly equal contribution of neurons from DMS 
and DLS to movement-specific aspects of my task. In contrast to the results seen in most 
lesion studies, others who used single unit recordings to directly compare DMS and DLS 
found similar results to this study. In tasks directly testing the contributions of DMS and 
DLS to habit vs. goal-directed behaviors, recordings done in the rodent striatum have all 
found surprising overlap between the two regions in the amount of direction encoding 
(Kim et al., 2013; Kimchi et al., 2009; Stalnaker et al., 2010; Thorn et al., 2010).  
 Despite similar proportions of neurons encoding Action between regions, there 
were differences between the DMS and DLS within this group of neurons. To further 
examine how the individual units contribute to the regional encoding of Action, we 
examined the individual firing rate patterns to create an index that tracks the trial type 
with the highest firing rate. That is, if a cell differentiates between contra vs. ipsi 
movements, which of those two trials had the higher firing rate. From this index, the 
proportion of cells of each trial type was plotted over time, and each bin was tested for 
significance (p< 0.05, binomial test). At the time of peak Action encoding, which 
happens between 400ms to 800ms after nose center out, the DMS shows a significant 
regional bias for the contralateral movement direction. In contrast, the DLS shows no 
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regional bias. This means that of the cells that show a significant contra/ipsi 
differentiation, those in the DMS are firing more for the contralateral action, while those 
in the DLS are firing equally for contra and ipsi movements (Figure 7C).  
This difference between DMS and DLS contribution to Action encoding is 
somewhat surprising. Lesion studies in the rodent have often found varying forms of a 
contralateral deficit in both areas of the striatum (Döbrössy and Dunnett, 1997; Carli et 
al., 1989; Brasted et al., 1997; Brown and Robbins, 1989). However, electrophysiology 
studies examining either or both areas have led to conflicting results. Some studies show 
no bias in either region, including a study from the Berke lab (Gage et al., 2010; 
Stalnaker et al., 2010). In maze tasks, although movement/turn related activity was 
encoded in areas of the striatum, direction specific bias was not reported in studies from 
the other labs as well (Berke and Eichenbaum, 2009; Schmitzer-Torbert and Redish, 
2004, 2008; van der Meer et al., 2010). In contrast to these results, the Graybiel lab 
(Thorn et al., 2010), did find directional bias in both DMS and DLS, with a stronger 
contralateral bias in the DLS. However, a nose poke task, more similar to the one 
employed in this study, that was only examining the DMS found an increase in firing rate 
in the DMS for contralateral turns (Bryden et al., 2012). 
A possible explanation for there were different regional biases between the DMS 
compared to the DLS could be due to the number of FSIs. In the DLS, 27% of the task 
related responses came from FSIs. In the DMS, only 10% of the task related responses 
during the action event were from FSIs. It could have been that since there are relatively 
more FSIs in the DLS, then the stronger contribution of FSIs to the recording database 
served to balance out the distribution of bias between contra and ipsi movements, as was 
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seen in Gage (Gage et al., 2010), MSN-FSI pairs always showed an opposing bias. 
However, when examining either just MSNs or just FSIs, the same patterns are found- 
that the DLS has no specific directional bias while the DMS is biased in the contralateral 
direction. 
Another possible explanation for the difference in regional bias between the DMS 
and DLS could be due to the actual mode of response. Even though the DLS is thought of 
as the sensorimotor striatum, due to its anatomical connections and task-related 
responses, it is possible that single neuronal contributions to movement are in a more big 
picture, broad sweeping variety- so that individual contralateral and ipsilateral 
directionality in a small nose poke task may not be enough to engage specific biases to 
either direction. Carelli (Carelli and West, 1991) demonstrated that 38% of DLS neurons 
responded to whole body movements, and that there were some neurons still tuned to 
specific directions. In contrast, the DMS may be more concerned with specific response-
related movements that cause a greater increase in the contralateral movement direction 
due to downstream connections to the substantia nigra.  
The sensorimotor striatum receives convergent projections from the 
somatosensory cortex, primary motor cortex and premotor cortex (Haber et al 1994 
(Haber, 2003; Parent and Hazrati, 1995). In recording studies, specific MSNs have been 
found that fire in relation to sensorimotor activity of single body parts (Alexander and 
DeLong, 1985; Carelli and West, 1991), and from the connections of the DLS to the 
GPi/SNr to the thalamus, they then project back to the motor cortical area (Parent and 
Hazrati, 1995; Alexander et al., 1986; Haber et al., 2000). Due to these connections to a 
more broad range of motor cortex, it is likely that the DLS is only concerned with the 
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broad movements of contra vs. ipsilateral directions, activating similar numbers of direct 
and indirect striatal pathways, while the DMS, which may be more intricately involved in 
specific movements, fires more for the contralateral space due to the requirement of 
activating more direct neurons.   
 
Nucleus Accumbens:  The original hypothesis did not anticipate a large amount of action-
specific encoding in the Nucleus Accumbens. Since the NAC is usually thought of the 
limbic-motor interface (Mogenson et al., 1980), due to its anatomical connections 
(Groenewegen and Russchen, 1984; Heimer et al., 1991; Wright and Groenewegen, 
1995); Voorn et al., 2004), the hypothesis was that the NAc would integrate Action + 
Value, or Action + Cue, rather than simply fire for Action alone. In fact, previous lesion 
work in the NAc found no deficit in a spatial task (Kelley et al., 2005; Kelley, 1999). 
Similar to the different results seen when contrasting single unit studies vs. lesion 
studies in the Dorsal Striatum, studies that examine single units within the NAc have 
found action-related encoding in rodents (Taha et al., 2007; Ito and Doya, 2009; Chang et 
al., 2002; Kim et al., 2009; Roesch et al., 2009). Most of these rodent studies examining 
neural activity have focused their analysis on how the movement related activity signals 
upcoming reward choices, rather than specifically examining the movement themselves. 
Additionally, when examining movements, prior studies have just examined the general 
movement-related time period compared to baseline, rather than having a task designed 
specifically to examine contralateral vs. ipsilateral movements.  
Contrary to the original hypothesis, we found a significant amount of encoding 
for specific contralateral vs. ipsilateral movements in both regions of the Nucleus 
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Accumbens. The Shell had the lowest proportion of cells encoding Action, reaching a 
peak of 18%, while the Core had a proportion of 25%. Both regions began encoding 
movement as the rat began moving, although the Shell reached significance at a later time 
point than the other 4 regions. These results were for cells that specifically differentiated 
contralateral and ipsilateral movements- this was not a general movement-related activity 
pattern, unlike other studies (Figure 7A). 
An additional result that is still somewhat puzzling is the fact that within the cells 
that encoded action, there were significant proportions of cells with contralateral 
directional bias in both the Core and Shell (Figure 7C). The Shell only briefly (but 
significantly) responded with a contralateral bias for 600ms, right at peak encoding. The 
Core bias began towards the end of peak encoding, and lasted as long as the Shell. In 
previous single unit recording studies that examined directional encoding in the NAc, no 
other study has reported a significant bias, typically finding similar proportions of contra 
and ipsi favoring neurons (Taha et al., 2007; Ito and Doya, 2009; Kim et al., 2009; 
Roesch et al., 2009).  
It is possible that there is a motor component involved in the NAc firing of a 
subset of cells that explains why there is a brief contralateral bias in the Core and Shell. 
McGinty (McGinty et al., 2013) examined the firing rates of NAC neurons in a task that 
allowed the animals to flexibly approach a nose poke, and found that cue-evoked 
excitation predicted the movement initiation latency and speed of the flexible approach 
response, as well as proximity to the target. The task event that we analyzed here wasn’t 
under the same flexible approach paradigm that was used in the McGinty task- the 
movements still had a specific beginning and end location- but the speed and vigor with 
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which the rat made his movements, and the flexibility of left/right not being signaled 
ahead of time, could have been encoded in these neurons, and reflected in the subsequent 
firing rate bias. However, a specific analysis examining speed and vigor is beyond the 
scope of the current thesis project.  
Their results, as well as the results in the current study, can possibly be explained 
by the fact that different groups of neurons encode specific actions, while at another time 
in the task, other groups of neurons in the NAC encode the upcoming goal choice. Most 
previous research, even those involving effort or long delays, still do not have the drawn 
out behavioral events seen in the current task. Additionally, since Cue, Action and Goal 
were separated in both meaning and time, it gave ample opportunity to dissect what each 
brain region was doing. From these results, it is apparent that in both Core and Shell, 
there are subgroups of neurons that specifically encode directional movements in the 
pursuit of reward, without having those movements be directly tied to reward.   
 
Orbitofrontal Cortex:  Even more surprising than the significant amount of Action 
encoding seen in the NAC, as well as the strong contralateral bias in that region, was the 
fact that the region with the highest proportion of Action encoding, in the absence of 
reward value, was the OFC. Primate research in the OFC has long demonstrated no 
directional bias in a wide range of single unit studies (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; 
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009a; Abe and Lee, 2011). 
Contrary to findings in non-human primates, most single unit studies in rodents have 
shown directional selectivity in the OFC (Feierstein et al., 2006; Furuyashiki et al., 2008; 
Young and Shapiro, 2011; Roesch et al., 2006). Only recently has there been an 
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exception in primate literature, in a study by Luk and Wallis (Luk and Wallis, 2013), as 
well as one other primate study by Tsujimoto (Tsujimoto et al., 2009).  
In trying to differentiate the strong difference in findings of movement encoding 
between the primate and rodent literature, the answer may be in the specific motor 
component of the behavioral task. A majority of primate studies that have not found 
directional selectivity in the OFC used tasks that involved eye movements (saccades) 
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Wallis and Miller, 2003), or lever reaching (Tremblay 
and Schultz, 2000), and only after performing those movements did the rat than indirectly 
receive a reward- he did not actually execute a motor pattern to get the reward himself. It 
is possible that the rat studies, which involved the rats physically moving through space 
to specific, spatially distinct goals (reward locations), caused the difference in firing rate 
for movement, seen in the rodent OFC. In contrast to the primate OFC, studies examining 
primate striatum often show directional selectivity, but this may be due to the specific 
anatomical connections in the primate caudate to the visual cortex, that is specific to the 
saccade movement. 
Another possible explanation, as brought up in Luk and Wallis (Luk and Wallis, 
2013), is that previous primate OFC studies, despite utilizing an instrumental response, 
may have actually been solved using a Pavlovian mechanism- that is, the pattern of 
stimulus and outcome was so well learned that it no longer relied on planning the actual 
motor movement. Like the Luk and Wallis task in primates, the current task also did not 
require the rats to make the exact same movement to get a reward, preventing a long term 
mapping of precise movements with reward. This idea can also be thought of as 
disentangling actions and rewards. 
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Even though the findings in this study about Action selectivity in the OFC 
correspond to other rodent electrophysiology studies, the major difference is that there is 
also a significant directional bias in the OFC. Similar to the NAc and DMS, the OFC 
initially showed a strong contralateral bias as the rat moved from the center nose port. In 
contrast to the other regions, the OFC then switched to an ipsilateral bias at 2.2 seconds 
after nose center out. This was as encoding of action began tapering off, so it was with a 
smaller group of cells.  
One of the main studies to find directional selectivity in the rodent OFC was from 
the Mainen group (Feierstein et al., 2006). They recorded from a similar area in the 
rodent OFC and had a similar task, where direction was not signaled prior to movement. 
They found that during the response period, 41% of the cells were directionally selective, 
a very similar proportion to what was found in the current results. Even during the entry 
into goal port, 35% of cells were still selective for the left/right location of the ports.  
Research in the OFC that has found directional selectivity has not found a bias for 
either ipsilateral or contralateral movements (Feierstein et al., 2006; Furuyashiki et al., 
2008; Young and Shapiro, 2011; Roesch et al., 2006). In the OFC, Feierstein did find that 
speed of movement modulated the activity of some direction-selective neurons, which 
could explain the time course of selectivity in the current data- that rats were faster for 
contralateral movements, causing a bias early in the event, then the slower, ipsilateral 
cells demonstrated their bias later. Additionally (Furuyashiki et al., 2008) did not find a 
specific bias in contra vs. ipsi movements, but did find that the rats moved faster for right 
trials than left trials. They found that action-related neuronal firing rates were correlated 
with speed of movement. A more in depth analysis into specific timing-related firing rate 
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differences is beyond the scope and objective of this thesis, however it would be an 
interesting avenue for further research.   
Interestingly, when looking at directional bias on the days when the rat was only 
sated or restricted, the switch in contra/ipsi bias no longer is apparent. Directional 
selectivity is still highly significant in all 5 regions, but there is also only a small 
significance in the OFC bias to the contralateral side, and it happens later than on the 
food and water restricted days (Figure 8A, inset). This could mean that there is an 
invigoration component to the firing rate differences seen in the direction, that creates a 
bias when the rats are in a more motivated sate. 
 
Allocentric vs. Egocentric encoding 
Previous work examining the role of the striatum in reward related tasks has often 
questioned the idea that cells in the DMS and DLS may be encoding space, rather than 
movement (Mizumori et al., 2009). To account for this potential explanation, we used a 
modified 5-poke chamber, and utilized the center 3 nose ports as starting points, 
randomized across trials. The design of the nose poke parameters ensured that the starting 
central nose port changed randomly, so that each of 3 different central nose pokes was 
utilized throughout each recording session. This way, each movement was made to a 
different allocentric location- the specific movements were in relationship to the rat’s 
egocentric space, rather than specific port entries. In this way, encoding of spatial vs. 
allocentric movements were controlled for. This also makes this task unique compared to 
most other rodent reward paradigms, who used the same central nose pokes, and left vs. 
right fluid wells to deliver reward (Roesch et al., 2009).  
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The contralateral and ipsilateral movements made in this task were to egocentric 
space. The analysis of direction performed in the multiple regression was used based on 
the head movement made, not the starting port. If starting port were more highly 
significant than the movement, than the Action-Only factor would fail to reach 
significance.  
Despite being able to determine if these firing rate changes were allocentric vs. 
egocentric, it was not possible to determine if they were turn-specific, or head direction 
firing rate changes, since the movements made by the rats involved moving the head in 
separate directions, but each movement was relatively stereotyped. There was no 
comparison for movements made away from the nose poke vs. those done at the nose 
pokes because there was no way to precisely measure turning behavior away from the 
laser-guided nose poke holes. Additionally, there were no EMG recordings taken to 
determine if the neck related movements completely corresponded to the neural firing 
rates seen during action.  
A more in depth video analysis with corresponding EMG recordings would 
probably help explain the differences seen in encoding in the DMS vs. DLS, as a 
difference in general body orientation vs. specific head movements. If the DMS is more 
concerned with fine tune movements, than the subtle contralateral and ipsilateral 
movements may engage more of the direct pathway within the basal ganglia, and a 
subsequent increase in firing rate for contralateral movements. If the DLS is more whole-
body oriented, than the entirety of the direct and indirect pathways may be involved in 
orienting towards the adjacent nose pokes, and cause an overall split between firing more 




Timing of Action  
 Other results from the striatum have found post-movement encoding, or encoding 
only after response initiation (Lau and Glimcher, 2007; Kim et al., 2009; Kimchi and 
Laubach, 2009a) but the results from this study show involvement of all 5 brain regions 
as the rat begins movement into the adjacent, lit nose port (Figure 7A). There is some 
post-movement activity that continues in all 5 brain regions up to 1.5seconds after 
completing the nose poke movements.  
 In primates and some rodent studies, action coding in striatal regions is often 
found to encode reward expectations in the upcoming motor movement (Hikosaka et al., 
1989a; Apicella et al., 1992; Hollerman et al., 1998). However, this particular behavioral 
task did not give any pre-instruction motor related information, and therefore there was 
no pre-movement activity related to upcoming direction.  
It is not clear from these results which brain region could be responsible for the 
initial response of moving to the directional port since all 5 brain regions begin at nearly 
the same time. The DMS and DLS do reach significance as a population, 100ms before 
the OFC, but it is not clear that this result is compelling enough to argue that the striatum 
leads the OFC. It is interesting that there is not a clear leader in the control of actions and 
movements between the OFC and striatum, so it may instead indicate that both regions 
are receiving inputs from the same brain structure about movement and action selection. 
 
Action Encoding: Summary and Conclusions 
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No other study has directly compared directional selectivity, absent of reward 
specific movements, in all 5 of these brain regions, at the same time. It was not surprising 
that areas of the striatum encoded movement direction, since the Basal Ganglia has long 
been known for its role in action selection. However, finding simultaneous directional 
selectivity in both the DMS and DLS, with only the DMS showing a contralateral bias is 
a more novel finding. Since the DMS and DLS can be segregated based on their down 
stream connections, it has long been known that the DMS, in particular, would have a 
bias for the contralateral movements. This has been demonstrated in the past with lesion 
studies and recording studies. However, previous work in the DLS has found 
contradictory results, with some studies positing a contralateral bias in the DLS as well. 
Previous work in our lab with electrophysiology recordings did NOT find a contralateral 
bias in single cell units within the DLS, while lesion studies did find a contralateral 
deficit (Gage et al., 2010).  
 By directly comparing the two regions simultaneously, in a task that isolated 
movements alone, we are able to show conclusively that the DLS does care about general 
movement, but is doing so without a strong bias for a particular direction, whereas the 
DMS, as well as the nucleus accumbens Core and Shell are biased in their movement 
direction selectivity. Additionally, this directional encoding is not specific to the actual 
location of the nosepokes (spatial representation) rather it is movement specific to the 
egocentric location of the turn.  
 Not only is the striatum crucial in encoding action, the OFC had the highest 
proportion of cells to differentiate contralateral and ipsilateral direction. Although 
previous rodent work has shown direction-specific firing in the OFC, this result is not 
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typical in primate studies. Previous rodent work has also not always disentangled 
movements from spatial locations and reward-related encoding. This task was able to 
isolate action-specific encoding and decisively show that the OFC is involved in 
movement specific directional selectivity.  
Even though previous research has robustly found action-related activity in areas 
of the basal ganglia, no study has comprehensively examined all areas of the striatum in 
the same task, in the same rat in a reward-related task that differentiates specific 
movements from reward. In this task, when examining all behavioral events, we only find 
direction-selective encoding during movement. All 5 regions show a high proportion of 
cells encoding directional selectivity- so these are cells that are not only significantly 
active during the movement-related events, but are also showing turn-specific selectivity. 
It is therefore surprising that such a large proportion of cells from all regions have this 
directional selectivity.  
In summary, the most surprising results found were the strong encoding of 
directional selectivity ONLY, seen in both regions of the accumbens and the OFC. 
Previous research in rats have rarely disassociated specific aspects of movement vs. 
reward in the nucleus accumbens to be a particularly strong candidate for encoding 
direction, only, and so this is one of the only single-unit studies showing very specific 





Striatal Specialization for Cue 
Despite the homogenous encoding of Action seen in all 5 brain regions, 
differences between regions emerged early in the task in response to the Tone stimulus. It 
was the original prediction that the Nucleus Accumbens Core would respond most to the 
Tone, along with the DLS. When analyzing neural firing rates during the time of the tone, 
the analysis focused on the difference in firing between the two tones rather than examine 
the total activity pattern at the tone compared to baseline. The goal of this analysis was to 
see how the brain regions differentiated between stimuli. At the time of the Tone the 
DLS, Core and Shell showed a discernible response to a specific cue.  
The current behavioral task focused on examining the difference in firing rates 
between the two tones. The tones played at an unpredictable time, and the location of the 
rat within the recording chamber was flexible, so tone presentation did not rely on any 
behavior from the rat. Additionally, presentation of the tone stimulus was only indicative 
of the reward the rat could work towards- it did not have any information about the 
expected motor movement. When the rat heard the tone, he was expected to find a lit 
center nose port, and then begin a motor movement on the way to potentially collecting a 
reward.  
 
Dorsal Striatum:  The Dorsal Lateral striatum reached a significant proportion of 
encoding the Cue at the time of tone presentation, reaching a maximum encoding of 10% 
for 600ms (Figure 9A). The Dorsal Medial Striatum did not reach significance for the 
Cued reward, at any point when the tone was playing. Previous work in the Berke lab has 
not found a robust signal for a cue in either maze tasks (Berke et al., 2009) or in a simple 
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reaction time task (Gage et al., 2010), so finding any cue-responsive encoding was 
somewhat surprising. 
Despite the fact that the Berke lab has not seen a role for the DLS in cue 
responsive encoding, there are many reports of Cue encoding in single unit recordings in 
the primate striatum (Apicella et al., 1992; Vicente et al., 2012; Yamada et al., 2004); 
Hori et al., 2009). These results are not always consistent when studying single units in 
the rodent dorsal striatum. Most studies find very few, if any, cue-responsive neurons 
(Carelli et al., 1997; Jog, 1999; Berke et al., 2009; Kubota et al., 2009; Root et al., 2010; 
Barnes et al., 2005; Barnes et al., 2011). The only previous results in rodent 
electrophysiology studies with cue responsive neurons, when comparing the DMS and 
DLS is a study looking at alcohol-related cues, and finding only DMS cue encoding 
(Fanelli et al., 2013), or cue encoding in both DMS and DLS (Stalnaker et al., 2010). 
Evidence from rodent lesion studies indicates that the DLS may be necessary for 
executing stimulus-response associations (Atallah et al., 2007; Balleine et al., 2007; Yin 
et al., 2006). However, recent electrophysiology studies in rats and mice have found 
conflicting results. When recording from the DLS in mice, Kubota (Kubota et al., 2009) 
found very few neurons that differentiated between the two auditory cues that instructed 
the mice where to go. They did however find an increase in only the DLS at the start and 
end of the task, even if the neurons did not differentiate between the two stimuli. 
Similarly, Barnes and Job all found very few cue related neurons in the DLS, 
occasionally finding none at all (Barnes et al., 2005; Barnes et al., 2011). In a task similar 
to the one used in this study, where the cue that instructs where to go is largely separated 
in time from the actual choice, Barnes (2011) found that only 6% of neurons 
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differentiated between the two tones at the beginning of the task. In the current study, 
10% of DLS neurons responded based on the tone that played, meaning that cue-
responsive neurons were not the overwhelming majority of the responses seen in the 
DLS.  
 The difficulty in comparing past results with those seen in this behavioral task can 
be partially explained by both the task and the analysis used. In a majority of previous 
research, both in the primate and rodent literature, there is often only one cue used. Most 
studies utilize probabilities of reward, rather than 2 separately valued rewards. A study 
that did utilize two separately valued rewards was Stalnaker (2010), but they only 
manipulated the amount or the delay to reward, whereas the actual identity of the reward 
stayed the same. This study did find single units that differentiated between the cues in 
the DMS and DLS (Stalnaker et al., 2010). 
 The behavioral task used in this project appears to be quite unique, then, and the 
finding that the DLS differentiates between two different tone-reward pairings is a novel 
finding. The fact that there were two different rewards may also explain why there was 
distinct firing for the two tones, a result that has not been seen in the Berke lab before 
(Berke et al., 2009; Gage et al., 2010). In these studies the tones indicated a different 
movement response, but the rat was still working for one specific type of reward- a 
sucrose pellet. In this case, the idea of stimulus-response encoding was seen to be the 
specific action that was taken. However in the current behavioral task, there may have 
been stimulus-response encoding that actually signaled the response as a differentiation 
in the type of reward.  
Work in the rodent utilizing lesions has hypothesized a role for the DLS over the 
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DMS in pairing cues with responses. In a series of studies by Featherstone et al, they 
systematically lesioned either the DMS or DLS in instrumental learning and found that 
the DLS was required for stimulus-response learning (Featherstone and McDonald, 
2004a, b; McDonald and Hong, 2004). Lesions of the DLS impaired the rat in 
discriminating between a rewarded and unrewarded stimulus, but it was only due to the 
discrimination between the CS+ and CS- and not a motor deficit.  
It follows, then, that the DLS in the current behavioral task is responding to the Cue 
because it represents a pairing between a specific tone, and the response required to get 
that reward, that is, which port to go to. The fact that the DLS does not show a significant 
bias towards the higher or lower valued tone, based on the reward it is paired with, or to a 
specific tone-stimulus, is further proof that the pairing is due to the response selection 
required, rather than specific tone qualities, or value associated with the tone.  
 
Nucleus Accumbens:  When examining the two subregions of the Nucleus Accumbens, 
the Shell began differentiating between the two Cues at the onset of tone presentation. A 
significant proportion of cells within the Shell encoded ‘Cue’, and maintained encoding 
for 800ms, but the region only reached a maximum proportion of (11%). The Core had a 
much smaller window of significance, reaching a 12% maximum for only 500ms.  
 Examination of the precise nature of encoding at the time of the tone revealed that 
the Shell was responding by increased firing for the Water tone, regardless of internal 
state (Figure 9C). The Core did not reach significance for either a specific stimulus or a 
specific value parameter- meaning there was equal firing for both food and water tones, 
distributed among hunger and thirsty days. 
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Tone encoding in the Nucleus Accumbens has been seen in many previous studies 
(Roesch et al., 2009; Nicola et al., 2004b; Setlow et al., 2003; Taha et al., 2007). These 
results demonstrate a much stronger role for the Shell in responding to the tone, 
compared to the Core. This is in contrast to a great deal of previous research examining 
the specific roles of the Core and Shell, many of which have only found cue responding 
in the Core. Ambroggi (Ambroggi et al., 2011) found that iNActivation of the Core, but 
not the Shell, caused a decrease in responding to reward predictive cues. Additionally, 
when recording from the Core vs. Shell, they found more frequent, and larger magnitude 
firing rate responses to the reward predictive cue in the Core vs. the Shell. Both of these 
results indicate the importance of the Core in cue-related responding, which contradicts 
what was found in the current study. However, their study used a discriminative stimulus 
task that had either reward vs. no reward predictive cues, unlike the current behavioral 
task, which had slightly different valued reward predictive cues, with no ‘unrewarded’ 
cue. 
Evidence that the Core is more important for cue-related behavior shows that 
inactivation of the Core, but not Shell, disrupts reinstatement of drug and food seeking 
behavior (Fuchs et al., 2004; Floresco et al., 2008). Cocaine cues cause an increase in 
dopamine in the core but not shell (Aragona et al., 2009). Other voltammetry studies have 
found that cues predictive of sucrose increase dopamine release in the Core (Roitman et 
al., 2004; Day et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2010;  Cacciapaglia et al., 2011).  
Lesion studies have also indicated the Core over the Shell in cue-guided behavior 
(Di Ciano and Everitt, 2001; Floresco et al., 2008; Chaudhri et al., 2010). NAC neurons 
show Cue related responses that correlate with both the predictive value of the cue and 
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the action elicited (Nicola et al., 2004b; Taha et al., 2007; Ito and Doya, 2009; Roesch et 
al., 2009). These results are all contradictory to the current findings- the Shell fires more 
for the Cue, and does so by firing for the identity of the reward, not the value. One of the 
only studies to find a stronger response in the Shell, compared to Core, is Cacciapaglia 
(Cacciapaglia et al., 2012) who found dopamine release events in both Core and Shell in 
response to a cue for a sucrose reward.  
This study was not looking for cells that showed a more general signal for tone-
related activity. The hypothesis was testing if there were cells that specifically 
differentiated between the food and water tone. In other studies, such as Goldstein 2012 
(Goldstein et al., 2012), there were only a small percentage of cells that were active 
during the cue that actually distinguished between the different trial types, which is 
similar to the results seen in the NAc Shell and Core in this task. The Core may have a 
more general cue response, which is separate from a more rare response that actually 
differentiates between different tones.  
Other studies that show slightly more subtle changes in firing for the Cue show 
that NAc neurons that respond to the Cue are firing based on the cost of the trial, as it 
relates to the delay before getting a reward of the same magnitude (Day et al., 2010). In 
this population, neurons exhibited a larger magnitude excitation on low-cost trials 
compared to high cost trials. This last part of their results is in contrast to the current 
results, however, since the Shell cells in this task fired for identity. A caveat to their 
results is that action was directly related to the cue, so these cells could actually have 




Finding more firing in the NAC Shell compared to the Core is a novel result, and 
makes an important contribution to the understanding of how different subregions 
contribute to encoding a decision-making task. This behavioral task is unique compared 
to most other studies that examine single unit NAC firing, because it specifically 
compares two different types of reward. Past results that find firing in the NAC Core and 
not the Shell rarely examine two separate rewards. This study adds to that literature and 
demonstrates a role for the Shell in distinguishing separate Cue identities, in a non-value 
based manner.  
 
Orbitofrontal Cortex:  However surprising it may have been to find encoding for the Cue 
in the Shell rather than the Core, it was equally surprising to NOT find encoding in the 
OFC. Primate studies from practically the beginning of electrophysiology have found that 
the OFC responds to salient cues that either relate to, or predict reward. Results like these 
are some of the most consistent findings in the primate OFC literature. Primate 
electrophysiology studies dating back to at least 1983 have found single unit examples 
that respond to different stimuli that predict rewards (Thorpe et al., 1983). Using both 
visual and olfactory paradigms through the years, research have consistently found 
neurons in the primate OFC that respond to reward-predictive cues (Rolls et al., 1996; 
Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Hassani et al., 2001; 
Simmons et al., 2007; Kobayashi et al., 2010). Most studies show higher firing for cues 
that predict a more valuable reward (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Roesch and Olson, 
2004; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Roesch and Olson, 2007; Simmons et al., 2007; 
Bouret and Richmond, 2010; Kennerley et al., 2011; Padoa-Schioppa and Cai, 2011).   
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 In the current study, the OFC never reached significance for the Cue at the time of 
the tone. Besides just the difference in species, one explanation for why there is no cue-
related firing in the OFC could be due to the difference in behavioral tasks. In most 
primate studies, they are rarely comparing cues that predict different rewards. 
Additionally they rarely use a task where the monkey gets a lot of trials wrong. The 
studies examine only correct trials and use a behavioral task that is predictive and does 
not utilize a choice, using highly trained monkeys where behavior is 90% or better. 
Anatomical differences between primates and rodents could also explain some of 
the difference in findings. The areas recorded from in this study may not line up with the 
precise areas seen in the primate (Wallis, 2012). In this study, the recording locations are 
from both medial and lateral OFC. In primate research, lateral OFC is often shown to be 
critical for updating the value of objects during satiation studies, while medial OFC is 
often crucial in studies that test the inhibition of responding during extinction (Rudebeck 
and Murray, 2011a; Rudebeck and Murray, 2011b). Another study comparing medial and 
lateral OFC in primates show that the lateral OFC is used in reward-credit assignment, 
while the medial OFC is necessary for reward-guided decision making (Noonan et al., 
2010). In rats, lesion studies beginning to dissociate the lateral and medial OFC found 
that lesions to medial OFC made rats less impulsive while lesions to lateral OFC made 
rats more impulsive (Mar et al., 2011).  
Few single unit studies have compared medial and lateral OFC in the rodent. A 
recent study by Burton (Burton et al., 2013) directly recorded from medial OFC in a task 
that used odors to predict either short or long delayed rewards. They found very few 
neurons that differentiated at the time of the odor cue (only 16%, or 41 neurons), 
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compared to baseline, and found only 13 cells that differentiated between the different 
odor cues. The cells that did respond to the cue in the medial OFC fired more during 
odors that predicted low-value outcomes. These results give insight into why the current 
study did not find a significant proportion of cells encoding the Cue at the time of the 
tone in OFC- previous work that actually tries to disentangle specific cues show very few 
neurons that do so in the OFC.  
Other differences between the current task and previous rodent electrophysiology 
recordings studies are what the actual Cue stimulus was. Nearly all rodent studies that 
have recorded from areas of the OFC used odor cues to predict reward (Feierstein et al., 
2006; Furuyashiki et al., 2008; Young and Shapiro, 2011; Roesch et al., 2006; van 
Duuren et al., 2007; van Duuren et al., 2008; van Duuren et al., 2009; Kepecs et al., 
2008). These studies had a cue that simply predicted a reward, with no value related 
information, or only used correct trials. The Feierstein study had an odor cue that 
indicated both direction and reward and in this task, 14.5% of cells fired discriminately 
between the two odors. In contrast, the cue used in the current study did not discriminate 
movement direction. In the Furuyashiki paper, there were 4 odors, so action and odor 
identity could be distinguished from each other. During cue sampling, both response and 
outcome selective neurons were found. Odor sampling occurred 500-1000ms after initial 
nose poke, and rats were required to respond within 5 seconds. The rat then had to hold 
for another 500-1500ms before receiving reward. The odor sampling port and reward 
delivery port were on the same wall, so movements were very quick, despite any delay 
imposed. Similar to the primate studies, the time between a cue stimulus sampling and 
actual reward receipt was less than 5 seconds, so anticipation of reward would be hard to 
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separate out from the cue response, especially since rewards were delivered to the same 
well.  
In contrast, the behavioral task used in the current study requires the rat to make 
an extended movement in between the time he hears the cue and receives the reward. The 
timing difference between this task and other rodent and primate studies may be why 
there is a difference in results for OFC cue-related firing. One possibility is that previous 
results misinterpreted a reward anticipation signal as cue-related response instead. The 
other possibility is that the OFC is not engaged in a task that has an extended time delay 
between Cue presentation and actual reward receipt.  Further analysis examining trial 
lengths would be an exciting extension of the current results. 
Evidence that suggests previous research may have had an overlap between cue 
response and reward anticipation can be seen in the current analysis, which shows that 
the OFC does fire for reward anticipation beginning 2 seconds before goal port entry (see 
Goal Chapter, Figure 12A). Relative to that time frame, previous results that have a short 
duration between cue presentation and reward may simply be washed. Additionally, since 
the rats in the current behavioral task are allowed to choose the reward port, and often get 
the trial incorrect, it is more than likely that the Cue that plays is not very predictive of 
the actual reward.  
 Previous studies done in the OFC from the van Duuren group, which looked at 
reward probability during odor sampling found that 7% of neurons changed firing rate 
during odor sampling. Due to the nature of their task, they didn’t examine reward 
probabilities associated with the rewards, since they couldn’t dissociate odor identity 
from probability (van Duuren et al., 2008; van Duuren et al., 2009). They did find that on 
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a population level, as well as on a single unit level, the reward probability was encoded 
during the movement, waiting and reward periods. This study is one of the few rodent 
studies that did not find a very large number of cells in the OFC that encode the cue at the 
presentation of the stimulus. They impose longer delays (1.5s once the rat enters the 
reward trough) before delivering reward, so in a similar manner to my study, it may mean 
that if there is a longer waiting period between hearing the cue and receiving the reward, 
fewer OFC neurons respond to the Cue. Additionally, they had a reward probability task, 
so reward wasn’t guaranteed after odor sampling, unlike some of the other rodent single 
unit studies, which may also explain why their study, like mine, doesn’t find a large 
fraction of OFC responsive neurons during Cue presentation.  
 
Overall Cue Discussion: 
 The difference in behavioral tasks most likely explains a lot of the results either 
seen or not seen in the current results- this task is not probabilistic, but it is also not 
strictly Pavlovian. Most studies in both primate and rodent played a reward predictive cue 
that always meant a reward was coming- there was often no choice involved. In other 
groups of studies that have found cue related activity, it was for tones that compared 
reward vs. unrewarded stimuli- in this case it means there is no choice, the rat/primate 
will either receive a reward or he will not. The difference with the current behavioral task 
is that even though the rat heard the cue, and technically understood what the correct 
response was, it did not make receiving that reward a forgone conclusion. The rat could 
still enter the incorrect reward port, and not receive any reward. However, getting the 
trial wrong is still different than hearing a cue that indicates, ahead of time, that the trail 
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is unrewarded. The current task still does not make it a probabilistic task, because even if 
the rat still made a choice about which goal to enter, he technically had the information 
available to get every trial correct.  
A task that is similar to this task uses a t-maze to impose a choice for the rat, and 
uses a tone to indicate the correct direction. In these studies, there are very few reports of 
actual discrimination between two tones (Thorn et al., 2010; Barnes et al., 2005; Barnes 
et al., 2011).  
 Another difference between the current task and most other simple instrumental 
tasks that have found cue encoding is the length of time between when the tone actually 
plays to when the rat is making a decision about which reward port to enter. The average 
time it takes to complete a trial ranges from 6.5 seconds to almost 14 seconds, depending 
on the individual rat. This is much longer than most nosepoke, saccade and lever reaching 
tasks.  
 An even more compelling reason that the current task is different than other tasks 
is the fact that not only were incorrect trials utilized, but also incorrect trials were 
repeated. This means that approximately 10-25% of trials were repeated from the 
previous trial.  The rat had information about the upcoming trial before the tone actually 
played. Over time, this may have had the effect of making the Cue a less valuable 
stimulus. Pair that with the fact that the rat was wrong on 10-25% of trials means that the 
predictability of the cue is even lower. When the 3-factor regression was analyzed using 
only trials that were previously incorrect, the response to the Cue no longer reached 
significance in any brain region (Figure 10A). When analyzing Cue response in only the 
non-repeat trials (so Previously Correct Trials) the same proportion of cells becomes 
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significant- there is no alteration in encoding seen across the brain regions (Figure 10B). 
The Shell and DLS are only responding to the Cue when there is no previous information 
about the current trial.  
On Sated and Restricted days, for Cued only, the DLS reached a higher 
proportion than the Shell, and encoded the Cue for longer (Figure 8B). The Core also 
became significant for a longer period of time. However, there was no clear difference in 
the index for food vs. water reward. This demonstrates that the firing at the time of the 
tone was for some stimulus identity, or possibly signaling a salient event. The response is 
not dependent solely on value, since the encoding of the tone still happens on sated and 






Specialization for Action-Goal in the Dorsal Medial Striatum 
 
Although Action encoding was universal across brain regions, the integration of 
Action and the upcoming goal was only seen in the Dorsal Medial Striatum, 
demonstrating another instance of regional specialization. Previous research studying the 
integration of action with reward has found a signal in the dorsal medial striatum for 
‘Action-Value’ (Samejima et al., 2005; (Lau and Glimcher, 2007; Lau and Glimcher, 
2008; Pasquereau et al., 2007; Seo et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2009; Kimchi and Laubach, 
2009b). In a majority of these studies, animals were given a probabilistic choice task, 
with no actual correct answer. There was no cue that told the rat which goal port, or 
action was correct so the rat had only had a certain probability of finding a reward. 
Different movements were assigned different probabilities for reward, and the typical 
task design included blocks of various reward probabilities, so that specific action-value 
terms, calculated using equations from reinforcement literature, could subsequently be 
examined.  
The current behavioral task was not designed to specifically test for ‘action-
value’. Instead, this task was designed to disentangle movements from rewards, in order 
to test how those factors are encoded without being linked to one another. Additionally, 
this task was set up so that the rat was always informed as to what the correct answer 
was. The difficulty came from the fact that the rat’s desires often interfered with the 
correct choice. This led to behavioral errors in the 10-30% range, depending on the 
individual rat and trial type (see Figure 3E).  
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Interestingly, despite the fact that actions were not specifically tied to rewards, or 
reward probabilities, there was still an integration of action and choice, based on which 
goal port the rat went to. This result is similar to an action-selection signal, or an action-
choice signal, rather than an action-value signal, since it integrates both the direction and 
goal port the rat actually went to (rather than the option the rat faced). This also happened 
at a time that was before actual reward port entry, so the integration of action and 
upcoming goal port could conceivably be the actual action-selection mechanisms- or 
choice-like mechanism. This was seen mostly in the DMS, and very briefly in the OFC.  
The fact that the DMS signal was earliest and strongest could mean that the actual 
decision was being made in the DMS about where to go. The fact that the cells fired most 
on non-preferred trials could mean that the DMS is only involved on trials that require 
the most effort. Other studies attempting to distinguish the first instance of action-
selection between the OFC and Striatum found that the OFC fired first (Simmons et al., 
2007). However, in that study, they were comparing different animals and studies done at 
different times. The current study is the first conclusive finding that directly compares the 
OFC and DMS in a task that can determine where an action-goal signal originates. 
Findings of action-goal in the DMS are not new, however, it was unexpected to 
find this signal only in the dorsal medial striatum and OFC. Other rodent studies in 
particular have found an action-value, or action-outcome signal in the Nucleus 
Accumbens (Roesch et al., 2009), and due to its connections, the NAc is often thought of 
as the limbic-motor interface (Mogenson et al., 1980). In contrast, follow up studies that 
specifically disentangled actions and goals, like the current study, did NOT find action-
goal related firing in the Ventral Striatum (Goldstein et al., 2012; Ito and Doya, 2009).  
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Other rodent studies have found an action-goal signal in the DLS (Stalnaker et al., 
2010). In this study they used a free choice and forced choice task to separate actions and 
responses, as well as the cues that predict them, and found that both the DMS and DLS 
represented action + goal contingencies in the time before receiving reward. In their 
analysis, they looked at response selective neurons, and then examined the differences in 
firing rate during different predicted rewards. This analysis did not actually use statistics- 
they just showed the average firing rates of different types of neurons, collapsed across 
trials.   
The current studies unique ability to disentangle all aspects of reward related 
information, allow a more focused analysis on the important aspects studied in decision-
making: Cue, Action and Goal. Using this task, it is clear that the DMS has the strongest 
role in combining actions with upcoming Goal. These are not cells that only react to the 
Cue, nor are they cells that only respond to direction- they specifically integrate Action 
and Goal, regardless of what the upcoming outcome will be- this signal is very specific to 
the movements and goal port. 
To further understand how the DMS was encoding Action-Goal, we examined the 
firing rates of the individual cells and found that nearly all cells that reached significance 
in the 3-factor regression were firing most for the contralateral movement on non-
preferred trials. This signal is rather puzzling, because there are very few studies showing 
any brain region that consistently fires more for a non-preferred reward. There is some 
evidence though, that this signal may be necessary to help guide an animal through less 
preferable trials onto a more preferable trial (Minamimoto et al., 2005; Minamimoto et 
al., 2009). In these studies, the authors propose that the DMS is involved in ‘rebiasing’ an 
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action that is required in order for the rat to correctly go to a smaller reward, since the 
brain is usually biased to collect higher rewards. Corresponding to this, the results seen in 
the current study show that a majority of the neurons with an action-goal significance had 
the highest firing rate on Correct, Contralateral, Non-preferred trials (Figure 11C). It 
appears that the rat is putting in an effort to go to the non-preferred reward port to get it 
correct. This may have to do with the nature of the task because incorrect trials are then 
repeated. Possibly, the rat is putting in more effort to get the non-preferred reward correct 
so that he can then get a preferred reward the next time, rather than repeating the non-
preferred trial, similar to the theory proposed by Minamimoto et al.  
It could be that the DMS is rebiasing the rat into picking the non-preferred 
reward. Another interpretation is that the DMS is exerting extra control, or effort, on the 
non-preferred trials due to the fact that if incorrect, the current trial will be repeated. That 
means that an even longer delay will occur, and the rat will not receive the preferred 
reward for an even longer period of time, making a mistake very costly, in terms of time. 
In order to actually get to a preferred trial, then, the rat must exert greater effort on those 
non-preferred trials, and this is encoded in the DMS. The DMS is exerting cognitive 
control on trials that are against the Pavlovian response of simply heading to the more 
preferred reward port.  
Instead of firing for a combination of action + goal, the neurons could have fired 
for an integration of action + cue. This would be similar to the action-value like encoding 
seen in Samejima (Samejima et al., 2005) and Lau and Glimcher (Lau and Glimcher, 
2007) because it would have been an alternative option of task-related factors, other than 
simply where the rat chose to go. Individual brain regions could have encoded the Cue in 
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order to maintain a signal for the correct reward during each trial. Since most rats were 
incorrect on 10-25% of his choices (Figure 3E), there were enough trials to actually 
compare what was cued to what the rat chose (goal). In terms of the RL literature, this is 
similar to having options, in a reward probability task, even though the task was not 
specifically designed this way.  
The neural firing rate patterns followed the rats’ behavior, and not the Cue. The 
neurons that fired during this time frame did not encode the cued tone- there were no 
brain regions that fired differently for the cued tones while also firing for action (Figure 
11E). The result is somewhat surprising, given that recent studies in the rodent and 
primate literature have demonstrated that various choices are encoded in the striatum 
(Samejima et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2007). The fact that this task was not a 
probabilistic choice task could explain why there was no integration of the Cued reward 
prior to entry into the goal port. Another explanation could be that the rats always thought 
they were going to be rewarded, which is why they always encoded the upcoming port 
choice, rather than the actual Cue that played. The final explanation may be that there 
was too much time between when the tone played and when the rat made the final 
movement to the reward port. The average trial time was between 6-11 seconds, 
depending on the rat, so this may have exceeded the working memory needed to actually 
encode the Cue at the time of the decision.  
Despite the fact that the Nucleus Accumbens is often referred to as the ‘limbic-
motor interface’ (Mogenson et al., 1980), there was no encoding of action-goal, action-
cue, or action-outcome related variables in either area of the Nucleus Accumbens. Cells 
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that reached significance only did so for the main effect of either term- Action or Goal- 
with no overlap between the two.  
 Anatomical studies (Heimer et al., 1991; Voorn et al., 2004) as well as lesion 
studies (Cardinal et al., 2002b) have suggested that the NAc participates in integrating 
information about the value of expected rewards with the motor behaviors needed to get 
the reward. Other work in RL related fields, however, suggest that the ventral striatum 
has a role in encoding value as a critic, and therefore would relay that information 
downstream, rather than acting in an integrative manner (Takahashi et al., 2008; Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011).  
Few studies have actually examined reward related information in the ventral 
striatum without having the motor output linked directly to rewards. Studies either 
examine probabilistic rewards, or change the instrumental response. Studies that presume 
the NAC acts to integrate motor and reward related information utilized tasks that gave 
action + reward specific directions (Carelli and Deadwyler, 1994; Bowman et al., 1996; 
Setlow et al., 2003; Janak et al., 2004; Nicola et al., 2004b; Shidara and Richmond, 2004; 
Taha and Fields, 2006; Simmons et al., 2007; Ito and Doya, 2009; Kim et al., 2009; van 
der Meer and Redish, 2009a; van der Meer et al., 2010; Day et al., 2011). 
Utilizing a task that did separate the cue signaling reward from a directional 
response, in a similar manner as the current task, Goldstein (2012) found NAc neurons 
that encoded value independent of the motor behavior. The task differences were the fact 
that the cue was an odor presentation, and the rewards were just different magnitudes of 
the same liquid reward (3 drops vs. 1 drop). Their task was also quite fast, possibly 
lasting 1-2 seconds at most. Even if the task was fast, they found that rats were slower on 
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the more preferred trials, again indicating that separate populations of neurons in the NAc 
may encode value, independent of a motor, or motivational response.  
Ito and Doya (Ito and Doya, 2009) also recorded from the NAc and found a small 
fraction of neurons encoding action-value, but like a lot of other studies, they used a 
probabilistic task that relied on actions that specifically led to reward.  
The direct comparison of the current task with other previous research is not 
straightforward. This task specifically manipulated independent aspects of motor and 
reward related response, and also utilized behavioral errors to examine choice and value. 
Because of these manipulations, it makes a strong case against either action-goal or 
action-value information in the nucleus accumbens. If the NAc held the opposing options, 
while integrating action, then we would have expected to see encoding of some mixture 
of action, cue, and the interaction between the two.  
Only the DMS integrated the movements/direction the rat went with the 
upcoming goal choice. It did so in a manner that suggests it was actually an action 
selection mechanism, rather than integrating information specific to the potential 
outcomes- since the signal only showed up by examining where the rat chose to go. It 
could be that if the Nucleus Accumbens is involved in representing action-goal, it can 
only do so in a task that links very specific actions with their outcome- that only one type 
of action can lead to one specific reward. The DMS on the other hand, can still integrate 
action and goal when they are not explicitly linked. This is evidence that the DMS is 
responsible for the actual action selection process.  
 
Summary and Conclusion: Rebias for Non-Preferred Reward in the DMS 
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Actual evidence for action-selection in the DMS has rarely been seen in rodent 
studies. Kim et al. only found a brief indication of the upcoming choice in a free-choice 
maze task, 50ms before the choice was manifested (Kim et al., 2009). Stalnaker et al 
found action-goal encoding in both the DMS and DLS (Stalnaker et al., 2010). Seo, Lee 
and Averbeck found action-value representation in the striatum, but found a strong action 
selection activity only in the lateral prefrontal cortex (Seo et al., 2012). 
Previous research has found an action-value signal in the DMS. The signal found 
in this study in the DMS is for action + goal integration. This signal is specific to the 
contralateral movements paired with the non-preferred reward. The signal seen here is 
evidence of the DMS exerting cognitive control in an action-outcome encoding scheme 
that is utilizing a model-based framework to specifically re-bias, or to direct the rat to 
choose the Non-Preferred reward port correctly. The DMS is required to exert more effort 
on the less preferred trials, in order to not make a costly mistake and go to the 
‘Pavlovian’ port- the port that on that day delivers the more preferred reward. Additional 
support that the DMS truly is being utilized for action selection is the fact that this comes 
before entry into the reward port, and it is only for the goal port the rat chooses- not for 
the actual outcome, or the cued reward. 
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Universal Encoding of Upcoming Goal Port Choice 
Despite specific striatal subregion differences in Cue and Action-Goal integration, 
the encoding of which reward port the rat was about to enter was another signal shared 
across regions. As the rat finished the movements to the adjacent nose ports, the next 
event in the task was to enter a reward port, and potentially receive a reward. In this task, 
the rat was cued as to what the correct port was to enter, but since there were two 
separable reward ports, he actually had a choice prior to reward port entry, and could 
decide not to enter the cued (correct) port. An incorrect choice causes the houselight to 
come on, and a lengthy time out until the rat is allowed to begin the next trial. 
Additionally, if incorrect, the rat must repeat the trial until he is correct, which creates an 
additional delay. This was crucial to the training and performance of the task in the rats, 
because their behavior was strongly influenced by internal state, so often on trials when 
the non-preferred reward was cued, the rats chose the preferred port, incorrectly. On a 
very small minority of trials (<11 trials, on average), the rat incorrectly went to the Non-
preferred reward port when the preferred port was cued.  
When the rat chose the incorrect reward port, the Cue that played differed from 
the Goal chosen. Since the rats consistently made mistakes due to internal state, rather 
than simply not understanding the task, behavior was stable, which allowed us to 
compare the how a decision was made as the rat approached the reward. The potential 
neural correlates of differential activity could be accounted for by the Cue that played- 
the rat could be remembering the tone, and continue to fire for that tone, regardless of if 
he entered the correct port. Alternatively, the firing rates could instead be a neural 
correlate for Goal- that is, the actual reward port the rat entered, regardless of which tone 
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played, and therefore regardless of if he would get the actual reward. Finally, he could 
encode the interaction between Cue and Goal, which serves as the signal for ‘Outcome’- 
if he went to the Cued Goal port, he was correct, which causes an interaction between 
‘Cue’ and ‘Goal’ in the multiple regression analysis, while going to the wrong port still 
has an interaction effect, it is just in the opposite direction.  
Surprisingly, the only neural signal that reached significance before the rat 
entered the reward port was for Goal only. Starting long before the rat even entered the 
reward port, all 5 brain regions began firing more for the port the rat would enter, rather 
than fire for the port that was cued. The DLS and DMS began encoding the upcoming 
chosen reward earlier than the other brain regions, beginning almost 2 seconds before 
reward port entry. The Core, Shell and OFC encoded Goal more than 1 second before the 
rat got to the reward port, indicating that all 5 regions carried information about the 
reward port the rat intended to enter.  
The original hypothesis was that nearly all brain regions would encode the 
upcoming anticipated reward, prior to reward port entry. This encoding would most likely 
reflect the ‘Cue’, since that was the correct reward, and it was signaled ahead of time. 
Depending on the task, previous research has found signals relating to upcoming reward 
probability, upcoming value, or upcoming choice, in the rodent OFC, rodent dorsal 
striatum, as well as the rodent ventral striatum (van Duuren et al., 2007; van Duuren et 
al., 2009; Sul et al., 2010; van der Meer and Redish, 2010; van der Meer et al., 2010; 
McDannald et al., 2011). This has not been a universal finding in the dorsal striatum or 
the Nucleus Accumbens, with some studies not finding a choice signal prior to the 
behavioral manifestation of the decision (Thorn et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2007). 
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Additionally, no single unit studies have been conducted in such a wide range of cortical 
and basal ganglia areas, so we could only make a guess that the OFC would signal this 
choice earliest, due to a previous study comparing striatum and OFC in primates 
(Simmons et al., 2007) as well as an early signal in a free choice task in the rodent 
arganular cortex, which projects to the rodent OFC (Sul et al., 2011). 
 Much to our surprise, all 5 brain regions significantly encoded ‘Goal’, rather 
than the other options of ‘Cue’ or ‘Outcome’. In fact, no region even became significant 
for only the ‘Cue’ either before or after reward port entry. The specific signal we found 
was only related to whether or not the rat entered the food port or the water port, which 
are physically separated on the opposite wall of the behavioral chamber from where the 
nose poke ports are located. The reward port locations did not change for any rat 
throughout training and testing and therefore have a very strong association to reward 
delivery. 
 One interpretation of this signal could be for the location of the ports, similar to 
‘place cells’, since they are in physically different locations. This interpretation is not 
likely due to the fact that the differentiation between ports is seen as the rat leaves the last 
nose poke, which is typically 1-2 seconds before entering the reward port. If it were a 
specific place signal, it would only differentiate at the time the rat enters that physical 
space. It is also most likely not a ‘turn’ signal, or a movement related signal, because the 
rat makes different contralateral and ipsilateral movements, regardless of his starting 
location. The way that the reward ports are physically separated from the nose poke ports 
also means that the rat has completed a contra or ipsi rotation before heading directly to 
the port, meaning that the turns used here are categorically different than the contra/ipsi 
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nosepokes made at the beginning of the task.  
 Instead, this signal most likely relates to some specific aspect of anticipation for 
the upcoming reward, based on that reward’s identity. The fact that there was such a 
strong encoding of the upcoming goal choice 2 seconds before the decision was revealed 
that was a specific identity signal, rather than a general ‘reward’ signal is a novel finding. 
It is also a unique finding because this signal was not related to the Cue or the Action 
prior to entering the goal port, yet was significant nearly simultaneously in all 5 brain 
regions.  Most previous research on rodents has not directly compared two different 
stimuli when examining reward-related firing (Wallis, 2012). Instead, other behavioral 
tasks either utilize a cue that indicates reward vs. no-reward (Taha et al., 2007; Nicola et 
al., 2004a), or the task involves some probability of reward (Sul et al., 2010; Sul et al., 
2011; Ito and Doya, 2009; Setlow et al., 2003). In those tasks, neuronal firing rates are 
then correlated to either reward anticipation, or reward probability. Additionally, most 
other previous research has not specifically isolated expected outcome from the 
behavioral response, or movement (Day et al., 2006; Nicola et al., 2004a; Ambroggi et 
al., 2008; Feierstein et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2006; Young and Shapiro, 2011). The 
current behavioral task finds specific neural encoding of the upcoming goal, irrespective 
of the action it takes to get there, and this signal is not related to a general signal for 
reward anticipation- it is specific to the identity of the reward. 
Finding coding for distinct reward identities is not a novel result. Previous work 
in both rodents and primates has shown that when animals are working for different 
categories of reward (i.e. juice vs. cocaine), areas of the striatum respond with different 
subpopulations of cells (Carelli et al., 2000; Carelli and Ijames, 2001; Cameron and 
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Carelli, 2012; Bowman et al., 1996). In these studies, the theory has been that the brain 
actually responds differently to ‘naturally’ reinforcing stimuli compared to drugs of abuse 
(Carelli et al., 2000; Bowman et al., 1996). Only a handful of studies have compared a 
wider variety of rewards that do not include drugs of abuse, and found nearly similar 
numbers of identity-only encoding cells (Carelli et al., 2000; Hassani et al., 2001). Rather 
than differentiating between natural rewards vs. drug rewards, it appears that the striatum 
and OFC have significant proportions of cells that encode identity, regardless of value.  
 Carelli (2000) shows similar results to the current study, finding that 32% of 
nucleus accumbens neurons differentiate between food and water rewards. In that study 
they were focused on how ‘natural’ rewards were different than cocaine rewards, so they 
did not go into great detail about how, specifically, the food and water rewards were 
encoded. A similar study performed in primate compared cocaine reward to a juice 
reward, and recorded neurons in the ventral and dorsal striatum (Opris et al., 2009). Like 
the Carelli study, they found differential encoding depending on reward identity in 20-
30% of task responsive cells in the DS and VS. In a study done in the primate striatum 
(Hassani et al., 2001), 5 different types of reward were used and they found that 1/3 of 
striatal neurons recorded had different levels of task-related activity depending on which 
reward was predicted. This study did find higher firing rate in some non-preferred 
rewards that again show the importance of identity over value.  
 It is important to realize that a full 30%, give or take, of all neurons recorded from 
studies that have specifically examined different reward stimuli respond to the specific 
reward identity, rather than simply the value. A lot of previous research trying to relate 
specific reward activity to a reward probability or anticipation of a reward based on an 
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assumed ‘value’ of the reward may only be responding to an upcoming reward identity. 
The current study has manipulated value in a unique way, where internal state dictated 
what reward was more preferred. It was our prediction that neurons in the NAC and DMS 
would track the change in reward value based on internal state. As it turns out, within the 
neurons that clearly differentiated between food and water rewards, it was the identity, 
not value, that was encoded in the individual neural firing rates.  
 The fact that this behavioral task had the rat working for two different rewards 
may be why there was an upcoming goal/choice signal, whereas other single unit studies 
that used different goal port locations, but a single reward type did not (Thorn et al., 
2010; Kim et al., 2009; Sul et al., 2010). In the Kim and Sul studies, the rats were in a 
free choice maze task, where different turn directions had different probabilities of 
reward. Unlike the current study, they found very little choice signal in either the DS or 
NAc before the rat’s actual choice was revealed. The difference may be due to the 
difference in task. The rats were given no cue instruction, and their decision at the maze 
intersection was still not guaranteed to get them a reward, since it was a probabilistic 
task.  
In the Thorn (2010) study, as well as Barnes (2005), they used a t-maze task, but 
this time there was an instruction about which direction to go, and if the rat went the 
correct way, he would get a reward. Like the Kim and Sul papers, Thorn and Barnes did 
not find a robust choice signal prior to making a decision. The Thorn study was most 
similar to the current study, in that there was an actual instruction about the correct 
direction. However, they did not find a robust decision making signal, and this may be 
due to the fact that there was only one type of reward. The fact that the rats were only 
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working for a single type of reward is the main difference between the Thorn and Kim 
studies and the current study, and could explain why neither of those studies found a 
choice signal before the rat made a decision. In the current study there is a signal before 
the decision is revealed, and it may be because the rat is keeping in mind the actual 
identity of the reward, which is only manifest if there are two competing reward identities 
available. If the other tasks had different reward identities rather than a single reward 
type, there may have been a choice signal, since that may be more relevant to what the 
striatum actually encodes- reward identity. 
 Even though the current study utilized two different rewards, it is still relevant to 
compare these results to studies that have looked at upcoming reward signals in a single 
reward paradigm. The main caveat is the fact that most previous studies used a vastly 
different behavioral task that was a probability task, a Pavlovian task, or an instrumental 
task.  
 
Dorsal Striatum: Kimchi and Laubach used a go/no-go task and found around 44% of 
DMS neurons that were modulated around nose poke exit on Go response trials, while 
33% were modulated on no-go trials. This proportion of DMS cells is slightly higher than 
the response rate found in the DMS in the current study. Kimchi and Laubach only used a 
single reward, and it was not a choice- the rat just went to the reward port to collect the 
reward (Kimchi and Laubach, 2009b). In their study, they also found that 28% of neurons 
in the DMS were modulated by the outcome of the current trial, which is very similar to 
the proportion of neurons that found in the DMS, after reward was received (see 
‘Outcome’ section, this chapter).  
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 Kim et al. tested for choice signals in a dynamic two armed bandit task, but 
only found signals in the dorsal striatum 200ms prior to when the choice was revealed 
(Kim et al., 2009). This task was different than the current task in a few ways. First of all, 
there was no correct answer since it was a probability task that used free choice- so there 
was no instructional cue. Second, there was only one type of reward possible. They state 
that action selection may not be conducted in the striatum, since they did not find any 
evidence of the choice signal more than 200ms before the choice is revealed. It could be 
that without prior instruction, actual action selection is not as strong or early of a signal in 
the striatum. However, when an aspect of either working memory, or reward identity is 
required, the striatum comes online at a much earlier time point, and neural signals 
correspond to the upcoming reward identity, rather than just a choice in turning direction. 
In the Kim task, the choice was a turn, but the rats may not have had to really change 
their behavior much more than the running motion they were currently engaged in, so a 
difference in firing rate may not have been detectable. In the current task, where there is a 
choice between actual types of rewards, the choice is revealed much earlier because an 
aspect about the actual outcome- the identity- was kept in mind.  
 In a study specifically testing the differences in DMS vs. DLS, Stalnaker et al 
found that 31-32% of both DMS and DLS neurons encoded information about the 
upcoming response (Stalnaker et al., 2010). In this task, movement and value were not 
separated, but they examined the firing rate differences based only on value, so the signal 
was more similar to an upcoming goal (or outcome) signal. Despite not having two 
different types of rewards, the DMS and DLS did encode information about the value of 




Nucleus Accumbens:  Kim (2009) studied the Nucleus Accumbens and did not find 
corresponding choice signals in the NAC before the appearance of the behavior revealed 
(Kim et al., 2009). This is in contrast to the current results that found signals in both Core 
and Shell that encoded the upcoming reward port 1-2s before entry into the port. Another 
study examining impending goal choice was done by Kim and found that there were very 
few cells that encoded the impending goal choice in a forced choice t-maze task (Kim et 
al., 2007).  
 A study recording from the ventral striatum in rodents by Roesch, found that 
NAC neural firing rates were modulated by the value of the expected reward, prior to 
reward port entry (Roesch et al., 2009). This study did not disentangle left and right 
movements from reward value, so it is hard to interpret this as a purely reward-related 
signal. In a follow up study slightly more similar to mine, where they specifically 
disentangled actions from value, Goldstein (Goldstein et al., 2012) found that during odor 
presentation (a time point prior to reward entry), the NAC had higher activity during cues 
that predicted a higher reward.  However, in this study, they did not report on the time 
before the rat actually receives the reward, so even though the timing was fast, there was 
still a delay before reward receipt, therefore it is hard to tell if the information about 
upcoming reward was encoded. The fact that reward value encoding was seen during cue 
presentation was similar to the current study, since it was absent any action-related 
information. However, they only used one reward type, so they were not comparing 
different identities of reward information, rather, they were only studying how reward 
magnitude modulated neural firing rates.  
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 Ito and Doya also found a signal in the NAC prior to the rat actually getting the 
reward about whether or not the trial will be rewarded (Ito and Doya, 2009). Wilson and 
Bowman recorded from the NAC and found neurons distinguishing between different 
reward identities, but they were comparing rewarding vs. aversive events (Wilson and 
Bowman, 2004). They found that of the 30% of neurons that responded to a conditioned 
stimulus, 2/3 of those encoded the difference between the upcoming rewarding or 
aversive events.   
 
Orbitofrontal Cortex:  Single unit studies have also been conducted in the rodent OFC to 
determine if upcoming choice signals or reward are encoded. Sul et al. used a two-armed 
bandit task and did not find a signal related to upcoming choice in the OFC before the 
behavior was manifest (Sul et al., 2010). In a slightly different task, the van Duuren lab 
found that reward probability was encoded in the rodent OFC prior to reward entry (van 
Duuren et al., 2009). Roesch et al. used a delay task to find that firing in the OFC did 
predict the upcoming size of the reward, but did so differently than a delay to reward 
(Roesch et al., 2006). Furuyashiki also found outcome selective coding when comparing 
sucrose vs. water reward, beginning at cue presentation (Furuyashiki et al., 2008).  
 
Value vs. Identity: 
 Interestingly, in many of the previous studies that did find some upcoming 
reward signal, the authors mentioned that the identity of the reward was encoded, and not 
necessarily the value. For example, in the DMS and DLS, Stalanaker (2010) found that in 
both regions, the outcome modulation did not reflect the relative value. In Ito and Doya 
	  
151	  
(2009), in the rodent NAC, they found a larger response in the no-reward predicting tone, 
and again, found more information about the specific trial type rather than any other 
combination of factors. In the OFC, Roesch (2006) found that there were populations of 
OFC neurons that distinguished between the large and small reward, but did not actually 
fire more for the larger reward.  
 To better understand what was encoded in the brain regions that had single 
units that fired for the goal port, we utilized the firing rate index to compare signals for 
‘Value’ vs. ‘Identity’. If a region, as a whole, was more interested in the value of the 
upcoming goal, than it would have more neurons that fired for the food reward on hungry 
days, and more neurons that fired for the water reward when thirsty. If, on the other hand, 
the signal was simply about reward identity, then there would be no bias based on 
internal state, and instead, a bias may show up for a specific reward identity (food or 
water, regardless of preference based on internal state). To our surprise, we found that the 
Value index did not show a bias as the rat approached the reward port. There was also no 
bias in the Identity index either, prior to reward port in. After the rat entered the port, 
there was then a significant bias in the Identity index for some of the brain regions. The 
DMS, DLS and OFC all reached a significant bias for the Food Goal Port, while the Shell 
and Core reached a significant bias for the Water Goal Port (Figure 12C).  
 This finding was not what we expected- we hypothesized that the DMS and the 
accumbens would differentiate encoding based on the value of the reward ports, prior to 
reward port entry and the value status would be dictated by internal state. Previous 
research in all 5 brain regions indicate that firing rates often distinguish from each other 
based on value (Setlow et al., 2003; Nicola et al., 2004a; Nakamura et al., 2012; 
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Pasquereau et al., 2007). This is not to say that this is the first study to show more firing 
related to specific trial type or identity, however. Ito and Doya (2009) examined rodent 
NAC and found that most encoding was related to information about specific trial type, 
rather than any type of action-value like encoding. Stalnaker (2010) also tried to 
differentiate between DMS and DLS in a task that independently manipulated response-
outcome and stimulus response in an attempt to distinguish how each region encoded 
value vs. identity, and found that there was little difference between the two, finding that 
outcome modulation did not reflect value, but instead signaled identity. In the rodent 
OFC, Furuyashiki (2008) also found single cells that distinguished between upcoming 
rewards- sucrose vs. water- independent of the motor contingencies for the reward, and 
the signal began at the presentation of the cue indicating which reward the rat would 
receive, and signals were independent of value. Roesch (2006) also found a group of 
neurons in the rodent OFC that fired equally for both sizes of reward during a long delay, 
granted- these were the same reward, just different sizes. 
 In the current study, any bias that was found only showed up right at or after 
reward port entry- there were no regional biases prior to entry to the reward port. The 
biases that began after reward port entry were not responding to reward consumption 
because they were not differentiating between correct and incorrect trials, which would 
be necessary for a eating or drinking only response. This is interesting because this means 
that the cells responding to Goal Only after reward port in, are not responding to the 
actual outcome of the task. These cells were only firing for the identity of the port itself, 
either as a true ‘port’ identity, or what the port represented- food or water. However, 
there still are some % of cells from each region that are showing reward port 
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differentiation prior to actual entry into the ports, they just do not show a bias for either 
value or identity until the actual reward port entry. 
 What do these biases mean? Why is there an increase for water encoding in 
both regions of the Nucleus Accumbens? Previous research done in the Kelley lab and 
the Carelli lab show that there could be specific differences in the striatum between food 
and water reinforcers. Despite the fact that most results from the Carelli lab examine 
natural vs. drug reinforcers, and that in general, they try to lump food and water together 
as a natural reinforcer, a closer reading of the results are actually in line with the results 
seen in this study. Specifically, despite the fact that a majority of cells encode food and 
water reinforcers on a lever press task in a similar manner, there still are between 20-35% 
of task-responsive nucleus accumbens cells that did differentiate between either food and 
water (Carelli et al., 2000), or water and a sucrose solution (Roop et al., 2002). Further 
evidence for the NAC playing a specific role in water encoding comes from the fact that 
when previous studies compared the ‘natural’ water reinforcer with a drug reinforcer such 
as cocaine or ethanol, distinct groups of cells in the NAC only increased firing for the 
water reward (Robinson and Carelli, 2008; Carelli et al., 2000; Carelli, 2002). In this 
group of studies, they did not specifically target the Shell vs. the Core, which is similar to 
the fact that in the current results, both Core and Shell increase firing for the water 
reward. The proportion of neurons seen in this study and in past studies is also similar- 
right around 30%. When the Carelli group tried to differentiate between water and 
cocaine reinforcement in Core vs. Shell (Carelli Synapse 2006), they did not find a 
specific distribution between regions for cells that encoded the two reward types 
differently. A primate study also compared cocaine vs. juice rewards and found groups of 
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cells that responded differently depending on the identity of the reward (Bowman et al., 
1996). These studies demonstrate that not only are there groups of cells that differentiate 
due to specific reward identities, but there is also evidence that some cells also show a 
selective increase that is specific to a water reward.  
 Studies that specifically address the role of the Accumbens in approaching and 
consuming food and water demonstrate the confusing relationship between single unit 
studies and regional manipulations. Research into feeding behavior has shown that 
iNActivation of the medial shell results in an increase in food, but not water intake, while 
iNActivation of the Core does not increase food intake (Basso and Kelley, 1999; 
Soderpalm and Berridge, 2000; Stratford and Kelley, 1997; Taha et al., 2009; Stratford 
and Wirtshafter, 2004; Stratford et al., 1998). However, amphetamine injection does 
increase responding for a water reward (Covelo 2011). The apparent increase in 
responding for the water reward seen in this current study by both the Core and the Shell 
may instead be a decrease in response to the food reward. The specific analysis that was 
done would not be able to differentiate between phasic excitations vs. inhibitions, so if 
the Shell is more responsible for feeding, but does so by actually shutting down firing, 
this would manifest in my data as an increase in water reward responding. Evidence from 
studies that have specifically examined inhibitions vs. excitations in feeding behavior 
have shown that different groups of NAC cells have separable firing rate patterns (Taha 
and Fields, 2005; Taha and Fields, 2006; Krause et al., 2010).   
 It is quite possible that the areas that were recorded from in this study come 
from two separable groups of cells in the nucleus accumbens. One group is responsible 
for feeding behavior, by inhibiting cell firing, while another group responds to water 
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rewards with a phasic increase in firing. The analysis that was done would then 
combining the data from these two groups of cells resulting in what looks like a water 
port preference, when in reality, there is a separable responses to two different ingestive 
behaviors- consumption of food vs. consumption of water. The important caveat to 
continue to remember in this assessment is that this effect is only seen in the ‘Goal’ cells, 
so they are responding to the actual port entry, and not necessarily to consuming the 
reward. The results would then indicate that the rat is responding to the anticipation of a 
food or water reward, and that this is more in line with an approach response, rather than 
the actual consummatory behavior. 
 
Food Identity Encoding:   
 An explanation for why the DMS and DLS are firing more for entry into the 
food port could possibly be because, as a general rule, the Food reward maintained a 
higher value. When the rat was food restricted, this was obvious. However, when the rat 
was water restricted, he could also only eat while he had access to water. To control for 
this, the rat had free access to both food and water for an hour each day, as part of the 
internal state manipulation, but it is possible that he still carried over too much food 
restriction, on a day-to-day basis. This also shows up in the total trial times for some of 
the individual rats where they are actually faster on food chosen trials, on water restricted 
days (Figure 4B). Each individual rat was kept at a weight well above what a normal food 
restricted rat typically weighs, most rats were 500-600grams so they were not starving. It 
may just be that water was an immediate, pressing need on water restricted days, but as 
soon as that need was met, the food instantly became the more valued reward. 
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 If this is the case, then the increase in firing for DMS, DLS and OFC could be 
explained in this manner, and the NAC data could also be explained as a ‘dip’, rather than 
an increase (similar to what was proposed before). However, the most obvious way to test 
this theory would be with other internal state manipulations. Part of our motivational 
protocol was to also test the rats when restricted on both food and water, as well as when 
sated on both food and water. Behaviorally, the rats showed a preference to the food 
reward- on free choice trials and on their error trials (Figure 5A and 5B). This was not as 
strong of an effect as was seen on food restricted days. However, the neural data in the 
DMS, DLS, OFC and Core are not fully explained under the umbrella ‘food is always 
more valuable’, as I will talk about next. 
 
Sated and Restricted:  
 In order to examine if food really was more valued, we examined the 
proportion of cells that differentiated between the two rewards on sated and restricted 
days. On these recording days, rats had either free access to food and water rewards 
(sated), or only a limited access to both, making both food and water either equally 
preferred, or equally non-preferred. When examining the factor ‘Goal’ on these days, the 
proportion of cells encoding either the food or water port, prior to entry, remain virtually 
the same (Figure 8D). There were still significant proportions of neurons differentiating 
between the two ports on these days. Interestingly, when examining the Identity index, 
the only result that remains the same is that the Shell still shows a bias for the Water 
Identity (Figure 8D inset). The DMS, DLS, OFC and Core all have equal numbers of 
cells firing for both food or water reward, showing no specific Identity bias. This means 
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that there is no longer a preference for the food reward in the DMS and DLS. 
 This throws a wrench in the theory that the encoding seen for Goal Port 
encoding was due ONLY to the fact that it was reward identity, with no influence of 
value. There now appears to be some change when the rat is hungry or thirsty, compared 
to when he is only mildly food/water restricted or sated. The possible explanation for this 
is that the rat had a tendency to view the food reward as more valuable, overall, on days 
where he was food or water restricted. When he was no longer specifically deprived of 
food or water, that signal went away, and there was no longer any bias in the regions that 
had previously signaled a bias for the food port.  
 This explanation could be due to an effect of general motivational state on 
reward responding. If the rat was in a motivationally charged state (food or water 
restricted), than the brain may signal that food = better, even on water restricted days. On 
sated days, both water and food had an equally low value, and so equal numbers of cells 
differentiated between the food and water ports, but with no bias towards identity or 
value. In a motivationally charged state, the food port gains greater value for the brain 
regions influenced by (possibly) a dopamine signal, and therefore the DMS and DLS 
increase response for the food port, as identity, but this can only happen when the rat is 
more motivated, and not on sated and restricted days.  
 
Model-free vs. Model-based Encoding Schemes 
A very popular concept in striatal research right now is to examine neural 
encoding in specific regions through the lens of reinforcement literature. Within the 
current understanding, different areas of the brain operate in separate ways when 
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representing what the rat intends to do, as far as decision-making and action selection go. 
In a ‘model-based’ representation of the world, the specific stimulus of interest is 
represented in a rats mind, and he acts accordingly. In a ‘model-free’ environment, the rat 
does not have a specific goal in mind, and instead executes an action that is known to be 
good due to prior experience, but without representing the specific outcome. In the 
model-based framework, the rat has to think and plan ahead, using a search like option, to 
make a decision, which takes time and energy. On the other hand, time is saved by using 
a model-free framework by ‘caching’ the values of specific actions, and carrying out the 
decision without searching for the representation of the upcoming goal. 
 Based on previous lesion work, the DMS is thought to operate in a model-based 
environment, encoding action-outcome contingencies and representing the goal in mind. 
The DLS is thought to operate in a model-free environment, in a more habitual manner, 
without prior goal-orienting knowledge (Daw et al., 2005). Single unit recording studies 
seeking to specifically test these hypothesis using tasks that utilize both a model free and 
model based encoding of a task have not found the precise neural correlates in the rodent 
striatum (Stalnaker et al., 2010; Thorn et al., 2010). 
The results from this study show that there is most likely model-based encoding 
in all areas of the striatum, OFC and nucleus accumbens. As the rat approaches the 
reward port, specific goals can be distinguished in the neural firing rates of all 5 brain 
regions, beginning up to 2 seconds prior to actual port entry. If the idea of model-free vs. 
model-based decision-making is based on whether or not a specific goal-identity is in 
mind, then a direct comparison of two distinct goals directly tests this. In this task, the 
rewards are food and water, and through the rat’s behavioral choices, it is obvious that 
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one reward is more preferred, depending on the hunger or thirst of the rat. However, since 
the rat must go to a specific port in order to actually collect the reward, this study directly 
tests if these goal representations are ‘in mind’. If the rat did not have a specific 
representation of his intentions, then there would be no differentiation in firing rate as the 
rat approached the reward port. This would be consistent with a model-free form of 
encoding- there could possibly be an increase in overall activity as the rat approaches the 
reward, but an actual differentiation between the two rewards would be unlikely, since 
that would indicate some type of distinct representation of goal identity. Another possible 
encoding of a model-free representation would be firing for the specific Cue, or stimulus, 
that played at the beginning of the trial. This signaled the correct reward port, and could 
have been represented in a stimulus-response manner, without actually having a goal 
associated with it. The Cue simply represents a response, such as ‘go to port on left’. 
Within this study, if the DLS had a model-free representation, it would not encode 
a significant proportion of cells differentiating between the two specific reward ports. 
This is NOT what was found. Instead, each of the 5 brain regions examined had distinct 
populations of neurons that fired differently, based on if the rat was approaching the food 
port or the water port. Having a specific representation of any type of goal, prior to 
actually realizing it, is consistent with a model-based theory.   
Current theories and previous lesion studies have found distinct and separable 
roles for various BG loops in processing action-selection, while single-unit studies have 
found conflicting results.  The results from this behavioral task, which directly tested 2 
distinct types of rewards, with different preferences based on internal state (a more 
natural representation of value), provides insight that rather than parallel loops carrying 
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distinct information through the basal ganglia, a more integrated system is present. This 
integration includes a representation of the different components of a decision-making 
task, including representing a specific goal in the DMS and DLS, as well as nucleus 
accumbens and OFC.  
 
Reward Port Encoding Conclusions: 
 The overall conclusion from this analysis on the factor ‘Goal’ is somewhat 
surprising, given past studies. First of all, the fact that there was any differentiation at all 
between two natural reward identities was unexpected. Since most other studies simply 
examine the anticipation of one rewarding event, it seemed like the signal from the 
striatum was a generally motivational, or generally reward-predictive signal. However, 
from comparing 2 separate rewards, both of which are valuable, it is clear that the 
specific identity of that reward is actually differentiated in the brain. If this were related 
to the fact that one of the rewards was more valuable than the other, then the findings 
here would be directly in line most other results. However, the results from this study 
show that specific differentiation does NOT depend solely on internal state, and that the 
identity of the upcoming reward is encoded, with dorsal striatum showing a bias for the 
food identity and the nucleus accumbens showing a bias for the water identity. When the 
rat was no longer in a specifically food or water restricted state, all regions still 
differentiated between the two Goals, but identity was only encoded in the Shell for the 
water reward. This could mean that food port identity is only encoded in the DMS, DLS 
and OFC when the rat is in a state of higher general motivation, which then signals a 
stronger bias for the food Goal.  
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 These results make it more difficult to fully understand how previous reward-
related firing in studies that only study one reward truly show ‘reward anticipation’, or 
predict a probability of reward. If different reward types are not being compared, other 
studies can not rule out reward identity as the corresponding neural signal. 
  In contrast to the Goal only cells, there were no regions that showed 
significance for the actual cued reward before the rat got to the reward port (Figure 9A). 
This result is somewhat surprising, since we expected to see encoding of the tone that 
played in at least one region, most likely the Shell, Core, or DLS, in order for the animal 
to keep the Cue in mind. The Cued reward was the tone that played, which corresponds to 
the correct port the rat had to enter. If a brain region encoded the Cued reward, rather 
than the Goal, then it would be signaling the ‘rule’ that the rat needed to follow, and 
could be interpreted as a signal that overcomes the Pavlovian instinct to always pick the 
more preferred reward port. By utilizing the multiple regression analysis that had factors 
of Cue vs. Goal, we can be sure we know what, specifically, the cells were firing for. It 
turns out the prominent signal before the rat entered the reward port was for Goal, with 
no regions reaching significance for Cue. After reward port in, there were cells that 
reached significance for the ‘Cue’ factor, but they also reached significance for the 
‘Goal’, as well as an interaction between the two- these will be discussed later.  
 Research from the Graybiel lab (Thorn et al., 2010; Barnes et al., 2005; Barnes 
et al., 2011) are some of the only other rodent studies that specifically instructed the rats 
about what the upcoming choice should be, in a task where the rats still had to make a 
choice, and were wrong in some trials. In their study, unlike the current study, they did 
not see any Cue encoding at the time of tone presentation. They also did not see any 
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encoding of the tone/cue that played when the rat actually made the decision. The results 
from the current study add further proof that neither the striatum, nor the OFC, encode 
information about the Cued stimulus prior to the actual decision, despite the fact that we 
expected to see some encoding of the correct answer prior to reward port entry. 
Outcome encoding was another significant finding that was shared across each 
brain region. Finding a specific signal related to receiving a reward is not novel. Most 
research in the striatum in rodents has found an outcome signal in both dorsal and ventral 
striatum (Oyama et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2009). Comparing the DMS and NAC, Kim 
2009 found a signal related to the current outcome just after a choice was revealed. The 
NAC is often shown as the region that encodes whether or not a reward is or is not 
received which is often used as evidence to support a role for the NAC as a ‘critic’ (Kim 
et al., 2009; Taha and Fields, 2005; Van Der Meer and Redish, 2009a). 
Rodent OFC studies have also found outcome related firing (Sul et al., 2010; 
Feierstein et al., 2006; Furuyashiki et al., 2008; van Duuren et al., 2009). Some studies 
have even found firing for the upcoming outcome before it’s actually revealed in the 
rodent OFC (Kepecs et al., 2008). Sul et a.l found that firing in the OFC, after a choice 
was made, had a combination of factors related to the chosen value, including expected 
outcome (Sul et al., 2010).  
Interestingly, the DLS is the only region that fires for the correct reward, while all 
of the other regions fired much more for the incorrect reward. However, the DLS 
switches this preference 2.2 seconds after reward in, and begins firing more for incorrect 
reward. At this time, all 5 brain regions are still encoding a strong Outcome signal. One 
possibility is that the Core, Shell, DMS and OFC are encoding some variant of a reward 
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prediction error- that the rat truly believed he was supposed to receive a reward, despite 
having gone to the wrong port, and is firing for the missing, but expected reward. The 
DLS may be the region that knew the answer all along, and is integrating the information 
of what was cued, what was chosen, and what was received in order to ‘stamp’ that into 
memory, and signal a positive outcome. The regions firing for the incorrect reward may 
be doing the opposite, firing when a reward was not received to remember that result into 
the next trial, and not repeat the same mistake twice, since the trials are repeated when 
wrong.  
Another possibility is that the DLS is only responding to the motor movements 
required to consume the reward at the 700ms time point, then switches over to more cells 
encoding the incorrect reward in a similar manner as the other 4 regions. This would only 
be if the DLS motor movements were very general- that is, the same for food and water. 
This is because the current outcome factor only takes into account whether a reward was 
presented or not- it does not matter if it was a food or water reward. The motor 
movements of chewing vs. licking are quite different, and it would make sense that they 
would actually use different muscle groups encoded in separate areas of the DLS.  
 The findings in this study show that there is a separation in signals between 
specific aspect of reward identity and encoding for receiving the reward. We can directly 
compare the signal that relates to specifically receiving a reward, and the signal that 
relates to the goal. By having a behavioral task with longer time intervals between events, 
and utilizing two different reward identities, we can see that prior to entry into the reward 
port, the neural signal encodes the identity of the upcoming reward (‘Goal’). After the rat 
either does or does not receive a reward, a separate signal arises that encodes reward 
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receipt (‘Outcome’).  The different signals we see in this analysis most likely overlap 
with previous results seen in these brain regions in signals that are interpreted as reward 
anticipation, or an outcome signal. Obviously, it is impossible to fully probe exactly what 
the rat was thinking before he entered the reward port- whether or not he knew he would 
be receiving a reward- but we do know that receiving or not receiving a reward was a 
different signal than the integration of getting a specific reward, which will be discussed 
in the next section. 
The final main result that came from the 3-factor analysis was for cells that had 2 
main effects + an interaction- for Cue, Goal and their interaction (outcome). Like the 
results seen for Outcome, the cells that showed significance for reward integration only 
did so after the outcome of the trial was revealed. The DLS had the highest proportion of 
cells showing this integration effect, and again, like the Outcome results, the DLS as a 
region was more biased for the correct trials, while the other 4 regions showed a 
significant bias for the incorrect trials.  
This combination of terms is the only other instance, besides action-goal, when a 
brain region shows value-related firing, rather than identity. In the DMS, and the DMS 
alone, the cells that are significant for reward integration show a bias for the non-
preferred reward port (they did not show significance for the identity). The fact that the 
DMS is the only region to show a value-related bias, and only does so in cells that 
integrate more than one factor (action earlier in the task, and goal after reward port in), 
including the interaction effect, is an interesting result. It also just so happens that the 
DMS cells are doing so in the same direction in both analysis- for the non-preferred port. 
There is a group of DMS cells that fire more when the rat is selecting the non-preferred 
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port, and a group of DMS cells that encode information about the non-preferred trial 
upon trial completion. However, these same cells are not showing a bias for correct vs. 
incorrect- they are firing differently for it, but not in a biased manner. The DMS cells that 
are integrating information after reward port in about the non-preferred reward port entry 
are doing so significantly on both correct and incorrect trials.  
 This integration of Cue, Goal and Outcome is the only other time, besides at the 
time of the tone, when the factor ‘Cue’ reaches significance. Just like at the time of the 
tone, the DLS stands out in this combination of factors, having a much greater proportion 
of cells with the 3 effects than all of the other brain regions. Interestingly, the DLS shows 
a bias for firing the most for correct trials right after reward port entry. 
 The integration of Cue-Goal-Outcome may actually be a reward consumption 
signal. The rat most likely uses different muscle movements for consuming food vs. 
water, so depending on which reward the rat received would dictate the motor aspect of 
consuming the reward (chewing vs. licking). The reason there is a main effect of Cue 
AND Goal is due to specific differentiation between actually receiving one of the two 
rewards. For example, a licking cell would show a response for water cued AND water 
chosen to actually receive the water reward (outcome). On the other hand, if there was 
only a main effect for Cue + Outcome, this would mean that the rat differentiated 
rewarded vs. no reward, but only did so on water-cued trials, regardless of where the rat 
went, and therefore would not differentiate a licking movement. A main effect of Goal + 
Outcome would mean that the rat differentiated reward vs. no reward, but only for when 
the food port was chosen. However, having a main effect of Cue + Goal, + Outcome 
means that the rat had to choose the cued reward and then differentiated reward vs. 
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Reward History Encoding Across Regions 
 
The combination of factors seen in Figure 13A and 14A shows that both the Core 
and Shell prominently encode reward history. As the outcome of the current trial is 
revealed, both Core and Shell fire more for the incorrect reward (Figure 13B). In the 3 
seconds before the tone plays, only the Core fires significantly more for the previously 
incorrect trial (Figure 14B). Although all 5 brain regions are encoding Previous Outcome, 
there is only significant bias in the Core. As the rat continues the current trial, signal 
related to the previous outcome begin to fade in all regions except for the Shell. The Shell 
only briefly shows a bias for the previously incorrect reward, but it is only for 500ms.  
This type of firing rate pattern has been seen before, in Kim et al. papers- where 
reward history influenced firing rate both in the intertrial interval and into the next trial. 
Previous research finding reward history has been seen in the rodent OFC (Sul et al., 
2010; Young and Shapiro, 2011; Takahashi et al., 2011; Roesch et al., 2006), the rodent 
NAC (Kim et al., 2007; Goldstein et al., 2012), and primate striatum (Hori et al., 2009; 
Yamada et al., 2007; Yamada et al., 2011).   
Finding information related to previous outcome is not ubiquitous among regions. 
Thorn (2010), directly compared DMS and DLS and did not find encoding of the 
previous outcome in either region. Contrary to that, other rodent studies have found 
previous outcome encoding in the DMS (Kim et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2013; Kimchi and 
Laubach, 2009a), though previous outcome finding in the rodent DLS is relatively sparse 
(Kim et al., 2013). Interestingly, most previous research that found a signal related to 
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previous outcome has not specifically analyzed (or presented) what that information was. 
It may be due to the varying types of tasks used. This gives my analysis a unique 
contribution, by differentiating what the signal conveys from the previous outcome.  
In the current study, for the duration of the next trial, the two regions of the 
ventral striatum encoded information about the previous trial the longest. Both Core and 
Shell had a very strong encoding about whether or not the previous trial was rewarded up 
until the rat received a reward in the current trial. The Shell held onto the previous 
outcome information the longest. Additionally, at the time of the tone, the Core showed a 
significant bias for the previously incorrect outcome- meaning the cells were firing more 
on trials where the rat had previously been wrong, therefore making the current trial a 
‘repeat’ trial. The Shell, OFC, DMS and DLS did not show a bias in the cells that 
encoded previous outcome, though each region did significantly encode this factor.  
Additional regression analyses were run on other aspects previous trial encoding, 
based on the Cue or the Goal, but no brain regions reached significance for any single 
factor or combination of factors. This is interesting because previous outcome is even 
more informative in this behavioral task than most- it actually could determine the trial 
type in the next trial. If the rat picked the incorrect reward port, he had to repeat that trial, 
and that gave the rat more information going into the next trial than he would have if he 
had picked a correct trial. On correct trials, the probability of preferred vs. non-preferred 
reward goes back to 50-50. The fact that the NAc regions encode this previous outcome 
factor for so long into the next trial seems to show that the NAc may actually be 
performing as an informative critic, by utilizing information from the previous trial. 
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However, since there is no interaction between other terms in the current trial, it isn’t 
clear exactly how the NAC is influencing the current trial.  
Kim (2007) found strong encoding of information related to the previous outcome 
in the ventral striatum. Their behavioral task was similar to this task and did not require 
an actual choice. Rats were always rewarded with a constant amount of water for visiting 
the lit side of a figure-8 shaped maze. This was a visual discrimination task- they were 
only rewarded when they visited the lit side of the maze. Interestingly, the rats only 
performed correctly in >70% of trials.  They did find activity in NAC for the animals’ 
choice during reward approach, reward consumption, and return (after the reward). 
However, prior to the choice, or response selection stage, less than 3% of neurons were 
modulated by the upcoming choice in the current trial, while at the same time, 17% of 
neurons were modulated by previous choice. Although the current study shows 
significantly more cells firing for the upcoming choice than they do, that difference is 
most likely due the difference in tasks. There is a similar pattern in NAC activity about 
the previous outcome all the way up to the Goal port choice in both tasks.  
 Another study that found encoding for the previous outcome was in the DMS and 
DLS in Kim (2013).  This finding has not been seen quite as prominently in the 
DMS/DLS, so the findings in the current study, coupled with the findings in Kim (2013) 
show a more interesting role for the dorsal striatum in decision-making. Previous 
research and theories have tried to contend that the NAC and DS have separate roles as 
an actor or critic, based on the type of information and timing of those information 
signals. However, the strong overlap in all of these regions, especially for the previous 
outcome signal, calls into question the role of the NAC as the only area that can act as a 
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critic. In Kim (2013), the previous goal choice modulated neural firing rates for a longer 
time in the DMS, but was still there in the DLS. Interestingly, they found that there were 
higher firing rates for unrewarded trials, but this was only seen as a network pattern, 
rather than a signal that was carried by a few neurons. In the current study, there was not 
a strong bias for previously unrewarded firing in the DMS, but instead, this signal was 
found in the Core. It may be a difference in the nature of the task- they used a 
probabilistic free choice task so the rats did not expect to get a reward on every trial, 
while the signal the rats had in the current study was a more direct error signal.  
In this way, the information processing done by the DMS and Core may be able to 
be distinguished. Although neural representation is strongly overlapping in all striatal 
subregions, the exact content of that representation is more differentially modulated by 
the precise nature of the task. In a more unknown environment, one without specific 
Pavlovian associations, like the free choice probability task used by Kim (2013), the 
DMS encodes the unrewarded outcome. In a cued-task, with a Pavlovian association that 
also involves an instrumental response, the Core may reliably encode the unrewarded 
outcome. 
In the Core, there is a strong bias for previously incorrect trials, however the 
multiple regression for previous outcome + current outcome did not show any significant 
interaction effects among cells, so it appears as though the cells that encode information 
about the previous outcome are separate from those that may encode information about 
the upcoming outcome, or upcoming chosen reward. What are these cells encoding, if 
they aren’t actually informing the behavior of other cells? It is possible that increased 
firing after incorrect trials in the Core leads to increased vigilance and motivation into the 
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next trial, so the rat can get the next trial correct. The fact that the other regions also 
modulate their firing rate for previously incorrect trials shows that this information is 
informative, but it is puzzling that no other regions show a bias in firing between the 
previously correct vs. incorrect. It seems like this information would be particularly 
informative after incorrect trials, because those trials are repeated, so in order to 
remember that, or be more vigilant, firing should be higher on previously incorrect trials. 
Instead, all other brain regions have even encoding of both trial types. To determine the 
exact nature of this encoding is beyond the scope of this project, but would be extremely 
informative, since Previous Outcome is another factor where clear regional differences 
were found. 
This behavioral task is unique in the literature on decision-making because the 
behavior and subsequent analysis utilized both correct and incorrect trials. The fact that 
the rat’s behavior was steady, and their errors were not random (ie, they were nearly 
always in the direction of the preferred port) indicates the rat understood the stimulus-
response pairing, but was often compelled by his internal state to seek out what he 
wanted, and incur an error/time out. Other behavioral tasks that have tested reward and 
outcome-related encoding have rarely used a task where reward was instructed, but 
animals chose to perform in an incorrect manner. Other paradigms use probability of 
reward at a specific port and a free choice paradigm to look for outcome or goal in 
different brain regions. This study directly compared where the rat was instructed to go, 
with where he actually went. This direct comparison leads to critical insights in 
instruction vs. intention, and provides interesting ideas about what happens when a 
conflict arises. The results show that all 5 brain regions care most about where the rat 
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actually goes, regardless of the instruction. None of the 5 brain regions reliably encode 
the instructed port during performance of movement. Additionally, despite each port 
having specific value depending on internal state, no brain region was biased to fire more 
for the more highly valued reward.  
The brain regions studied all clearly identified a difference between the choices the 
rat was about to make. If this signal was to fit into a distinct model-free vs. model-based 
encoding framework, we would expect to see regions that never reached significance 
between the different reward port identities. If that had been the case, then the response 
the rat was engaged in could be seen as potentially habitual, and lacked specific goal-
related encoding. Another piece of evidence for a model-free encoding result would be if 
the rat integrated information about the stimulus, or cue, prior to reward entry. In this 
case it would be indicative of a representation based on something other than the specific 
reward identity and it could be argued to be a stimulus-response, or habitual action. This 
is not what was seen. All 5 brain regions had specific populations of neurons that fired 
differentially between food and water ports, showing clear model-based encoding prior to 
reward port entry. The first conclusion in this analysis shows that all 5 brain regions 
encode reward choice by specifically representing the Goal.  
The second conclusion is based on a test of value vs. identity. It has been 
proposed and shown that firing rates seen before receiving a reward are an anticipatory 
signal based on an estimation of the value of that reward. If this were the case in the 
current study, then internal state, which influences behavior, would subsequently 
influence the firing rates of individual neurons and lead to a higher firing rate on 
preferred reward port entry. Again, this is not what was found. If the regions had no bias 
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about value, and instead were firing equally for preferred vs. non-preferred reward, then 
we would also expect to see no bias when testing for identity, either. The analysis for 
reward identity DID show a significant bias in brain regions- food in the dorsal striatum 
and OFC and water in the NAc. This shows that the population of neurons that 
differentiate between the 2 reward ports do so based on the specific goal identity rather 
than value. Although this has been demonstrated in the past, it is a finding that is not 
often probed, or considered, when examining neural firing rates that are presumed to 
underlie ‘value’, mainly because studies typically examine only 1 type of reward. 
A third important finding from this analysis showed the differences in timing and 
regional biases related to outcome. This signal- whether or not the trial was rewarded- 
was significant in all 5 regions. The NAC is often thought of as the ‘Critic’, showing the 
greatest signal about whether or not a trial was rewarded, but other studies have found 
similar results in the Dorsal Striatum, calling into question the specific contribution the 
NAC has in decision-making. By directly comparing these two regions, this study shows 
that they both have distinct cells that specifically fire based on whether or not a reward 
was delivered. These cells independently encoded this factor from other potential neural 
correlates such as action, the actual goal port the rat went to, or the cue that played, and 
instead was solely based on receiving the reward or not.  
Another important results from the current outcome factor showed a significant 
difference in the processing of outcome. The DLS stood out as the only region that 
increased firing for correct rewards. The fact that incorrect rewards had higher firing rates 
in DMS, Core, Shell and OFC could be seen as a negative prediction error, while the 
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increased firing in DLS could be seen as a positive prediction error. However, the 
behavioral task was not designed to specifically test this, so this is only speculation.  
Before the rat entered the reward port, there were no brain regions that 
demonstrated knowledge of what the outcome of the trial would be. No region fired for 
the correct cue, or the current outcome, or any integration between cue/goal/outcome. 
After the rat received the reward, there was finally an integration of all factors related to 
reward. The timing of this onset, though, could reflect consumption of the specific 
reward- that there are specific cells in all 5 regions that are actively engaged in only 
eating vs. drinking, based on the different motor movements involved.  
The final result from studying activity at the reward port is the relative contributions 
of the regions. Each region tended to show a relatively different contribution to each of 
the factors at reward port in. The DMS, which had higher firing during action-goal, 
showed relatively little firing rate differences for the upcoming goal, comparatively. The 
Core and OFC had the highest contribution to the actual Goal. The Core had the highest 
contribution for the Outcome, while the DLS showed the highest proportion of cells 
integrating all of the factors at the reward port. 
The conclusion is that all 5 brain regions have an overlapping representation of all 
aspects of specific reward coding, with a model-based, identity-based encoding scheme. 
None of these findings are actually novel, but shown together, in the same task and in the 
same rats, underscores the overwhelming overlap in signals in all of these regions, and 
argues against very specific regional encoding that is left to distinct subregions. There 
were, however, relative differences in proportions from each region, which could explain 
some of the behavioral differences seen in lesion studies.  
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Another potential explanation that could explain the gap between lesion and 
single unit studies is that the initial contribution of each factor may originate in a specific 
locus, which is then sent to the other brain regions to become integrated with the signals 
that originate in that region. Since the basal ganglia is shown to have loops that integrate 
information between specific subregions, it could be that these results are the 
reverberation of signals accumulating throughout the regions, as they overlap in the 
informational processing network. Despite having precise temporal resolution in single 
unit studies, it may be that the network timing is even faster than can be detected with the 
current data analysis, so the net result is a recording of the integration of all signals in the 
BG network after they were initiated and shared. 




Putting it all together: A shared framework with specializations 
 
The results from this research project give answers to some questions in the field 
of basal ganglia research, while also opening new and exciting avenues of research about 
how an animal makes a decision. The first contribution this study makes to the field is the 
introduction of a unique behavioral task that has the ability to separate and identify 
specific aspects of decision-making- the Action, Goal, Cue, Outcome and the integration 
of these factors. Further research can be done probing various aspects of this internally-
driven behavioral task, both through behavioral studies, lesion studies and more 
electrophysiology studies. The reaction time differences seen in some of the individual 
rats open questions about how motivation may influence both reaction and movement 
times. Questions about movement times related to errors can also be studied behaviorally 
as well as with single unit recordings. Even studies testing learning can probe how a rat’s 
behavior and reaction times track with his choices as he learns the meaning of the 
different tones throughout training. Lesion studies should also be undertaken to fully 
understand each regions unique contribution to the different aspects of the task- in both 
performance and acquisition of the behavior. 
 Questions that were answered in this study relate to the specific contribution that 
individual neurons have within a region that participates in decision-making and reward-
related behavior. One question that is seemingly answered with lesion studies, but is not 
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as well understood in electrophysiology, is the contribution of the DMS and DLS to habit 
vs. goal-directed behavior.  On one hand, previous lesion work in rodents has 
demonstrated strong regional differences between the DMS and DLS in the acquisition 
and performance of instrumental behavior. On the other hand, single unit recordings 
attempting to discover the exact neural underpinnings of those differences have not 
replicated the clear distinctions seen in the lesion work. By directly comparing these two 
subregions in a novel behavioral task that used a more indirect measure of value- internal 
state- we can address the similarities and differences.  
Based on lesion studies, the DLS should be participating in this task in a habit like 
manner, since the rats were highly overtrained in the task, and therefore should show very 
little influence of internal state on the neural firing rates. It would also make sense to see 
more stimulus-response coding in the DLS, since it is proposed that this is how the DLS 
processes more habitual behavior. Additionally, connections between the DLS and motor 
cortices would indicate a greater involvement in the motor aspects of the task, compared 
to DMS and the nucleus accumbens. Since the DLS is thought to encode information in a 
model-free manner, there should be little influence of internal state, and potentially little 
to no encoding of the separate rewards, since that would mean that the information was 
being represented differently, based on the identity of the outcome. 
 In the DMS, lesion studies predict that the involvement of this region would be in 
encoding the action-outcome association. Models of the DMS using reinforcement 
literature theorize that the involvement of the DMS is in representing information in a 
model-based way, so the neural coding of the region would represent the identity or value 
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of the chosen reward. The hypothesis would be that the DMS was representing value 
while working for reward. 
 The results of this study both agree and disagree with these hypotheses. The first 
interesting result is that there was a surprising amount of overlap in the encoding profile 
seen between these two regions. That is, both areas of the DMS and DLS encode a great 
deal of information about the Direction of movement, the Goal the rat was working for, 
and the Outcome of whether or not the rat was correct. Of particular surprise was the fact 
that there was almost equal encoding of Action in both regions. 
 The main differences in encoding schemes between these two subregions offer 
some support to current theories on how information is processed in these neural 
networks. The Cue is the first instance where sub-regional differences show up. As 
predicted, the DLS encodes information about the Cue, or stimulus, while the DMS does 
not. This indicates that the DLS may be responding to the stimulus in a habitual, or 
stimulus-response like manner. Additionally, the DLS is not encoding this information 
with respect to value, since it is responding equally regardless of if the tone presented 
indicates a more or less preferred reward. This difference between DMS and DLS in 
encoding for the Cue is the first instance that shows different contributions to the overall 
encoding schemes in a decision-making task. 
 The second instance where sub-regional differences manifest is when the rat is 
performing the action. Both regions show nearly equal proportions of cells that 
differentiate between the contralateral and ipsilateral movements. The difference is in the 
nature of how that information is encoded. The DMS fires more on the contralateral 
trials, while the DLS fires equally for either direction. Despite the more direct connection 
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with the motor cortices projecting to the DLS, it appears that both regions fire for motor 
movement. The differences between the regions may be due to the specific connections 
and composition of each region. The DMS may have a more intricate connection with the 
precise motor movements of moving to the left or right, therefore activating more direct 
pathway neurons and showing a bias for the contralateral direction. On the other hand, 
the DLS may have a more broad, generalized encoding scheme and therefore does not 
activate differences between the direct and indirect pathway.  
 The third instance of sub-regional difference is seen as the rat moves to the final 
nose poke. In this instance, the DMS is encoding a combination of the contra/ipsi 
directional movement while also integrating information about the final goal port. The 
DLS is not integrating this information. This encoding is exactly what we hypothesized 
for the DMS, an action-outcome like association. In this case, the ‘outcome’ is actually 
the goal port the rat will then enter. Additionally, the DMS is encoding this information 
based on value, and is the first instance when value based on internal state actually 
manifests in this task. Finally, after the rat reaches the goal port and either did or did not 
receive a reward, there was another difference in encoding between the DMS and DLS. 
Both regions showed a difference in firing rate between correct and incorrect trials, but 
the DLS fired more for the correct reward, while the DMS fired more for the incorrect 
reward.  
 These sub-regional differences in a single unit study show that some ideas from 
lesion studies about the relative contributions to reward-based behavior in the DMS and 
DLS have distinct neural underpinnings. The DLS may respond specifically to a Cue in a 
more stimulus-response like manner, and not encode this information based on value. The 
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DMS does integrate action-outcome information, and does encode this information based 
on value, albeit by firing more for the non-preferred reward.  
Prior studies in the Accumbens have shown that the Core and Shell may integrate 
motor and reward information. Other theories show the NAC responding to cues that 
predict reward. More theories hypothesize a role for the NAc as a critic that informs an 
animal about his decision, rather than actually making that decision. This study directly 
compared both Core and Shell in a task that separated Action from Goal, and could 
specifically test the contribution of the NAc in direct comparison to other areas of the 
striatum.  
In this study, there was a great deal of overlap between the Core and Shell. First 
of all, both regions did show specific responses to the movement (contra vs. ipsi), but did 
not reach as high of proportions as the Dorsal Striatum and OFC. It was surprising to 
find, however, that at the time of movement, neither Core nor Shell integrated 
information about this movement with any other aspect of the task. Additionally, both 
regions showed a similar response to the Goal port as the rat entered to get a reward- both 
Core and Shell fired more for the water port. 
The one major difference between the two regions was the opposite of our 
hypothesis. The Shell responded more to the Cue than the Core. The only other major 
difference was the fact that the Core fired more for the previously incorrect trials, while 
the Shell did not show this same bias. Both regions maintained firing for the previous 
trial well into the next trial. 
 Another difference between the Core and the Shell shows up when examining 
how cells that encode information overlap between different events (Figures 15-24). The 
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Core has a great deal of overlap between cells that encode information between events 
(Figures 17 and 22). Specifically, there are very few cells that only encode action during 
movement. Most of the cells that respond to the two different directions also respond to 
either the outcome or the Goal. In contrast, the Shell, as well as both areas of Dorsal 
Striatum, have more cells that encode only the Action, with fewer cells overlapping 
between events (Figure 18). The Core is encoding information about the action in the 
same cells that go on to select the goal, or encode information about whether a reward 
was collected or not. The Shell and Dorsal Striatum seem to separate these aspects of 
information into separate cells at separate time points.  
 In all regions, including the OFC, the overwhelming majority of cells encode 
Goal, with far more cells that only encode this information, without overlap between 
Action, Outcome or Integration of that information. This is important information for 
future studies that are only testing one type of reward. It is apparent that a great deal of 
individual striatal cells encode specific information about identity, not value, or simply a 
general reward signal, but this signal is usually not tested for identity.  
The final contribution of this study is answering questions that relate to value vs. 
identity. Most single unit studies currently use only one form of reward when testing 
decision-making. Neural firing rates are then analyzed and assumptions are made about 
value, without always considering identity. Since this study used 2 different types of 
rewards that changed value based on internal state, it was a direct comparison of value vs. 
identity. The results show that all 5 brain regions most often encode identity.  




Breaking down the regions, each subregion has a unique profile that contributes to the 
overall decision-making network: 
Core: 
The Core’s highest contribution is encoding the Current Outcome after reward 
port in (Figure 13A and 17). The Core fires most for the incorrect reward, and continues 
to encode this information until the tone plays in the next trial. Within the Core, though, 
the highest proportion is Goal (Figure 17A). 
 
Shell: 
The Shell’s contribution is to have the highest encoding for the Water tone, 
relative to the other brain regions (Figure 9A and 9C). Within the Shell, the Goal reaches 
the highest encoding, and it does so for Water, on all testing days (Figures 8C and 12A 
and 12C). The Shell also encodes Reward history for the longest period of time, doing so 




The DMS has the highest action-goal cells, possibly as a role in action selection 
on non-preferred trials (Figure 11). The DMS also integrates information about non-





The DLS is the odd-ball out. When all other regions fire more on contralateral 
trials, the DLS does not have a bias (Figure 7C). All other regions fire more on the 
incorrect trials, while the DLS fires more on correct trials (Figure 13B). As far as 
proportions go, the DLS as a region fires most when integrating Cue + Goal + Outcome, 
and which is most likely specific motor movements for eating vs. drinking, by firing most 
on the correct trials, regardless of preference (Figure 13D and Figure 15). 
 
OFC: 
The OFC has the highest proportion of cells for both Action and Goal (Figure 7A, 
Figure 12A and Figure 19). It seems to contribute to everything, with only the Cue not 
showing significance. It also shows the most overlap between different events and 
different encoding factors, showing that individual cells change their encoding scheme 













Figure 25: Overall Encoding 
 
Each region of the Basal Ganglia and OFC has a specialized contribution to translating 


















In an overall scheme of encoding, the idea that the basal ganglia have integrative 
loops that possibly share information across regions is the best way to explain the current 
results. Lesion studies clearly show that when a region is inactivated, specific aspects of 
behavior are lost. In the current study, there were only a few instances of a region being 
the sole contributor to a specific aspect of behavior. Instead, the results show that all of 
the regions do actually encode information about nearly every aspect of the task, but the 
relative contribution of each region changes, depending on a specific aspect of behavior. 
The process of translating internal state to reward-guided decision-making is achieved 
through a network of shared information throughout integrated loops in the cortical-basal 
ganglia network. Each region is responsible for a main component of the decision-
making process, and then shares that information throughout the network. This 
information is highly distributed between individual cells within each region, since there 
are only a few cells that encode information for a lengthy period of time. Information 
processing happens through a distributed network of encoding- between cells, and 
between subregions- in order to decide to head to the cupboard, select the blue and white 
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